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REUSABLE ROCKET ENGINE OPERABILITY MODELING AND ANALYSIS 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The reusable launch vehicle (RLV) cooperative development program between NASA and the 
aerospace industry demands the design of cost-effective vehicles and associated propulsion systems. In 
tum, cost-effective propulsion systems demand minimal and low recurring costs for ground operations. 
Thus, the emphasis early on in this program should be effective operations modeling supported by the 
collection and use of applicable operations data from a comparable existing system. Such a model could 
support the necessary trades and design decisions toward a cost-effective propulsion system development 
program. These analyses would also augment the more traditional performance analyses in order to support 
a concurrent engineering design environment. l -4 
In this view, functional area analyses are conducted in many areas including operations, reliability, 
manufacturing, cost, and performance, as presented in figure 1. The design engineer is responsible to 
incorporate the input from these areas into the design where appropriate. The designer also has the 
responsibility to conduct within and between discipline design trades with support from the discipline 
experts. Design decisions without adequate information from one or more of these areas results in an 
incomplete decision with potential serious consequences for the hardware. Design support activities in 
each functional area are the same. Models are developed and data are collected to support the model 
analysis. These models and data are at an appropriate level of detail to match the objectives of the analysis. 
Metrics are used in order to quantify the output. This is an iterative approach that supports the design 
schedule with results updated from increasingly more detailed design information. 
Design 
Figure 1. Disciplines in design. 
Currently, in aerospace applications, there is a mismatch between the complexity of models (as 
supported by the data) within the various disciplines. For example, while good engine performance models 
with accurate metrics exist, the use of absolute metrics of reliability for rocket engine systems analysis is 
rarely supported. This is a result of the lack of good test data, lack of comparable aerospace systems, and a 
lack of comparative industrial systems relative to aerospace mechanical systems. Metrics also tend to be 
less credible for reliability. There is, as yet, not a comparable reliability metric that would allow one to 
measure and track reliability as the engine specific impulse (Isp) metric allows one to measure and track 
engine performance. Performance models such as an engine power balance model or a vehicle trajectory 
model tend to be of good detail, with a good pedigree, and the results well accepted by the aerospace 
community. The propulsion system designer has to be aware of these analysis fidelity disparities when it 
becomes necessary to base a design decision on an analysis. 
There is a need to develop models to obtain different objectives. Early in a launch vehicle development 
program, a top-level analysis serves the purpose of defining the problem and securing top-level metrics as 
to the feasibility and goals of the program. This "quick-look" model effort serves a purpose-it often 
defines the goals of the program in terms of performance, cost, and operability. It also is explicit about the 
need to do things differently in terms of achieving more stringent goals. A detailed bottom-up analysis is 
more appropriate to respond to the allocation based on an indepth study of the concepts. The "quick-look" 
model is appropriate if the project manager is the customer; the detailed analysis is directed more at the 
design engineer. Both are of value. The "quick-look" model also may serve the purpose of the allocated 
requirements model, the model to which comparisons are made to determine maturity of the design. It is 
inappropriate to use the data that supported the allocation of requirements to also support the detailed 
analysis. Although often done, this is inappropriate and could Jead to misleading results. 
The acquisition of good data is a traditional problem for the definition of baseline systems for 
aerospace launch vehicle operations analyses. For all models developed here, the Space Transportation 
System (STS) and the space shuttle main engine (SSME) are used as the source of historical reusable 
vehicle and engine systems operations experience. For the detailed model, the approach demands the 
identification of the requirements for SSME ground operations and the root source of the requirements. 
From this, a reusable engine model is developed that is based on the SSME operations model. This is done 
through incremental modification of the baseline operations model based on the proposed changes from 
the SSME to the reusable engine. The modifications of these processing activities are based on changes in 
hardware configuration and technology, processing technology improvements, and operations philosophy. 
The reusable engine system model is then traceable to past requirements and historical experience. This 
modeling approach supports credible operations modeling and analysis. In this paper, the baseline SSME 




The lack of historical data in support of aerospace launch vehicle operations analyses is acute. Data 
are either unavailable due to not being collected or not public, or are so highly aggregated as to mask 
needed detail at the process level. Top-level models generated by existing data were generally useful only 
for supporting programmatic goal discussions. Discrete event simulation models have often been models 
of choice.5- 7 
One approach to aerospace launch vehicle operations analyses is to compare with aircraft data. 
This information is generally more readily available and in the proper format with data collected from a 
maintainability point of view. Several papers have taken this approach.8,9 While this data supports good 
model development, the question of applicability of results is more of an issue. This is especially true of 
rocket and aircraft propulsion systems with major differences in configurations, environment, and operating 
philosophy. Specifically, these differences include operating environment; operating temperatures, pressures, 
and thrust; ability to idle, taxi, and loiter aircraft engines and vehicles; use of cryogenic fuels on rockets; 
large performance margins on aircraft; nonintrusive health management of aircraft propulsion systems; 
and, perhaps the major difference, a philosophy of use with aircraft that tolerates test and operational 
failures (and even loss of life). 
Ground operations analyses have also been conducted for aerospace launch vehicles based on 
available STS operations data. lO,ll Although the available data were found to be insufficient,12 existing 
databases can be augmented by other sources, such as the experience of launch site personnel. This study 
builds on this approach. The 55MB is regarded as the most directly applicable baseline for comparison 
with future and similar liquid oxygen (L02)lliquid hydrogen (LH2) rocket systems. Thus, for this effort, 
extensive data collection was undertaken for STS propulsion systems to augment the existing databases. A 
baseline set of propulsion systems ground operations databases has been developed with the goal of 
supporting detailed engineering analyses of process and manpower requirements for future propulsion 
system concepts. 
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3. OPERABILITY ASSESSMENT METHODOLOGY 
A. Approach 
The operability assessment methodology described in this document reflects an end-to-end process 
flow model that models the uncertainties inherent in the attributes of the process flows. This approach 
attempts to substitute a rigorous and objective structure for more qualitative types of judgments and to 
focus design experiences to help determine areas of design confidence. It is to be used upfront in the design 
process and combines past flight vehicle experiences with design analysis to determine cost and schedule 
parameters of interest. It can be used in the analysis of any process flow where the goal is to optimize 
processing in order to minimize cost and schedule impacts. 
The continuum of process flow activities includes development through manufacturing, assembly, 
and operations. For this modeling effort, the emphasis will be on the operational phase only. Figure 2 
presents the flows of the operational phase of a launch vehicle, a subset of which will be the focus of this 
analysis. 
4 
Vendor and Part 
Obsolescence 
Figure 2. Launch vehicle process flow-operational phase. 
The process flow model avoids estimates of cost and schedule parameters based upon nonspecific 
design characteristics such as weight and the use of integration "scale factors." In this modeling effort, cost 
and schedule indicators will be based upon realistic, high-fidelity process flows targeted against the current 
design configuration. 
This approach incorporates past vehicle development experiences in terms of experience databases. 
These are critical parts of this methodology and are explicitly included in the approach. Since it is often 
difficult to obtain historical data to support these design decisions, a significant effort was undertaken to 
identify, incorporate, and appropriately structure this information for use with the process flow model. 
Figure 3 presents the input flowing to the proposed process flows of a new launch vehicle. The new 
vehicle requirements and design configuration contribute in the definition of flows as does information 
gathered relative to historical launch vehicle flows. Data and requirements that are applicable from past 
launch and flight vehicles, including aircraft, expendable launch vehicles (ELV's), and the STS, may be 
used to generate or edit proposed flows and will be the main source of what is required (attributes) by these 
process flows in terms of manpower and schedule. The design and proposed flows will be continually 
updated, thus the approach is iterative. Also, historical data will be useful in providing insight into the 
traditional problems associated with the proposed process flow. Finally, new systems may require certain 
technology or special analyses to determine the operability of the system. This is also input to the process 
flow definition process. All of this information is, of course, subject to adaptation and interpretation by the 
design, manufacturing, and operations engineers. These groups and others must be involved at the outset in 
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Figure 3. Operability assessment methodology. 
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The lessons learned on other vehicles implicitly affects current design engineering efforts and also 
serves to organize the search for applicable historical data. For example, the problems of past hydraulic 
systems on flight vehicles may cause the design engineer to attempt to include an electromechanical actuator 
(EMA) subsystem into the current design. Also, this "lesson learned" can serve to organize the identification 
of historical process flows, requirements, and experiences. Organized appropriately, historic processes 
associated with hydraulics can be easily pulled from the database, thus facilitating the analysis of this 
problem area by an appropriate design engineering team. This step of the methodology involves more of a 
qualitative assessment than a quantitative one. However, there is a structure surrounding the use of "lessons 
learned" that reflects the need to evolve and iterate this process with the "lesson learned" information. 
Once the process flows and associated attributes have been defined, the modeling of the flows to 
generate quantifiable performance measures can be supported. The probabilistic nature of the system is 
clear due to the uncertain environment. Sensitivity studies, design change studies, and operability assessment 
studies are all supported. . 
A top-down approach is utilized in identifying and tracing process flows. At the outset, this 
hierarchical method is useful in identifying major cost and schedule drivers and assists in the allocation of 
scarce resources in the further analysis of the lower-level process flows. The danger of low-level analyses 
is the danger of misallocation of scarce resources to analyses that are not clearly important cost or schedule 
drivers. A top-down approach creates traceability of functional flows at each level in the hierarchy. It also 
serves to document and allocate the top-level program requirements. Its usefulness is limited to a "quick-
look" analysis and for comparison purposes with the detailed analyses. 
This methodology is designed to incorporate results from bottom-up analyses. Systematic evaluations 
of low-level process flows in terms of cost and schedule attributes will feed a detailed modeling activity. 
Once both models exist and comparisons are supported, both goals and actual timelines are subject to 
change: the top-down apportionment can be reallocated or changed; and the bottom-up reanalyzed and 
adapted to design changes resulting from changes incorporated into the design influenced by this modeling 
activity. Given this approach, the initial emphasis of this effort will be on supporting relative comparisons 
among design changes. Upon completion of an appropriate level of detail, accurate estimates can be 
generated. 
Figure 4 provides an overview of this two-pronged approach. First, a goal timeline is created from 
a future launch vehicle operations concept. Making this goal reflect an actual design is desirable if such a 
design exists . However, these are goals, and as such, are meant as comparison points for a bottom-up 
engineering analysis of a historical baseline system. The second prong is this bottom-up effort, which 
provides an experience base and supports traceability to design, technology, and process improvements for 
the future launch vehicle propulsion system. This bottom-up effort is the focus of this paper. A previous 
paper13 presented the goal-oriented approach, with both scheduled and unscheduled processing included in 
the goal flows. By nature, this approach is iterative. Comparing the historical estimates against the goals 
provides an identification of key differences . Design decisions will seek to lessen these differences-
larger differences seeking the most design effort in an appropriate design manpower allocation process. 
The design will change and so also will the goals. Unrealistic goals and requirements will be identified and 
adjusted. Trades between performance and operations or cost and operations will be key for the overall risk 
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Figure 4. Design-to-operations analysis approach. 
• ID of Drivers 
• Special Studies 
• Alternatives 
• Ops Modeling 
- Sensitivities 
- Critical Path 
data.14 Yet another paper points out the need to begin with experience-based requirements for this type of 
bottom-up analysis. IS 
Performance requirements as defined in requirements documents are allocated to a lower level and 
serve as goals for the system designer. One of the purposes of this effort is for the quantification of operability 
measures to support the comparison of the design against the requirement. Thus, this methodology serves 
to verify the relationship between design decisions and the fulfillment of design objectives. Furthermore, 
an appropriate quantification can serve to support the analysis of the current design suitability against a 
previous design. In this sense, both absolute and relative measures of merit are generated in this modeling 
approach. However, before a fully detailed model supporting the generation of absolute measures can be 
generated, a top-down flow can support the relative model comparison of critical use to the designer. A 
designer involved in a specific area of design can "stub" in the other parts along with their schedule and 
cost estimates and work in detail in their appropriate design area. 
B. Key Concepts and Detlnitions 
Establishing good measurable metrics is key to any functional area analysis methodology. Following 
is a discussion of key operability definitions and metrics. 
Operability-the ability to support required flight rates and schedules and to meet a variety of 
operational characteristics while minimizing cost and risk. In this definition, operability is not directly 
7 
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measurable. Common metricsfor operability include availability, turnaround time, and dependability. The 
definition of operability touches upon several key ideas including those of minimizing cost and risk. Risk 
may be defined as an expression of the likelihood and consequence of an event of interest. Risk involves an 
attempt to understand the uncertainty in and between the functional areas of the design. This emphasizes 
the need to model an end-to-end system. 
Dependability-probability of achieving a given launch without sliding the schedule on the next 
launch, given that the system is not in postfailure standdown; if hardware, the ability for the hardware to 
perform as needed when needed. Often defined in terms of probability of launching within x days of the 
originally scheduled launch date. 
Availability-fraction of time the system is operational rather than in standdown or delay; the 
probability that a piece of equipment will be capable of performing its mission when needed rather than 
being unserviceable due to failure, delays, or intentionally or unintentionally removed from service for 
maintenance or testing; is useful as metric for both hardware and processes; inherent is mean time between 
failure (MTBF)/(MTBF + mean time to repair (MTTR)); operational is mean time between maintenance 
(MTBM)/(MTBM + mean down-time (MDT)); also, scheduled time/(scheduled + unscheduled time). This 
latter definition is more aerospace-oriented given its acknowledgment of few vehicles that require extensive 
processing due to leading-edge technologies and cryogenic fuel operations. The traditional definition of 
availability is directed more at the military and commercial aircraft operations where there are large fleets 
of vehicles and preflight operations are relatively minimal. The process definition of availability is more 
suitable for this discussion and will be referred to throughout this analysis. Also, in this definition, a system 
is penalized only for unscheduled maintenance activities that occur on the critical path. 
Turnaround Time-a measure of maintenance having to do with time from last recovery to next 
launch. 
Reliability-probability of successfully concluding a mission segment; probability that an item 
will perform a required function under stated conditions for a stated period of time. Though metrics for 
reliability are not often included in operations analyses, reliability of the components and systems plays a 
critical role in determining the operability of the system. The operability study in this paper will include 
engine reliability measures. 
c. Modeling and Uncertainty 
The goal of any modeling activity is to accomplish accurate quantification in as realistic an 
environment as possible. This involves the need for quantifying in the presence of uncertainty. Thus, the 
model should ultimately be reflective of a probabilistic approach. Uncertainty is not only reflected in the 
accuracy of the information that exists but also in the availability of information that may lead to an 
inability to effectively model the system. These are both important pieces of information-manpower can 
be allocated to obtain the data or to complete the analysis that is required to lessen the uncertainty. The 
analyses cannot entirely eliminate the uncertainty associated with a process flow but are intended more to 
understand the extent of the uncertainty. Indeed, if no uncertainty exists in a design, no decisions are 
necessary. 
8 
There are several sources of uncertainty inherent to a process flow, including variation of nominal 
processing; that is, a process scheduled for 5 hr may actually take 4 hr one time and 6 hr the next. This can 
be modeled through the selection of an appropriate process time distribution supported by empirical evidence. 
Other realistic scenarios that will affect the schedule and cost include process failures, equipment failures, 
and associated unscheduled maintenance activities. Also, delays due to repair times, queuing delays, and 
waiting for resources can affect the planned schedule. The weather is a major source of delay at time of 
launch. 
D. Process Flow Definition 
The types of documents and databases used to generate the process flow for this analysis may be 
identified. In the case of the world's only RL V, the space shuttle, the documents that describe the requirements 
and the implementation of the requirements are the Operations and Maintenance Requirements and 
Specification Documents (OMRSD) and the Operations and Maintenance Instructions (aMI), respectively. 
Applicable process requirements and flows have been obtained from these sources for the specification of 
new vehicle operations process flows. 
Some attributes of the proposed flows can be obtained from the electronic database system in use 
by the STS program. The STS Computer-Aided Planning and Scheduling System (CAPSS)16 contains the 
nominal schedule and manpower requirements while the Problem Reporting and Corrective Action 
(PRACA)17 supplies the information on the problems and off-nominal flows that occur throughout STS 
processing. Other commercial launch vehicle data such as Titan, Atlas, and Delta operations requirements 
documents and operations experience databases, if available, can also support this type of analysis. Data 
requirements include both nominal and off-nominal process times and resource requirements. Mean time 
to repair along with incidence of repair are typical performance measures derived from such databases. 
As stated earlier, the data that supports the allocation process and the data that supports the detailed 
design evaluation should come from separate sources. In aerospace analyses, this is often not the case, 
primarily due to the lack of good data. While rough parametrics from one detailed source may feed the 
allocation process that uses several sources, this kind of analysis should be discouraged. At best, this kind 
of analysis is redundant and provides little confidence that the conclusions reached are correct. It could 
lead to inaccurate and misleading conclusions, resulting in a misallocation of design resources. 
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4. MODELING TOOLS 
Several good off-the-shelf software packages fit the need to support operations model development. 
A process flow model is the model of choice: it allows the analysis of timelines, schedule dependencies, 
resource requirements, and supports the generation of measures of operability including recurring costs, 
availability, and dependability. The models used here utilize Microsoft® (MS) Project18 for deterministic 
flow analysis and Imagine That!® Extend™ software 19 for probabilistic support. The benefit of MS ProjectTM 
as a process modeling tool is its ability to graphically represent detailed tasks in Gantt charts, allocate and 
track resource levels, and filter project information. Inputs to the model include the task description, resource 
allocation, task duration, and establishment of task precedence. MS Project™ is generally all that is required 
to do the "quick-look" analysis-layout top-level requirements and allocations to subsystems and 
components. Charts, tables, or reports can be customized to output the level of detail desired by the user. 
Extend™ allows us to apply the model in a discrete-event simulation format. It supports ease-of-input 
(icon-based), provides good report-generation capabilities, is well supported and tailorable with source 
code available, and provides animation capabilities useful for display and debugging purposes. 
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5. BASELINE ENGINE OPERATIONS DATA 
A. Data Collection 
The data collection process was a considerable part of this activity. This section will discuss this 
process and the data in some detail. Data were collected from a task-by-task point of view: what is required 
to complete only this task. Often times data are collected from a time-reporting point of view, making it 
difficult to determine actual task time. Appendices are provided to this document that will contain the data 
collected. An overview of the SSME data collection in support of the operations modeling approach is 
shown in figure 5. The analysis consisted of three parts: deterministic model of allocated processing, 
deterministic model of unscheduled processing, and the probabilistic model. This section discusses the 
baseline SSME model in 'the context of the deterministic modeling approach (both scheduled and 
unscheduled) and the baseline requirements database that is the foundation for all SSME processing activities. 
A complete presentation of the SSME operations database resides in appendices A (requirements), 
B (scheduled), C (unscheduled), and D (results). 
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Figure 5. Operations modeling and data collection process. 
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B. Scheduled Processing 
The fIrst step was to defIne the nominal 55MB processing flow. This was accomplished with 
flowcharts that identified the OMI-level processes and the location/facility in which the process was 
perfonned. SSME component life limit issues dictate that engine removal be scheduled each processing 
flow to allow the 55MB's to be processed offline in the orbiter main engine facility (OMEF). Thus, in 
addition to the every flight requirements defmed by OMRSD, nominal processing, for the purposes of the 
model, included SSME removal in the orbiter processing facility (OPF); SSME processing off-line in the 
OMEF; high-pressure turbopump removal and installation in the OMEF; and SSME installation in the 
OPF. 
Data collected relative to SSME processing is presented in figures 6-9. Figure 6 identifIes the 
OMI's and the serial and parallel nature of the process flow for the events that occur immediately after 
flight in the OPF. The engines are then moved to the OMEF. Figure 7 presents the processes and flow for 
this facility. Mter processing in the OMEF, the engines are returned to the OPF to be reinstalled on the 
vehicle. This process is shown in fIgure 8. Mter installation, the engine processing steps that occur during 
the vehicle assembly building (VAB) and pad operations are defIned (see fIg. 9). The detailed SSME 
scheduled data that matches the OMI's in fIgures 6-9 appears in appendix B. These data are quite extensive, 
breaking out process flow dependencies, clock hour, and manpower requirements by type for each engine 
process. It should be noted that not all engine processing is fully represented here. Some routine and 
periodic actions associated with minor OMI's, job cards, or deviation approval requests (DAR's) were 
excluded in order to present a system that can be represented in a model as an operational system. It is 
arguable as to whether or not the Shuttle system is a fully operational system. There are too many things 
that are done that are not necessarily repeatable from a modeling point of view. For example, the exact 
order of engine processing in the OMEF is subject to visibility, manpower available, and priorities in place 
at the time of repair, making this aspect difficult to model. 
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Figure 9. SSME VAB/pad processing operations. 
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The data that were collected were laid out into Gantt charts and task sheets to a lowest level of 
detail. Technician, quality control, and engineering resources were identified for each detailed task and the 
task duration was quantified based upon National Aeronautics and Space Administration's (NASA's) SSME 
engineering experience at Kennedy Space Center (KSC). Figure 10 exemplifies the level of detail outlined 
in each deterministic process; in this case, the high-pressure fuel turbopump (HPFTP) removal and 
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Figure 10. Example of detailed model-HPFTP removal and replace. 
Although serial and parallel relationships were established between the detailed tasks and OMI 
processes within the Gantt charts, it is difficult to accurately predict overall OMI durations or end-to-end 
vehicle or 55MB subsystem processing times. Reasons for this include: 
1. Lack of all downtime data including logistic delay time, administrative delay time, 
and maintenance delays downtime. 
2. Interdependence between 55MB and other subsystems was not modeled. 
3. Other vehicle subsystems not modeled. 
While accurate predictions of 55MB processing are not always possible with this data, it is appropriate 
for future launch vehicle engine analysis since these kinds of attributes need not be modeled. Of interest for 
a future system analysis is the definition of an operational system. It is not desirable to model all the 
artifacts of the STS processing system as appropriate to the new system. While downtimes will occur for a 
future system as well, it is premature, without detail, to model those. Of course, a complete vehicle model 
should represent the engine-vehicle interface and other subsystem operations fully. 
The baseline 55MB model will provide insight into the actual workload, required subtasks, and the 
overall processing flow. This actual manhour prediction method differs from top-down manhour estimates 
in that manhours of downtime are not accounted for. The utility of determining manhours in this fashion is 
that labor-intensive processing activities are readily identified whereas the actual impact of each processing 
activity can be masked by downtimes in the top-down approach. 
C. Unscheduled Processing 
An analysis of 55MB unscheduled maintenance operations was performed using the PRACA 
database. Unscheduled maintenance information from the PRACA database was obtained for 30 STS flights 
between 1989 and 1994. During this period there were 3,785 problem reports (PR's) that were processed. 
This is engine PR's only, thus, ground support equipment (GSE), facility, and spares PR's relative to the 
engine were not included. The PR's were sorted and grouped by component, malfunction, and disposition 
code. This allowed the fIltering of this database into 123 PR classes representing 84 SSME processing 
flows. PR's were further classified into six types based upon processing action taken. The six types, the 
123 classes, and the number of applicable PR's are presented in table 1. 
Table 1. 55MB PR classification summary. 
PP Classification Type Number of Classes Number of PR's 
Remove and Replace 70 795 
MR Repair 13 79 
Repair 19 1,121 
MR Accept 6 156 
Accept 7 137 
Waiver/Exception 8 82 
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This filtering processed 2,370 PR's. PR's that were eliminated from the database during this 
classification and filtering process included PR's from incomplete processing flows and PR records with 
insufficient data to allow it to be classified. 
Each PR will fall into one of the six classification types. These types were categorized based upon 
the disposition code in the PRACA database and limited to the detail provided therein. These represent the 
most common actions required for each PR at the lowest level of detail possible. Each classification type 
was outlined to identify the basic tasks and resources associated with setup, performance, diagnostics, 
administration, review, and delay times. Figure 11 presents an MS Project™ view of the base remove and 
replace (R&R) classification type. In addition, an initial attempt at quantifying the resources required was 
conducted. Note that these are initial estimates until more accurate data can be made available and collected. 
The actual "hands-on" R&R time is represented by a milestone on line 4. This would be replaced in the 
model by the actual component R&R timeline. 
The classes identify the number of different PR's that fall into each PR type. These are usually 
associated with components or hardware. In the case of an R&R PR type, the 70 different classes are 
mostly associated with different hardware or components that require R&R. However, this is not necessarily 
the case for the other PR types. For example, a large number ofPR's were generated due to contamination 
and corrosion on unidentified hardware. Because the detail in the database did not allow us to associate the 
corrosion problems with the hardware or component, the contamination and corrosion PR's were separated 
into five different PR classification types based upon the nature of the disposition (repair, material review 
(MR) repair, accept, MR accept, or waiver/exception). The five other PR classifications as well as the 
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Figure 11. 55MB base R&R. 
This PRACA database is limited in that it does not provide resource or task duration information 
for unscheduled corrective actions. However, ~RACA does provide data to determine the frequencies of 
PR's as well as information to determine what malfunctioned and how the PR was dispositioned. Corrective 
action processes, including task descriptions, durations, and resource assignments, were defined and 
quantified by 55MB engineering in the same manner as the scheduled processes for each PR classification. 
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A few low-level processes were set to a standard time for simplicity sake; For example, QC response time 
was set to one standard value, when in actuality, this value is more dynamic. The unscheduled data as it 
applies to the six PR classifications appears in appendix C and a summary of the results from the data 
(relative to SSME) in appendix D. 
D. Baseline Requirements Database 
Figure 12 describes how the data collected are being applied to the reusable engine analysis. The 
applicable requirements identified by the STS OMRSD's are mapped to major corresponding STS OMI's 
(see appendix A). An iterative review process identifies, task by task, the appropriate processing for the 
future engine operations. Future reusable engine-specific operations are added; SSME operations artifacts 
are removed; changes to processing facilities and support equipment is identified; and any dependency, 
timeline, or resource requirements are also specified. This leads to a traceable proposed operations flow 
prediction and re~ource esti,mate. Table 2 displays a sample of the OMRSDIOMI database with comments 
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Figure 12. Requirements to process definition. 
Predict Future Engine Operations 
Requirements, Processes, and 
Resource Requirements 
Table 2. OMRSD/OMI database with requirements rationale. 
OMRSO New OMRSO OescrlpUon OPFOMl's Engine Shop aMI's VABjPAD aMI's OMRSO Ratlonale/Rool Causes 
Number Engine (V41 File III Dated 9/15/95) 
Usa 
V41BLO.050 n SSME Weld 22 & 24 Lk Ck V'0".0S Seq 07 VI294.007 Seq 04 VI 046.003 Seq 07 Due to poor proceSSing, HPOTP balanca cavity 
standoff welds are leak checked - No leaks ever 
verified, but lack of weld penetration up to 90% 
has been found on these welds. StandOffs have 
been suspected of leaking and caused retum to 
Canoga. 
V41BLO.060-A n El HPOTP Plug Weld Lk Ck V'0".0S Seq 09 V1294.004 Seq 04 VI 046.004 Seq 04 Plug weld leak occurred on a unit - Concem over 
these welds leaking either GoxlHelium/Hot gas 
into boat tall-therefore all extemal plug welds on 
the housing are cheeked 
V41AXO.020-A y El L02 Feed (Joint 01) Iff Lk Ck V'0".05 Seq 07 VI 046.003 Seq 05 Ensure joint integrity of LPOTP to pump Inlet ducting after engine is installed 
V41AXO.020-B y El LH2 Feed (Joint Fl) Iff Lk Ck Vl01'.05 Seq 05 VI 046.002 Seq 04 Verify pump inlet jOint Integrlfy after Installing the 
LPFTP 
V41AXO.020-C Y El GH2 Press (Joint F9.S) Iff LK CK VI 011.05 Seq 09 V1046.004 Seq 04 Joint Integrity Post Engine Installation 
V41BLO.033 y SSME Encapsulation Oxld Sys ISO Test VI 294.007 Seq 04 System leak integrity check for launch - Mat I or 
WBln Thru-Crack: Seal not Sealen - > Crit 1 
V41BLO.034 Y SSME Encapsulation Hot Gas Sys ISO VI 294.007 Seq 04 System leak Integrity check for launch - Mat I or 
Test Weld Thru-Crack: Seal not Sealed - > Crlt I 
V41 BPO.OID-A n EI GOiGCV Ex! Lk Ck & Orifice 
Veri! 
VI 011.04 Seq 07 VI 294.002 Seq 17 VI 046.005 Seq 05 Establishes leak test of all gaseous oxygen system 
Joints from the AFV to the orbiter interface on an 
aach flight basis 
V41AQO.OIO-A y EI Sensor Checkout VI 011.06 Seq 02 V1294.002 Seq 06 VI046.001 Seq 04 Planned Preflight Checkout 
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From table 2, development or definition of an reusable engine operations concept is traced to the 
55MB experience. This database was developed to link propulsion system concepts and technology 
candidates to the 55MB operations experience. The backbone of the 55MB experience is the OMRSD 
database. Deterministic model data are linked to the OMRSD database for each requirement. Additionally, 
root causes andlor OMRSD rationales are provided that allow for rapid determination of those OMRSD's 
affected by technology improvements or hardware configuration changes. From table 2, first row, a 
requirement was established for SSME weld and leak checks on the high-pressure oxidizer turbopump 
(HPOTP). The root cause of this requirement is a concern for weld integrity. The OMRSD number, three 
applicable OMI's, and an applicability column for the new launch vehicle engine are provided. It is interesting 
to note that this requirement was generated well after the design of the 55MB and its processing when 
potential problems with welds were identified. This specification of postdesign requirements is likely to 





6. MODEL DEVELOPMENT AND RESULTS 
The scope of the analysis for this document is a future launch vehicle ground operations analysis 
that includes shuttle-based uncertainties associated with scheduled and unscheduled maintenance. The 
emphasis is on propulsion systems and the specific topic is the engine which will be modeled in order to be 
responsive to the vehicle requirements. Of course, the engine processing is only one part of the overall 
vehicle processing. Interactions of the engine processing and other subsystems must be taken into account 
to get a proper estimate of vehicle and even engine flows. The results of this analysis reflect the impact of 
unscheduled processing on turnaround time in a deterministic model and on launch availability and 
dependability in a probabilistic model. The attributes of the maintenance activities will be limited to those 
supported by analysis of the STS PRACA, CAPSS, and Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC) Propulsion 
Laboratory operations databases. 
Given ground rules and assumptions, key processes were laid out for a fully reusable future launch 
vehicle engine concept. To avoid proprietary data considerations and to simplify the presentation, a rough-
cut engine design is assumed for this analysis. It is essentially SSME-like;20 a pump-fed LO:VLH2 high-
thrust engine with pneumatic and EMA valve control (no hydraulics) and health monitoring capabilities. 
The proposed launch vehicle uses three such engines with engine processing conducted in parallel. From 
this, a logic model associated with the flow of ground processing is developed. A 40-hr, goal-oriented 
engine ground flow serves as a baseline to the defined flows. Effectively, this 40-hr timeline was provided 
as a requirement (baseline allocation) for this model activity. Figure 13 shows the engine flows and the 
success-oriented timelines by processing facility. Three facilities were assumed after landing-a single 
processing facility with five bays and two launch pads. From figure 13, engine ground operations processes 
include drying; access; visual inspections; leak checks; and closeout on each engine in the processing 
facility and purge; flight readiness test; and launch preparation on the engine set on the pad. An unscheduled 
maintenance timeline is supported in parallel with the scheduled timeline. Key assumptions and ground 
rules to this development were 30 flights per year, a five-vehicle fleet, and 7 -day missions. Others included 
minimal and automated operations, separate payload processing, depot maintenance every 20 missions, 
and automated health monitoring. Manpower assumptions included two shifts per day, 5 days per week for 






























Figure 13. Engine operations processing. 
















An MS ProjectTM model was developed to reflect the processing requirements (top-level and 
allocated) of the engine system. From the flows defined in figure 13, processing timelines and resources 
required were input into the MS ProjectTM scheduler. The tasks were defined to three levels as subprojects. 
Figure 14 presents the top level to the level of detail at one of the lowest level processes defined here-that 
of the engine drying operation. Total duration and manpower requirements in the subprocesses of figure 14 
can be rolled up to the top level in a very direct fashion. This is the allocated appropriate times and 
requirements for those systems within the constraint of the overall requirement, which was provided as a 
top-level requirement; in this case, 40-hr total for the engine. Thus, the times and resources reflect a relative 
allocation to the subsystems: it remains to be seen, for example, whether or not a gaseous oxygen (gox) 
system leak check will take the 1 hr allocated, but the 1 hr allocated to this system is consistent with the 
time allocated for the fuel system leak checks (l hr). Again, this model serves as the goal-oriented model 
useful for allocation and comparison with the detailed engineering estimates. In the approach identified in 
figure 4, this is the top half-the goal-oriented model. 
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Figure 14. Hierarchical engine model. 
This type of modeling often predominates, especially early in design. With an emphasis on new 
ways of doing business, this goal-oriented modeling is often the only type of modeling undertaken on a 
program. There are several reasons for this. It can be time consuming and resource intensive to conduct a 
bottom-up analysis and difficult to present an unpopular result. The weakness of the goal-oriented modeling 
should be apparent. It often has no basis in reality. One example of how misleading goal-oriented modeling 
can be was that for the STS program. Early modeling predicted up to 60 flights per year with a 2-wk 
turnaround time,21 very different from current shuttle capabilities. 
Sensitivity studies of the MS ProjectTM model and even simple "back of the envelope" analysis can 
shed some light on the sensitivity of this system. For example, increasing scheduled uncertainty to 
50 percent increases total duration, for what is essentially a serial flow, a proportional percentage-from 
40- to 60-hr duration with personnel manhours increasing from 319 to 478.5. Concerns with meeting 
availability and dependability requirements increase also. However, even a 50-percent increase in scheduled 
processing may not be a serious impact. Adjustments in scheduled timelines or built-in holds can be included 
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to deal with this. Even if dependability is defined as launch within 2 days of scheduled launch, such 
variation is manageable-an extra 20-br duration is still within 2 days, if there are multiple shifts per day. 
Much more significant is the variation in unscheduled processing. In the baseline case, the 
unscheduled processing is designed to be in parallel to scheduled processing. Even this can tolerate some 
additional unscheduled processing before impacting overall flow. However, this assumes sufficient manpower 
to handle problems in parallel and that problems will occur in parallel. Such an assumption is not credible. 
For example, if four to six engineers are allocated to handle processing, the extra unscheduled activities 
cannot be conducted entirely in parallel without a schedule slip-there simply is not enough manpower. 
Also, if problems occur late in launch to critical path operations, there is a serial effect-problems must be 
resolved before any more normal launch processing can be supported. Built-in holds can also mitigate the 
problem of unscheduled processes, especially early in the flow. Late processes, such as pad processes, 
must attempt to minimize all unscheduled activity. 
In this deterministic model, the unscheduled maintenance activities were added to reflect these 
issues. A notion of unscheduled maintenance considerations should be incorporated into the requirements 
allocation for accuracy sake. Table 3 lays out the 55MB-based experience and the impact per OMI for this 
analysis. For example, from the historical 55MB record, twice as much time is spent on unscheduled 
maintenance during the visual inspection OMI (VI 011.02) than for scheduled maintenance. Table 4 presents 
the results of this analysis including a run with the unscheduled maintenance data. The first column of the 
table presents the baseline results-both clock hours and personnel manhour requirements. The second 
column adds in unscheduled timelines based on STS SSME experience. If the unscheduled activities are 
assumed to be done in parallel, the overall impact to the timeline is small. That which is not on the critical 
path has little impact, while adding unscheduled maintenance activities to critical path operations is realistic 
and has a significant impact. The impact to the overall dependability and availability metrics can also be 
considerable as will be seen in the next section. Keep in mind that many of the 55MB OMI's have already 
been excluded and that the baseline processing time is allocated. The result in table 4 is more of interest in 
a relative sense-the duration and manhour requirements practically doubled with experience-based 
unscheduled maintenance included in the analysis (from 40- to 70-hr duration, 348 to 615.6 man-hour 
total). Further and more detailed analysis is clearly necessary. 
Table 3. 55MB unscheduled maintenance experience. 
% Additional 
Task Unscheduled 
Description OMI Number Processing* 
Envir. Cover Install S0028 10 
Engine Drying V1011.01 10 
Assess to Engine V5058/v5057/V5087 10 
Visual Inspections V1011.02 200 
Leak Checks V1294.xx 100 
Closeout S1287N5057 50 
Purge Sequences V9018.001 10 
Flight Readiness Test V1046/v5057/V9002 75 
Launch Prep & Start SOO07 10 
*.Per SSME Experience,1989-1994 
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Table 4. Goal-oriented engine operations timelines. 
40-Hr Baseline With 
40-Hr Goal-Oriented Unscheduled Maint. 
Baseline Included (SSME-Based)* 
Task Name Duration, hr Man-hr Duration, hr Man-hr 
Processing Assessment 40 348 70 615.6 
• Landing Operations 2 6 2.2 6.6 
• Processing Facility Operations 30 310 59 573.8 
- Engine Drying 3 20 3.3 22 
- Engine Access 2 8 2.2 8.8 
-Inspections 8 32 24 96 
- Leak Checks 8 32 16 64 
- HM Monitor [20] 40 [22] 44 
- Unscheduled Allocation [24] 144 [48] 288 
- Closeout 9 34 13.5 51 
• Pad Operations 8 32 8.8 35.2 
* 1989-1994 
[ 1 Not on critical path 
This concludes the discussion of the goal-oriented model and analysis results. Turnaround time and 
resource requirements have served as primary metrics to this point. Operability metrics such as' availability 
and dependability are more appropriate to a detailed probabilistic model. The probabilistic model and its 
results are the topics of the next section. 
B. Probabilistic Model 
1. Overview 
The following analysis serves to illustrate the probabilistic approach-modeling to include uncertainty 
in the analysis. As in the earlier deterministic analysis, the scope of this analysis is a future engine operations 
analysis that includes uncertainties associated with unscheduled and scheduled maintenance. Consistent 
with the overall process, requirements were generated from the STS requirements list applicable to this new 
engine system. Engine design data were assumed for this application and use no proprietary information. 
Identical to the engine used for the deterministic model analysis, the future engine system is a pump-fed 
LH2IL02 system with EMA and pneumatic valve actuation (no hydraulics), and active health monitoring. A 
three-engine vehicle is also assumed for this analysis. The emphasis is on the engine processing, with the 
vehicle operations requirements allocated out to the engine level. The interest here is on the impact of 
engine scheduled and unscheduled processing on engine dependability and availability. The data used as 
baseline for this analysis are those of the shuttle engine system. 
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2. Operations Concept 
Given ground rules and assumptions, key processes were laid out for a fully reusable future launch 
vehicle concept. These are the same as those laid out for the deterministic model of the previous section 
with detail of depot maintenance now included. A logic model associated with the flow of ground processing 
was developed and figure 13 shows these engine flows by processing facility. The assumptions and ground 
rules are the same as in the deterministic case except for the following. Depot maintenance consists of 
engine removal and replacement, more detailed tests and checkout, and generally takes 30 days. Automated 
health monitoring is assumed, although this would only affect diagnostic and isolation time for unscheduled 
activities. Three vehicles may be on orbit at one time and two vehicles can be in depot maintenance at one 
time. The resources have been designed for minimal bottlenecks. This includes manpower, which is assumed 
available when and where needed, given shifting constraints. The block flows reflect periodic and depot 
maintenance operations that utilize parallelism and adequate manpower. For example, the engine processing 
for the three-engine vehicle is done in parallel. This provides a much shorter process clock time; however, 
manpower must be calculated accordingly. Typical engine operations include engine drying, inspection, 
and leak checks for the routine turnaround operations and engine removal and replacement for the depot 
maintenance operations. This discrete-event logic flow will be represented in a simulation model to be 
developed as part of this analysis. This flow will be modeled over a 20-yr lifetime. Results will be presented 
from a set of Monte Carlo runs. 
3. Model Development 
A computer program that supports discrete-event simulation on a personal computer was used for 
this analysis. This package, Extend™, allows icon-based time and event modeling. The package is available 
commercially and provides ease of use in building models and in specifying output parameters. It supports 
probabilistic modeling and hierarchical levels of detail for complex systems. 
The logic of the operations processes timelines was incorporated into the Extend™ modeling language 
and runs were made to analyze the parameters of interest. All simulations for this analysis were performed 
on a PowerMac 7600. This operations model was developed fully from Extend™ library building blocks. 
Figure 15 presents the top level of the ground operations modeled. The model is reflected in a hierarchy, 
the lowest level of detail for the processing facility, as presented earlier in figure 13. From figure 15, the 
processing facility with five bays (three for nominal, two for depot); the two pads; the runway; and vehicle 
tows are evident. The five vehicles come in as scheduled in the new vehicle block to the appropriate routine 
processing in the upper three bays or the depot processing in the lower two bays. 
This probabilistic detailed model serves as an experience-based model outlined in the approach of 
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Figure 15. Extend reusable engine operations model. 
4. Data and Metrics for Analysis 
For this analysis, the data as described in section 5 were used for model data support. As stated 
earlier, this database keeps track of the ground operations unscheduled and scheduled maintenance activities 
for 55MB processing. Distributions around the scheduled and unscheduled maintenance processing are 
modeled with a triangular distribution,22 selected due to its "conservative" nature. Evidence exists that for 
process simulation the lognormal distribution may be the most appropriate.23,24 Such evidence also exists 
relative to some aerospace applications;25,26 but without actual operational data to support this, the triangular 
distribution has been chosen. The triangular distribution requires a minimum, a maximum, and a mode. 
For this application the mode is the selected STS value, the minimum is 5 percent less than the mode, and 
the maximum 10 percent greater than the mode. These values were accepted during the data collection 
process by the system engineers as generally representative of actual shuttle engine task processing 
uncertainty. Extend™ supports many distribution types including the definition of a user input type. If 
desired, distribution types and parameters can be easily varied as part of a sensitivity study. 
Metrics for this analysis include measures of merit for availability and dependability. The measure 
of availability deemed most suitable for this analysis is the one described earlier in the metrics discussion 
for process availability-nominal processing divided by total processing which includes nominal and 
off-nominal processing times. Off-nominal processing time includes unscheduled maintenance, queuing 
delays, and standdown times due to failures. This is a measure deemed more suitable to spacecraft processing 
systems due to the processing-intensive nature of cryogenic-fueled rocket systems and small fleet sizes. 
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The dependability measure is a characterization of the on-time launches. This is reflected in a probability 
that all vehicles are launched on time (from an engine processing point of view), measured as within 2 days 
of original launch date. 
Requirements for engine processing were collected via the STS requirements list. There are three 
engines per vehicle with an engine out at liftoff capability. The only unique engine operation process 
proposed and not covered by STS operations is an engine-to-engine mate process which slightly expands 
the timelines for inspection and engine R&R. 
The reliability of the engine will be modeled as will any associated standdown time due to failures 
to illustrate the impact of reliability on operability. Standdown time in this case is 4 mo and is a required 
result of any vehicle failure. A range of reliability values and their impact to the overall processing system 
will be presented. Appendix E presents the engine out reliability analysis and its impact on engine set 
reliability that is used in this analysis. 
5. Results 
The simulation time for the model was set to 20 yr and run in a Monte Carlo environment. A 
relatively evenly spaced flight manifest spanning this duration served as input for the model. Vehicle 
flights were staggered so that, at most, three flights were on orbit and, at most, two vehicles (engine sets) 
would require depot maintenance at any given time. 
It was apparent from back of the envelope analysis that the use of the complete shuttle engine 
database would present a processing timeline that was a factor of 10 over the allocated requirement. 
Availability for such a system is approximately 70 percent and dependability is very low unless processing 
start dates were backed up to allow for this extra processing. If enough time is allowed up front, any system 
can be made technically dependable. Implicit in the measure of dependability is an acceptable and minimal 
turnaround time. This is a problem in using the STS system. The inherent philosophy and conservatism 
associated with this manned system leads to intense processing requirements due to extensive checking 
and double-checking. Using shuttle experience data results in a vehicle that is only capable of five flights 
per year at the outset. The required processing times preclude any more. This also assumes processing 
manpower available to process all vehicles in parallel to support a maximum of 25 flights per year. This 
would result in a prohibitively expensive system. Thus, for this analysis, a decision was made to just use 
the "active" process conducted on the shuttle engines for this model. This excludes all vehicle setup and 
access time (except that explicitly allowed); all GSE setup; test setup; and of course, shuttle-specific 
operations. Clearly as important to the processing requirements for the future engine system is the philosophy 
of operation. Philosophy changes create the most significant process changes; of course, it remains to be 
seen whether these changes can be maintained when the actual system is in operation. 
Given the above ground rule, a baseline case with no off-nominal (unscheduled maintenance) time 
was first established. The results for the probabilistic analysis for the operability parameters are presented 
in table 5. This turnaround baseline required, on average, 109.6 hr per flight. When adjusting for manpower 
shifting, this translates into just over a 6-day turnaround. The dependability measure assumes launch on 
time if launch occurs within 2 days of the original scheduled data. This system is appropriately rated at 
100 percent for both availability and dependability. Without unscheduled processing time, the only 
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uncertainty in this system is in nonnal processing and this is not enough to affect on-time launch. It is 
interesting to note that the original goal for the turnaround of the engine system as presented in the 
deterministic model was 40 hr. Even with extensive and optimistic ground rules, the projected turnaround 
is over twice that without considering any unscheduled processing. Extra manpower may make up some of 
the difference but this also raises the cost to the processing system. Clearly, the original goal must be 
adjusted to be more realistic. 
Table 5. Results of probabilistic analysis. 
Case Availability (%) Dependability (%) 
Full-up STS 70 Low (Assumption Dependent) 
Active Processes 
Only (No Unscheduled) 100 100 
Active With STS 
Unscheduled 82 0 
Active With 25% of 
STS Unscheduled 94 78 
When the shuttle-based, off-nominal times were incorporated into the model as reflected in table 5, 
the turnaround increased to an average of 171.5 hr which translates into a 12-day turnaround (a weekend 
added since processing facility time goes past 1 wk). With only 6 days allowed for turnaround time with a 
2-day buffer, the dependability of this system is zero. Availability of this system is at 82 percent. 
It is reasonable to assume that improvements in unscheduled processing and hardware will result in 
something significantly better than for the shuttle. From table 5, the case where 25 percent of the shuttle 
unscheduled processing is assumed, the dependability is at 78 percent and the availability at 94 percent 
Improvement to 10 percent of shuttle unscheduled processing improves the measures to 100 percent and 
96 percent, respectively. The general relationships of process time, dependability, and availability for this 
system are presented in figure 16. A typical requirement (95 percent) for availability and dependability is 
also included in this figure. Availability varies from 100 to 82 percent, based upon the amount of unscheduled 
processing time. Dependability displays a unique shape-almost a step function. Only between 23 and 
27 percent of STS unscheduled process time is any variation evident. This range is reflective of the variation 
in nominal and off-nominal processing. As such, dependability is a very sensitive measure. First, it is 
sensitive to the time allowed for processing-in this case, 6 days. Also, it is sensitive to the buffer amount; 
amount of uncertainty; and staffing schedules. Dependability can be improved by an early processing start 
or by the use of timing control mechanisms such as built-in holds. It is interesting to note that, traditionally, 
engine processing delays are not key to the vehicle launch delays and dependability. Weather is the 
predominant cause of vehicle launch delays. 
Other typical results from a discrete event simulation model include resource estimates of interest 
such as facility utilization rates, manpower usage, and queuing delays. In order to identify areas of 
improvement for operations, a Monte Carlo analysis of each process was perfonned by reducing the 
unscheduled maintenance from the shuttle-based percentage to a 10-percent target. Total manhours, cost 
per flow, and launch delay time per flight were used to provide a quantifiable measure of improvement. 
The results from these analyses are shown in table 7 for each engine task in the current processing flow. 
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Figure 16. Operability measures by process time. 
6. Effect of Uncertainty 
Table 6 presents the impact of the incorporation of uncertainty in the model. As discussed earlier, 
the purpose of modeling this uncertainty is to provide for a more realistic model. The hours presented are 
the total for the system over the 20-yr period (600 flights). The uncertainty in this case has little impact on 
the availability measure, given that availability is a ratio of values, both changing in similar fashion. In this 
case, the impact is small since the processes modeled have relatively low uncertainty in both scheduled and 
unscheduled activities. Also, consistent with earlier conclusions, the dependability measure shows a high 
sensitivity to the amount of uncertainty. Indeed the use of the maximum amount of uncertainty for the case 
here drops this value to zero. Upon further analysis, this was determined to be an effect of processing 
facility operation being extended past 5 days, resulting in the addition of a weekend to the processing time. 
These two events were enough to push the launch time past the 2-day buffer allowed. The dependability 
value is controllable to a large extent through the use of different ground rules, built-in holds, earlier start 
dates, or additional manpower. 
Table 6. Probabilistic model uncertainty impact. 
Case Sched Hr Unsched Hr Avail (%) Dep (%) 
25% of STS 166,460 11,482 93.5 78 
Unscheduled Mode 
25%-Min 162,348 10,764 93.8 95 
25%-Max 171,552 12,402 93.2 0 
7. Reliability Impacts 
When a measure of reliability is added to the model, impacts to operability are apparent. In this 
case, reliability is measured relative to catastrophic failure of the engine, and catastrophic failure of any 
engine leads to failure of the vehicle. The ground rule at the outset was that the system went into standdown 
of 4 mo after a failure in order to diagnose, isolate, redesign, or mitigate the problem causing the failure. 
The reliability impact of lost launches is presented in figure 17. Besides the failures, launches for the next 
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4 mo are delayed. Out of the 600 launches (rescheduled now over a longer period of time), 126 were 
canceled given an engine reliability of 0.95. For a reliability of 0.999, the number of lost launches is 1.8. 
Clearly, a reliability value much lower that 0.999 would be unacceptable to a launch system such as this 
one. Certain vehicle characteristics mitigate these failures (holddown, engine out), but the engines must be 
very robust for consistent acceptable operability scores. The relationship of reliability, dependability, and 
availability of this system as generated from the Extend™ model runs is presented in figure 18. The reliability 
estimates used for this analysis were as derived in the analysis of table 21 for the engine out at liftoff and 
catastrophic failure probability of 0.1 case. Clearly, reliability is the single biggest determinant of the 
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Figure 17. Impact of reliability on operability. 
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Figure 18. Operability metrics by reliability. 
These results indicate the impact of scheduled and unscheduled processing and reliability on the 
launch system. Values of acceptable availability and dependability requirements would likely be around 
95 percent. Considerable improvements in traditional spacecraft engine processing and design are necessary 
to meet this requirement. 
29 
These results indicate a potential manhour cost savings of approximately $115.3K per flight along with a 
7.4-hr reduction in the launch delay for the engine set modeled in this flow. The shuttle manpower data 
were used for this analysis. Figure 19 provides a graphical view of the manhour cost reductions and launch 
delay reductions for engine processing. While potential reductions are greatest in earlier processes (e.g., 
visual inspections), it is important to note that later processes may be more critical (e.g., pad activities). 
Timing controls such as built-in holds will be more effective earlier in the process flow. There is less 
opportunity for controlling delays late in launch. 
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Figure 19. Engine operations manhours/cost analysis. 
By using the shuttle-based results and the process target results, a relationship between percent 
nominal processing and clock hours or manhour cost can be determined for each process analyzed. This 
type of relationship provides a means to estimate how much improvement is needed to reduce the manhour 
cost of a given process to a specified target value, and where the improvements are most needed. 
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7. CONCLUSIONS 
Detenninistic and probabilistic operations models of engine processing flows have been constructed 
to illustrate the methodology defined in this document. The goal was to select appropriate metrics, develop 
a model, and conduct an appropriate design operations analysis. This supports design trade studies where 
operations will be considered equally with performance analyses. Traditionally, this has been a serious 
shortcoming of disciplines such as design operations. It has not been understood how to conduct such an 
analysis and what measures of merit to use. This analysis presents such an approach and applies it to a 
future engine concept. These models support trade and sensitivity studies allowing users to investigate 
"what if' scenarios to support design decisions. With the availability and dependability measures, it provides 
a means to quantitatively analyze scheduled and unscheduled maintenance activities for operations analysis. 
The applications of this approach illustrate the traditional outcome in aerospace launch vehicle 
operations modeling. The difference between processing goals and initial historical-based operations 
estimates is large. This is at least in part due to the lack of good and accepted operations modeling techniques 
which use well-understood and interpretable metrics. The approach described here attempts to correct this 
problem by offering a rigorous process and good baseline data to identify operations concerns. 
The results presented here represent a first iteration in an operations analysis process outlined in 
figure 4 for a hypothetical engine concept. Deterministic, goal-oriented modeling provides a top view of 
the requirements and allocations. The bottom-up, probabilistic analysis provides the operations processing 
estimates to compare against the goals and requirements. The first iteration involved the use of the STS 
engine (SSMB) experience base. Further iterations will adjust this baseline to better estimates based upon 
actual design decisions. All specifications of processing are subject to requirements traceability via the 
STS requirements database. 
Engine system scheduled and unscheduled maintenance impacts in the proposed launch vehicle 
flows have been identified. Critical path processes will have the greatest impact on launch delay. It is 
interesting to note that noncritical path processes defined in the initial operations concept may end up as 
critical path processes once an incidence of historical unscheduled maintenance activities is considered. 
From the results it is clear that the single biggest determinant of operability measures is reliability. While 
hardware reliability improvements are critical to improving operability, these results also point to 
improvements in corrective maintenance processing activities as critical to improved turnaround times and 
operability measures for future launch systems. 
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APPENDIX A-Engine Operations Requirements Database 
Table 8 presents 55MB operations requirements (OMRSD's) and other pertinent information to 
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laby seal· copper ~Iallng rub 
TURBOPUMPS i50ri$tpenBuralt1tor IiriOtiiiiiiiiiili"{lprlOrtotrtBii:: concern - - Fire. Ufflxmtalned EIrIgki8fSiiUii'~ 
over conlamlnaUon If high and e1ao start cheracterisUcs If rotor 
Is slow to spin - conlamlnatlon hSS been found that bound the 
rotor end bearing wind-up can 8180 rouUnely causes falluru of 
TURBOPUMPS ~ PeriOrined to ffee the iOtOrlt ~bl8 -dOne onlY 1f'n8Bded ~ -- Frro.UnCOilb:iinOdenglne falluro 
m~.~aketorque ~mtonl)~~~~lu_e.orpu'!lp!!l re~ ____ ~ _____ . __ ~ 
TURB9~l!M.,=~ _~ring w~~~_~~TP thrust bearing must be monilon:ld Fire, Uncontalned engine falluro _ 
COMBUSTION LOXPostlnteQrlIycOOt;kwlmpm;tsdDrDefet:ledPostPklgg9c! "" •• - _._._-.. --"",-_ .... " .. -
& Plug Damaged -> Loss of Plug, Increase Demage to Post-> 
Loss of Post, Crit 1 
COMBUSnON 1 Under Bias (cant) -> FlCM' ErOsIon Mec HIG Wan -> Rspalror I-FIre, Uncontalned engine fallure 
Cril1 l.8ak: Under Bias -> Combustion Performance loss 
COMBUSnON - --- ~f8l'lO. &bOi1"d@Un8fM. ->ReP81r. [jAWs. rt'orm.-",.o·ce l.0Ss; Flr& .• ".n","",'."ed engrne. failure 
Crlt3toCrit1lflnCl'8BSe. 
COMBUSTION BW'BitilaPllra9mDamag,,:~DnertoSiructUroThru- - - Ff,,':Unc0nt8ili8d8ngln8i8i11i8--
COMBUSTION 
COMBUSTION 
''''''.mlJl Debonds ->. Em .. Ploslon, Crft 1; ExlefnBllesk, UAI to I Fire, lin.coniainiid engf.ne lallure. 
Crill 
fnspec;t when HPFrP Ren,Oved -- Fire, Uncotiiiijiied englne-f8liUr&-
Cb~B~-STlO~ ---iifisped whenHPOTP Removed- _ ----t-A ... I.1."' .... 'nod .,gln. fa"'" 
COMBtJsTiON- -+COidOiHiitWBif Thru-craCiC;iiiiiiisd8di.irierMar.'lorB6lJond. FIre, Unconfiihied enginefallure -
> RePGIr. UAI Perfonnenc:e Loss; Crit a to Cnt ilf Increase. If 
~~~~~Ulred then data used to edjust engine perfonnenCOj 
COMBLisT~~N =- '-~1.5S~11Ji~1~~~~~,!:>.:~_cE!i1~~,!iJ:~~~ C~ =-~!I~!l.~~~n~ ~g~~!.~~~_~ 
COMBUSTION Cold or Hot Well Thru,CR!ck like Crown Erosion. Brazeless Fire, Uncontalned engine failure 
. _______ , ____ "_ 1:~~~~~'!_:-?'B~~!r.J-L~.E.~~!~£!~!;.9!t..atoCril1J! ________ _ 
COMBUSTION Erosed Tube Crowns -> leakage up !o crn 1; Tube Bu1g8s -> Fire, UnOOl'l1iJ/ned engine felturo 
Trip He:: Flaw or Shock: Wave -> Dyn. Destruction NZ. Crit 1; Re 
COMBUSTION -- ~t:~;:set;.~::t~ioB~~tf~~=l ~ic"'-"'=~+"'F, .. ;;;C'"""n""'=Ioc.:" .. =ong::;';::n.:-'fa:;;"'=" 
Trip HG Aow or ShtICk Wave -> Oyn. DeslnJctJon NZ, CriI1;Ra 
COMBUSTION -- ~~=~n~;:;.a~~~uon, Burst.:> C~1-_--I-A~ .. ~ ~"'~"'~n~Io'~""'~on'gI-no~fa7".~ . -
cOMeusTrON -- iiiSP8CtWhenHPOiPRemOV8ii---------· - --Arn.Uncont8iil8dqiliG~ 
COMBUSTI~- Inspect when HPFTPRetnoved Fire. Unconlalned engine failure 
COMBUSTION inspecfWhen iiPFrPRemoved- - - -- ---- -- FIre, Unconlalned enginaTaiiUm 
COMBUSTION frispetiWhenHPOTPRernoved----- --- -- --_. - - -"Are: Unconlafr:;&crengrn;f8lfure -
cOMI:lUS110N- -. fr1s~WhenHp6TPRemOVed-- Flre.Unconlalnedeng!nefal!i.iie~ 
COMBUstioN' . oamagedPcistSPfnn6d, loSS of Pins:':> InCfNSe Osmstle to - 'f:iie; Uncoo-Iefr1ed" engine faWwe--
COMBUSTIoN 
Post..)o Loss of Post Into TurbIne, Crll1 or Intemal Leakage -> 
OVerheat Turbine, Crll1 
Dam8ged PosI8Plnned,loss Of PIns -> Inerease DiffiEige to --Am. Uncontaioed enginefiiiiura --
Post..:> Plug Post & Use or Loss rI Post Into Turbine. COL 1 or 
COMBUSTIt)N ~:m~~-£:ed;;;-C;. L,;;:,:;:,·"":;;~n·"~;;;;"!:O'"';;;:'"';;:"'=D;:.;;:m.;;: .. ;;-;",o-l---'A;;; .. :;-.o.;"n;;:""';;;""";;;;'od""",='n;;;."fa"".;;;-.. 
Posl..:> Plug Post & Use or Loss of Post Into Turbine, Crit 1 or 
IntemaiLeakageOverhee.ITulblne.Crll1 
COMBUSTION - contiiigSlicr ieq-mt riidotmedto InspeetfOreiiCkSln FPB Flm, UnconIBlned engine failure ' 
dl~r. This reqmt will be Invoked only If data evaluation of 
___ _ tlP~tu.r:blne~_IsqI~Ill_E!:.~mJl~~~~I~~!y' ________________________ . __ _ 
COMBUSYlON Integrity check after -POP" - "POP" Damage. Bowing Fire, Uncontained enginefellure 
Indication of Braze Cracks -> Loss of Element Into TurbIne, Crit 
&,~~~~~~;~O::I~~~~e~~ttiout·- -~nContalned8ngTnef8llura -. 
~:u::~lyLPi=D helium tiBiii8r$Yst8iiiis funCtiOnsl to "PreclLidr-FifG. UnCOlliBi~9d eniiinefaiiW8' 
cryopumplng!n the eventof e leunch scrub Which can lead loa 
l?OlIapse~~_d~. . _ ____ _______ . 
Perioc:tlc (eveJ)' 10 starts). To verify thai the RIV shaft seals Fire. Uncontalned engine failure 
meffatn override openIng p~um wfthfn the RiV. 
I-~~tl~= ::v~~ iOO_'eaka~~umus 8~e~-~ - ~ ~~~~~~ !~:~~: "' 
VaIvelS8aILeakage-iRUIi1tegritYCheck. -. - Fire,ijntOntsTil9denginefatlu~ 
=~~:~;:C~Ih~ij~~~: Ie8k8Q~ifmll8 i~---=- -- ::=:::~:::: -
Vl 
0\ 
Table 8. Engine requirements database (Continued). 
-'E-- OMRSD Component OPFOMr. ENGINE SHOP _NUMBER. _ 1If41FILEnl DATED 9115195) EFFECTIVITY OMI'. V41BUO.22(I.A AFVFILTCRINSPECTIONS Velws V101'.04 POSU 5 V1294.002 POSU 6 
-V41BuOm-O - AFVFIlTER"REPlACEMENT - - -. --- A- - viuvOs- ~ \11011.04 Seq 07 
V41BQO.01M E1FUB. niiJolMFVBAll SEAl LKTEST EKSC. EFf---- ------ HPFTP.TPFtP:MFY- . --vfo1ios Seq05 < • V1294.00i"Saq03 
-v~~~~ 1~~ir~s7~~~~TESt-l~sc -J~:::.~:~~ V1011:~~0s 1- V1294.005Seq03 
-- V41BQo.021" - I RiEL TPPISTINAFlEXIMFV ISO teST IF 
- v4fBOO.o5o-A - E1 COMB HOT GAS SYS SEAL LEAKTEST EKSC. lRU 
HPFTP,LPFTP,MFV I V1~~1.05Seq051 V1294.005Seq03 
System V101'.05 Seq 09 V1294.005 Seq 08 
-'V5E02 Seq 25 
V5E02 Seq 25 
VABIPAD OMI'. 
V1046.005 POSU 2 
V1046.005 Seq 05 
v1046.062 Seq 03 
V1046.002 Seq 06 
V1046.002 Seq 06 
V104S.004 Seq 04 
~~~~I!t~!!i;~!:~;~tt~:?--~U\~_~·_~~·---I!~if; ~·jREVLKCK ··~1~.OO5seq06 ]--- '11046.004S&q04 
,~ y~~~~~_~ ~r~~'~~_~~~~~~~~. t~,~~- ---.:-. =--- --Y1·~j~~D~~ t _ Vi294.005~03! V1046.002Seq05 
! V41BUO.03O-B E2 COMPONENTS EXTERNAL INSPecTION EKSC V1011.02 Seq 04 
----v41BUiio3O-C eiOOMPONENTS EXTERNAL iNSPECTION EKSC V1011.02 Seq 04 
--V41~~~ __ - ~EL BLEEDV~YE_ BELiow.!lliB~SI. ~~~_-=---==.=~ y~-=-== ___ x~lli:~~Jrt~ Y12.94---:(X)~~~ ~ I _ 'y104e~fseq-07 
V41BUO.031-B E2 MeC BONDlINE ULTRASONIC EKSC V1011.02 Seq 05 
INSPECTION 
"V41BUo.o31-C E3MCCBONDLINEUiTRASONIC--- EkSC---~- V1011:62SGq05 
INSPECTION .-~~!!~~~~ ~~:~~~~'j~~o~~~~ r~,~LRU ---~~ ·~~~r~t!·~-I v~roo~sur· V1046.003Seq09 
- V41BSO.021- I HPfTPINVESTIGATIVEtORaUE 




V41A1.0.020-A iE1ELEclF.ICAlINTERFACEPANEL. -'I~ER --- - ----IAvlonlca - -----~--- ---
BONDING1EST 
. V41AlO.1J3Q-A !E1 SSME!lVC ElEC'ffilCAl BONoING- -- - \A;I:ER -.. ----
TEST 







----v41ANQ.02M jE1ACPOWER REDuNDANCY 
VERIFICATION 
-V41ANO.On-A- E1 COtiilfOLi.ER POweR siJPPl Y 
REDUNDANCY VERIF 
A,ER 
A.LRU Avionics V1011.06Seq02 I V1.294.002Seq08 
Avlonlc&-- -----v1mOO2S9qaa -rV41ANO.023-A ;Ei CONTROLLER 28V MEMORY lCST--l LRU .-- --
-·Y41ANO.035-A E1 cOMMANDEDCONTROl.i"ER"- - ---- -- A;-ER, LRU' 
,- -V41ZAD.010 - ~~~~ESS REPLACEMENT RETEST UiU- --
-AVlonlCB--
AvroniCS __ ~~'~~~~~--r ~~:~::::7 
-V72AOO 020-1\ ill 1 READiNEsSTESTf -iRu - AVIonICs 
V41AUO 060-A E1 GIMBAl.. BEARING SENSOR ER, LRIl- - - - - iiiw!M!\t&!ton--
CHANNB.IZATiON VERIF 
V41AUOO9O-A - E1 POST.flT STRAtNGAGE CHECKOUT A. EKSC - -- Instrument8ltOn -- 1- V1011.02Seq04 
I-V41AUOO9O-D - E1POST·FuGHTSENSORCHECKOUT A;EKSC - - -- InStrument8Jton 
lnatnnneiiiiiuon 
VERIFICATION 
V41AUOO2O-A- E1SKINTEMPCHANNELIZATION - ER.LRU InStrUmentStion v-io11.06 seq OB! "1294.002 POSU 11 
VERIFICATION 
-",,"'41·AU""O"04"'2'"-A-E1HPOTPSlAAlNGAGE"DEiSONDTEST- A,Pi"RU,I.NRAT .-----pnstrum&irtalioi j - - - l- V5~~~~7& 
V41APOO2O-A E1MFVAPRIHEATERPOweRON I --~ -rvalvea---·- .. ------.~ ----- ~---­
-W1AUO 016·A 1-1 MADS INsTRuMENTATION A. ER 
COMMAND 
W1APO.020-D-E1MFvASECHEATERPClWERON - I - --
COMMAND 
-V41BUO 351-.A- mOST FLIGHT MccUiIIER POLISHING EKSC-
~Bt.iO.352~ E1 PRELAUNCH MCC LiNER POLiSHING-- Ii: -~J~~-MCC 
-V41BU0093 {HGM~Ls~~v:~~r~~(:~E1l) ~ --~ii1ooci 
V41BU0096 HGMOXIDSIDEDYEPENINSP(PHASEII) TC Powemead 
V41BU0097 HGMFUELSIDEOYEPENINSP(PHAsE- iC- ~ 
________ I!!)___ _ _ ________ ~ ____ .. _ 
V41BUO 098 HOM OXID SIDE DYE PEN INSP (PHASE 11+) TC Powerhead 
V12A.OO.04Q.A \ VERIFYSSME 1IEIU i'COMMAND PATH LRU AvlOn!cs 




VsEoi s9ci 1-4 -
S12B70ssU3 
V1046.001 seq ci4 
V1046.001 Seq 04 
Y104e.OcI1 Seq 04 
'11046.001 Seq 12 
V1046.001 Seq 13 
V1046.001 Seq 13 
/---
51287 OSSU 9 
I 
OTHER OMI'. I 
V5005POSU3 
V1038Vl2 Seq 08 
V1036Vl2 Seq 08 
V500SSaq06 
V5005Suq 06 
V9001VL4 Seq 02 
V1038VL2 Seq 08 
V90Q1Vl4 ~02 
RTOMl's 





OMRSD RATiONALEIROOT CAUSES Root Cause categories 
ContamlnaUon chock 10 verify that filter Is not plugged which Rre, Uneont8!nttd engine r8llure 
couldlead_t98.co!18pseo.fJ;h.eH~ ___ . ___ ~ .. _" . _________ _ 
Contamlnallon check to veflfy that filter Is not plugged which FIre. Unconlalned anglne ralJUI9 
_ I~,!'~_~~~~a~~_~t'~ __ . ______________ , _______ _ 
Verify no LPFTP or HPFTP lift-off seal carbon nose laakage or Hazardous ges bulldup 
main fuElI valve ball seal leakage. (Fool system pressurized, 
m~r9leakage I~to hot g88 system) 
ISolationch.ec!<lrYte~~1BQO.01iMleajtage_l~mjiiar8 -- H~~Us~8s~Urr~p·-
Vertfy n() LPFTPorHPFrPlSri;dlamalersocondaryseal - -HaZardoUs gaS buildup -
leakage or Nanex or MFV l$llkage (Fual system prassurizsd, 
measure-i&alulge ou\ of tha fuel component draIn) 
Isolation check If the V41BQO.020-A leakage limits are Hmardous ges buildup 
Verify no LPFTPorHPF"f"Psmall dIameter secondary seal H8zardous gas buUdup 
leakage or other system le9ka9G8 (Kelt gas syslem pressurized, 
maasure leakage Out_ orthe!uel com~nent draIn) 
~f~:'I!f~~~~a:I~:'~~e(H~-r ~:aa:~:::~::. 
gas system pressurized, measure leakage Into fue! system) 
Incorporated when !he pump end to turbine end leak check dId 
not delacl existing carbon nose leakaga. 
-, isOlation ch-eCit iftiie V4:leoo.652-A leaka~ liiiiHssr8 - .. 
Velve L.,akage cheCk. . 
Handilng Damage, Clesrence ChOcks, LooSe sPot Welds on or 
- HazardOusgas tiulldUP-
~~0u8_wm_bul~~ ---=--_ 
_,M!i~.FS ________ .. _____ .. _____ .. 1 __ 
Handl1ng Damage, Clearance Checks, Loose Spot Welds onor 
M_lPS 
C6MBUilTl~N- ..... 1~~ff::~-:s~1~~;~,~i~ ~~ai leak, UAi'ro- ~_.J!~~_~_Q.8_sl!_~!!!!P __ 
COMBUSTION - Internal Debonds:;:Em,iiosiOn,001; ·Extem81 Leak,-lJAIto- ---~~---
Crit1 
LRu -R&move and ~.I8c8Veritic8~ - ----- Hazard~ii gas buiidu"i--
VerlrY the rotor is fiaii to roI8te prior to tasting ~ ---- improper S!8rt-:OXrlch msulfui9fn TURBOPUMPS 
_ _ _ engneflre 
IIlV9Stig8tlv& torque check If the sp9C/fication limits SrG Improper art. Ox flch resuiting In 
:rp(Operel9CtrjCir grOUndIng condlUons-eXist b8iW98n . -UMeh8duiiid e~:~~n~;ioo·ktioniii 
the SSME gImbal beating and the orbller vtructure. Test launch Delay 
_1~~J!I!~.~_~.~!~~i~~traJ~!_a~~~'!-'.r1?ed •. __ _~_~ _____ ~ __ 
Veflfles proper elDCI1Icel grounding conditions exist between Unscheduled MaIntenance ActIon or 
the SSME electrical Interface panel and the ortllter structure. launch Delay 
Tes:t perform~ ~ch_ time _the ~dlng ~ps are dl.st1!r:bed. 
veriit88PrOPer electriCal groundlng coilCtlllons G.iciSt betWeen' - -< Uri$cheduI9dMairi"tenance 'ActlOilOr 
the SSME lVe actuator attach points and the orbltetvtructure. launch Delay 





V9001VL4 Seq 02 I AVIONIcS Deflneslhe proper sequenCing Of cockpltsWltches rOt - - 'unsCtllidu'I9dMSrrrt8nance ActIon or 
\I9OOW14Seq02 IAvIDN\cs 
V9001Vl.4 Seq 09 I AVIONICS 
AVIONiCs 





V9001Vl4 Seq 02 AVIONICS 





eppllcatiOn of SSME controller ~r os we!! as thevaluea of Launch Delay 
the monltorecll'88ponsn. Identines the COTlStnIlnts for cooling 
~~d~~~:r:a poWDrredundancy VerillcallOll·whlle Unscheduled Maintenance ActIon or , 
con'!'OlI~rs~_u~Gf~!I?8d. _______ . _ _ _ __ . __ la~~~Q!Il!Y_. ___ _ 
Performs a redundancy verification or the SSME controller Unscheduled Maintenance ActIon or 
power slipplies. Conlroller channels MC and B&C are launch Delay 
verified. This procedure also verifies the baclwp memory 
power is functlonsland veflfiea Ihe AC supplied +10 Y 
_J~:~e;~~;~~~~-~n-dbaft9~-~ms~ -UI1$~~:t~~~~~:: 
Controller Chang80ut Verification. Functional hardware and Unscheduled Maintenance ActIon or 
~r:e_~uL ______________ . _______ "~~!1_ch~ay ___ _ 
Oeflnes the continuIty and Insulation reslstanCEt tesls to be Unscheduled Maintenance Action or 
pedormecl on any replacement h.amass Install~ ~ an engln~ launch Delay 
- . --. - - - - - --UMCheduled MiiiliienBnC8 kUoiior 
____ . ___ ~_. ______ . _~ ______ ~ __ L:aunch~I~ ___ _ 
Instrumentation Jntegrtty checkoUl: Unscheduled Melntenance Action or 
_, _________ .. _~ _________ ~ ____ 41~!!..C!l~~~_ 
Part of this check is Weld #3 Strain Gaga checkOut - neecladto Unscheduled Maintenance ActIon or 
ensu_re _elDCb'lcal contlnul_1)I: of _gage after bond Is essured launch 0e11!Y. 
instiumeniStrOnfnlegrltYchfK:kout - --- --- -.- -UnschoouledMainterlaneeACiiOnor-
_______ J:a1:'.'!.q._~~y ______ ... _ 
UnsChedulsd Maintenance ActIon or instrumsntatlonlnt8grltYCheekOlrt 
___ _ _ _ _ _ ____ ~_~ ___ ~E~~ ____ _ 
Insttumllntation Integrity checkout Unscheduled Maintenance ActIon 01" 
___ . _______ . ___________ .. _. _______ J~!'.!!!!L~I~ _. __ 
Weld ##3 StraIn gage In place to detect uneven beaflng wear- Unscheduled Maintenance Action or 
__ ,d~n_~~.n~~_!l!e!!S~re_l!.C?C8pJable_~a~_onn~!g~I __ ~ ___ ~~~,~ ___ _ 
Changeoul VaflncsUon Unscheduled Maintenance Action or 
______ .. ____ . _______ . ____ ~la!'_n_chOe!!L __ ._ 
Changeoul V&rIIicaIion Unscheduled Maintenance Action or 
COMBUSTION -h~emove i.irie;.-Roughness fiiiili IntenseEiiViiOn.-=>Eroslon:> UnschedUI~~~ ActIon or 
~~ge, PDffofll!8nce ~ _ . _ f»erformance loss 
Remove Surface OXidlt8l1on-:::'; Erosion ':>leskSge, - ., - -UnsdledufEKfMiiilnterisnC8 .ActIon Or COMBUSTION 
COMBUSTION -Ir~::r:r~i ~nSrei Tube wSid Thru.CraCkS -> BY·pasS fj-. ijnsCh9d~~~7nreC:a~ ActiOn Or 
Perform3f\()$loss P6Jformance lOllS 
COMBUSTION Liner MaL'l 8. TransrerTubS Weld Thru'-Cracks- .:> Sy.passA- . UIlSCh8dUiBd Maintenance ActiOn Or 
COMs-usfioN -- Ir~:~:.;;: ~=SrerTUbeWeIciThru-cnick~ Unschecl~::t.r:::,,~ne=':'.===.-""~O~"~., 
PGdotn'ltlnce Loss Perfonnance loss 
COMBUSTION urier Mat'I & TransferTubQ·Weld Thru-CrackS"> By-pasS FI iJriSdiedulEid Maint9nanceAciiOn-or 




Table 8. Engine requirements database (Continued). 
V41aUD ili~lE1 EMHS INSPEciiON - - A - Heat ShIeld -·V~BUO.05O HvoRAUL.IC DRAIN LINE INSPECTtoN TC UneslDucta 
__ ~ ___ {!IME;~C'(9~__ __ _ _ _ _ __ 
V58AGO.121-A SljPPlYQOPRE·MATEINSPECTlON I lfneaIDucts 
V58AGoru.e" RfffuRN aDPRE·MATE INSPECTION I - UnesIDucta 
- V58AGO.123-A SUPPLY QoDEMATE INSPECTION"- - - I--~- - - - LtnasIDudS 
V58AGO 123-8 RETURN 00 DEMATEINSPECTION f LtnesIDucfB 
-W1CSOooo:A.- ElMCCiNJ€cfoRINSPEcTlON - EKSc - MCc 
"V41CBO 06s.A E2 SSMENOziiE BUMPER - - - ~ jiLci - NozZIo 
INSTAlLATION 
V41BOO 090-A - El PeA Fuel SIDE ImERNAL LEAK TEST EKSC. LRU PCA 
'V41aoo:.ooi~A rElPCAL02siDE INTiHPiI srlsh St. LKCf) eKsc. iRu-
-- V41S00.002- PCAL02SIOEIHPVl.I(GISOLAllON - F-
V41ASO.iJ2O.:A- ei"PNEUMATIC CHECKOUf' ." . --- - EKsc, M;TRu 
-V41Buo]i~ efPNEUMAT1CVENTFlANGE-'----~ Tc; LRU . 
veRIFICATION 
-V41Bi.JO~03G-A- Ei"COMPONENTSEXTERNAL INSP-ECTi6N EKSC 
--V41BuO.033 --- FUELSYSTEM aJJ INSPECTION EKSC--
"V41S-UO.38O-A· E1 HELiuM BARRiER SYS iNSPECTIoN -,. -A, LRU 
-V41BUO.51G:,i. - E1 SSMEio ORBITER GfMsAt. - ER. MOO, tRU 
CLEARANCE CHECK 
V41BUOWA E1 GiMBAL CLeARANCE CHECK ---~ ER: MOO. LRU-
-v41BUO~ E1SSME-TO-EMHS Ci.eARANCE CHECI< Ii:"'-
- ~V41BWO.031..A - E1 PReps I=OR OPI: ROLLOUT A -












V410w0:050- gPENINGClOSeoUT~O~~- - ------ -00- -- . ----- system 
- V41dio.010-- SSME POSmONING ~T lANi>tNG PLCL System 
V41CBO.012-A £1 HE BARRIER SYS INSPECTION p~ "EKSC-- ------. .$ya!8m .- -
FlMlIiT 
V41cBO.OOO·· FEAAYfijGHT~iNSTAi.~TION . F~ - System 
V41CBO,Oso,:O-'- ENGIN1fORVlNG • 1ST PURGEIPHAsEII) EKSC System 








"""" ... ~~;!3O=A E1 Y~~Jt1~.~~~~~~ _____ ~u_. i~ _ __ . __ !Y.9 
-V41ASO,OaO-O E:i- FRT PNEUMATIC sHUiOowN sea JEKsC' ER. Lku 
~:~~~~--~.~,ijl~{~~~~~ - _ ~~.UC:~"iR~ _ .... ----~ .. C_: 
.- V41BQO.04O-A E1 OXIDIZER PRoP VLVSlPRG'W LEAK - EKSC,j--' -,--- Yaives -. 
I """""""'''',1« -='ZERPROPVLVSPRGCNiSOiA- - F --~--- -~ vawss ----
leST 
12O-A' '~1l02 PRciPVALVE BALL SeAL.lEAi<- -, EKSC, Eft 
1.121-i.02P~VAlVEWlu«HsOi.Atior;f a=- -
'.130 -- RlvSHAFlSeALLEAKTESfrriME&- -- iC - -.--~ 
___ ~ ~~~~_~2~.t@t ___ ~_._- ~~~.--=-_ 
-~il~~i51~~~~s:~ ~E~~~ 
V41BQo.191 -rl"POv SlEEVE lEST·& WINDOW CALIS 













V41 .. 40(.l18 
ENGINE SHOP 
OMI'. 
Vf294.002 Seq 19 
::;:.:;:: I ~::.:::~: 
'l101i05-stiq 12 J V1294.002Saq 10 
·VjOii~s.qD4I. ~~::::t,iJ 
V1011.02SeCt-04 








-V1294.008 Seq 04 
\11294.008 Seq 04 
V1294.008 Seq os 








- 'TBO . -. . 
~TBD-~ - -----
y1011.05~~ - V1~.006~~ 
Y~~l1.Os~·oo· --Vi~.OO6~f?3 
\11011.04 ~ be ~1294.6oe &q 03 
-THO . 
V1294.002 Seq f4 
- \11294.002 ~ 14 
VABlPAOOMI'. 
S<Xl1M13 Seq 42 
81287 Seq 04 
V104li.OO1 Seq 13 
V1 046.006 Seq 04 
V1046.008 Seq 04 
V104aOO1 Seq 06 
51287 Seq 06 
-. \19018.002 Seq 07 
V1048.001 Seq 08 
V1046.001 Seq 13 
Vf046.001 Seq 01 
V1048.004 Seq 04 
V1046.003 Seq 04 
y~048.oo3 Seq o:s 
"1046.003 Seq 06 
V1048.003 Seq De 






V9001VL4 Seq 02 
V900Z.00 S8q 03 
V9002.06 Seq 03 
V900Z.oe Seq 03 
V9ODZ.D6 Seq 03-
V1038Vl2 Seq 08 
50026 
V1C)11.06Seq03 
V1 01 1.06 Seq 03 
V9018.oo2 seq 07 
50026 
V1038Vl2 Seq 06 
Vl038Vl2 Seq 06 








OMRSD RATIONAlE/ROOT CAUSES Root Cause Catagor'ae 
_~!..~! ~~rm8~~.~ ~leaktO~~p~~_~ "-,crii 11 1-
HYDRAULIC I Periodic InfS;pection (evary 10 t9StS) of hYdraulic actualtlrshaft 
=~~~-~ =~:;:- --~~~-=-= ~-~~I--~ -.: -~:-- ~~I 
HYDRAULICS 
COMBUSTION H20«ContaiTilnaiiiSin ACousticCaVtiies~--- -











Combined kist damonstrates thai theemergoocy shutdoWn -. -. --
PAY vent port 8881 Is not leaking beyond 8llC8PIable limits. 
Also checks fuel purge and bleed Vamt oolenolds and fuGI 
CombiniKt lest damOhStrUt8S that the BnierQency -Shutdown 
solenoid vent port seal Is nto feaklng beyond acceplabfe ffmfts. 
Also the ~PV~.andsh~B:88lsarevEllffiad . 
-'i~~-=-~~~~;~~~t&st~~:~~~:ss--=-~j_ .. _________ 1 
FlowVerfflcation 




veifflBi thatfheBnglliels confIs.uniifiiiliMSiiiifrom UWOPF. 
lVC actuator locks I1)strain engine movements and Cllvaf"8 
p'roteclagB_!n~~tamination 
6eftn9$ uie conditions governing use of Ih$ subject!itO!8dive -
CO"". ---- -._- ._-
Minimize iiin or OIher contamiiiati"ts eFiiJY intO Ui8 nOizie l'verlryeagint8ct --.-.-----,-------
11j8~1 P~)~-COveni;8tC~fOr~fiTggy~~~ FiY -
eontfois the ciitarii ys8d to PGrlorm engine diYIng opeiiuOris 
following sach flight Pressures, temperatures. minimum 
durations and conHguratlons are defined 
ConifOls the Criteria y-seti to Pelfonn engine d-rYiri9 operations 
fOllowing each mghL Pres8ures., temperawres, minimum 
durations and configurations are defined 
=r::::.:::~e:_,;~~~Q%~:O~~d~~[-
Plenned Pl"IIfIlght Checkout ' 
PIsnnod Prelirght ciwdcOOt 
~1""" __ ~ ~-c~cc-=r- ~ ~~ ~ - . Check Velve Failure· ContamInation; STS-SS abort 
J~~:~~~~~~i::::~=~~----~-~~:I 
VaWs Leakage Valve-i.el;!k8ge - - -~ - -- .- ---- --
~:~_=:---------- ·---'--1- ··---~-I 
Valve Leakage 
sets Open Loop Command %:UsEid to adjust start aequence 
-'-sOls Open LOOp COmmand % ~ US8ifto adjust atart"sequence -






































E1 L02 SLEED {JOINT DfS} IIFLKCK ER,PR,OMOP 
E1 LH20LEEO(JOINTF4.3) Lf"LJ(CK EltPR,OMOP 
'E1 HElIUM {JOINT P1) VF lit CK ER,PR,OMDP 
El GN2 (JOINT Nl) vrLKCK ER,PR,OMDP 
El HYD. PRESS (JOINT Hlll1F LX CK ER,PR,OMDP 
E1 tMl· RETURN (JOINT H17) JJFLKCK ER,PR,OMDP 
El G02 ORBISSME INTERfACe Ft.ANGE A,ER 
LEAK CHECK 
SSME ENCAPSUlATION POMRtlO lEAK CK """&ER 
SSME ENCAPSULATION FUELSVS ISO TEST 
SSME ENCAPSULATION OXIO SVS ISO TEST 
SSME ENCAPSULATION HOT GAS SYS ISO T£ST 
El GOmCV EXT U; CK & ORIfiCE VERIF EKSC,I 
El SENSOR CHECKOUT EKSC, ER, LRU 
E1 OPERATIONAL INSTRUMENTA1l0N VERIFICATION A,ER 
El SENSOR IRVERIFlCATlONS EKSC,LRU 
E1HEXCOILLEAKlEST A,EKSC,PLRU 
SSME HEX COIL PROOF TEST PUlU 
HEX EODV CURREnt \NSPEoCT\QRS (lIME l. C'tClf.} TC 
HEAT EXCHANGER INSPECTION TC 
THEXVlSUAlINSPECTION TpUlU 
I El HPFTPINTERNAlINSPEcnON I PKSC 
T~=~:STAGE8LADE22X TTC,DCE 
I HPFTPTURBINE,,,,,,crIONmOE< C'iCLEJ I PKSO 





























Table 8. Engine requirements database (Continued). 
OMRSD RAnONAlE/ROOT CAUSES Root Caule Categories 
IDuatopoorproC&$Slng,HPOTPbalancecavltystandolf AnCOm~ant 
w8ldsare leakchecked-Noleakaewrwrlfled,hut lack overprossurizatlon or lira 
ofweld penebatlon upto 90% has been found on these 
welds. Standoffa fIave beon su&pected of leaking iDld 
causadrelumtoCilnoga 
I VI011.05Seq09 I YI294.004Seq04 Vl046.0Q.iS8q04 I V1294.0OSSeq07 I I Plug weld lGakoceurred on a 11l1ft - Col'lCllm owrthese AftCOmpartmerrt WIlds leaking eltller GOXIHaltumlHot gas Into boattall- onrpreaslJrI%atlonorfll\l 
thereft)reall&XI8malplugwBldsonthe housing are 
.. , ... 
Vl011.05Soq07 Vtll46.003S8qD5 DUCTS Ertsure/olnflntegrllyolLPOTPtopumplnlafductlng AftCompartrmmt aIl8r8~nelsfnstl1ned DwrpressuriZittlonor fira 
VIDlf.05Stq05 Vl046.002S11q04 Ouc<S Verlfy pump Inlet joint integrtty aflar Installing the LPFTF AftCOmpaf1mant OYBrpflssurtzationorfira 
Vl011.05SeqD9 Vf04S.004Seq04 DUCTS Joint In1tIgrily Post E!'Glne InshtIlallon Aft Compartment 
ovarpressurlzatlonor!1re 
V1Q11.Q.SSMj01 V1046.003SeqD5 DUCTS JolntlntagrltyPostEnglnelnstallaUon Aft Compartment 
overpressurizat!onorflre 
V1011.OS&lq05 Vl04S.0D2Seq04 DUCTS JoIntlrrtsgtllyPoslE!'Glnelmunallon AlICompartmenl 
1MrpressllTi2atlon or life 
V1011.05Seq12 Vl046.0D1StqD5 Vl046.006SeJ1D4 DUCTS Joint Integrfty Post Enlline InstailaIJon AftCompartmant 
ovarpressurl%allonorflre 
V1149&q 15 Vl046.006SeqD3 DUCTS JalntlntagrilyPosLEnolOlllnsta1fatlon AttCompartIMm 
ovarpressurizatlonorfire 
V5E17Seq09 VSE18 V9002.D6 Seq 05 DUCTS JalntlntegrtlyPosiEnglnelnstallallon Aft Compai1man1 
overpressurizatlonor nre 
V5f175eq09 VSE11l VSOO1J16SeqCS DUCTS .lDll1\:lrTt8'grltyPostEnglnelnstaJlllJon AftCompartment 
OYe/pressurlzatlonorfi(! 
V1046.0(I5Seq05 Dt.OTS JalntlntegrilyPoslElI9lnelnslallal:lon Aft Compartment 
oyerpressurizationorfim 
V1294,OO7Seq04 ENGINE Sy$tem leaJclnlagrttycheckfurlaunch-Mat.'1 or Weld Aft Compartmant 
Thru-Cm::k;Seal not&latfld·>CrfL1 ova/pressurizatlonorfire 
V1294.007SeqQ4 ENGINE SysMm leak Integrity check far I$lnch· Mat:1 or Weld Aft Compartment 
Thru~SealnolSn1ed·>ert.1 oll8rpressurlzallonorfil'll 
V1294.007 Seq 04 ENGINE System Ink IntegrItY ch8ckfor ImJnch - Mat:1 or Weld Aft Compartmenl 
Thru-Cfack;SealnotSeallld·>Crltl aterpressurlzatlon or fire 
Vl294.0D7 Seq 04 ENGINE 5yetBm leak InhlllrllYcheckfor laUnch - Mat" orWlId AttompW1m&t;t 
Thru-crack;SaalnotSeatBd·>CrH.1 OY8rpressutizatlon or fire 
Vl011.D4&1qD7 Vl294.002S8i!17 Vl046.0OSSoq05 Vl294.006Seq05 EstabU\!1lesleaJctesl:otallgaseousoxygensystem}olnts AftCompartmen! 
from t/le AFVto Iheorbf!er!nteriaeeon an eac:h 1IIglll basis OYerpres.aurlzatlonor filll 
V1011.D6SeqD2 Vl294.002&lq06 Vl046.001 Ssq04 V900lVL4Seq02 AVIONICS PfannadPreflJllhtCheckout ErrOn80usshutdown,loss otvehlcla 
V1D46.001 Seq 04 V9DOlVL4 Seq 02 AVIONICS Instrumentation~~ Errollllousshutdown,loBB olY11hlcle 
Vl011.02&1q07 FurrtionalcheckoleachturblnadJscharlJlltemp Erroneous shutdown, loss ofvel'kle 
V1011.D45eqD2 V1294.Q03Seq03 1l1046.005~Q6 HEX Mat.'1 (libinget) or Weld Thru-Cradt; HPOTP Installation Are,UncontainedengfntfaJlur& 
ImpactHole·>HGtoTank;CrIt 1 
V1011.04&1q03 Vf294.CI03&1q04 V1046.005 Seq 07 HEX ~~::_~~~ :~~n~~;i~CIc; HPOTP Installation Are,Uncontalnade!'GlnafaJrure 
V1Dl1.D2Seql1 HEX =~~OfrT:::.~wear, Manul:> Thru..crack,HG Are,Uncon!a1nedanglne1aRUre 
VSED2.SeqI4 H'X Visible Impact Damage, Bracket Vltar -> Thru-CracII:·> HG Fire, Uncontalnad enqlnafaUure 
toTank,Crft 1;Turn,VanaCreclc!l'> Lo88ofVane Impact 
MIPosI->OamalleorCrHt. 
T T V5ED2Soq12 T T T THE)( HPOTP Installation lmpad: Hole -> HG 10 Tanle; Crif. 1 Are, Uncontalnad en lnafaJlute I V1011.02&1q08 I I I I I nJRBQP\JMPS Vertfynolnl81.orlllschVgewnllltme'm)crat:lang;no Flre,UncontainedenglnefaJlure noZZleCRCkingoreros/on;nobiadecracklng,platform 
crackln",orerosion; no flshmouthseal ctaeldngor 
missing pieces: IIObellawsah!eldcracking. (All 
InspellOOnsccmplalLlClwllhlurbapumplns 
J I VSCOSSeq14 1 1 1 TURBOPUMPS Verify no blade cracldng dUeto prav!oU9 occurrences of air on cracking fire, Uncontaln!1I1anglnafaJIQre 
I I \l5ED6Seq14 I I I I1\JRBllP\lll<PS 'htifyn!l\n\8\otIil8Chatoasl1eetmetalcracldl'lg I Are,Unconla/nedenglnelaliure Includln" weld 450 and thBturning vanes, no nozzJe 
cracldngorerosfon;nobladacrackl~,platfotmcraddng, 
or erosion; no fl&hmouth seal aacklng ormlsslng pieces; 
no bel!oWS shlekl cracldr.Q Vlady 
























OMRSO OESCRIPllON OMRSD 
(Y41 FfI.£ m DATED EfFECrIYIfY 
VI1&III&) 
El HPFTPTUR81NEBEAR1NGORVlNG ,I(SC 
E1HPOTPPRIMARYOXIDSEAllEAK PKSC, NRAT 
TEO' 
!E1HPOTPTORQUETEST I EKSC,RI,PlRU,NRAT 
HPOTP JMST1GATNE lD.ROUE 
El HPOTP IMPELLER LOCKVERIF 
I HPbTP MICROSHAFTTRAVEl IPKSC,NItAT 
I El AID BLOCK 1111 HPOTP IPKSC,NItAT 
PRIMARY OXID SEAl LW TEST 
I E1 HPOTP INTERNAL INSPECTION 1 PKSC,NAAT 
T ~~!l~:~n~P SEAL RETAINER TPKSC,NRAT 
lEI LPFDOVALITYCHECK IF 
I PERFORM LPFD XRAY INSPECTION IF 
I SSME LPFD TRIPOD LEGS INSPECTION I DC' 
I E1 AID BlOCK 1111 HPOTP 1 PKSC, NRAT 
INTERNAl INSPECTION 
"'~TOR.UHEST ,01.''', ",PLOU 
~:S~~';~:BP TlEBOlT LOCK 
SSME HPOTP{.II.TTUR8rNE BfARrtm PJ(SC 
oov'". 
LPFTP1NVESTIGATtVETORQUE 
Table 8. Engine requirements database (Continued). 




I OMRSD RAnONAlEJIIOOT CAUSES I RoolCaut:.Calegarie. 
T Rre,Ull«lnlalnedenglnehilure HPFTP Vl011.o-1Sei103 VD018.0D2Saq04 V1D33VL2Seq07 TURBO-PUMPS EllsurealtmolstlUlllsremOllediromthnbearingarea 
aftcratestllllghl 
HPOTP V1011.05Soq07 VI2G4.006Seq03 Vl046.003Scq07 Cll&cksforllXcesaiYe leakaga of LOX/GOX from Ihe I Are,Uncontainodengfnefallure 




I HPOTP I Vl011.03SIIQ06 \l5E02 Seq 25 I TURBOPUMPS I Done to en!uretotor Is notbl)und up prior 10 stlln-- I Flre,Uncontalnadenglnefaliurl) 
concern OIIercohtllmlnatlon HhlghandalaOBtlirt 
chJ!TB&tVJs&s.lf tolDr Is sklw JD spin - cOnlamlnallon 
has beenlounduound tharOiorbulOlllyonceenough 
to uflecl atart (rusled PIE bearings) 
Done onfy 10 run In a high IOrquo pump 10 brlQg tho Flro,Uncontalnedenglnofallul"t 
1 uevaCuebefows c uirements 
Locking f8alurewu overcome on a HPOTJ:I PDP Impeller Flre,Unconltlnedenglnefallure 
boltloekdurlng torquetestsJaplnnlng of pump for 
lnspecllons. Recurrence contl"al la 10 only turn the 
pumplnthebolttlghtenlngdlrectlondurfngllltPccffons 
and to check ths locking feature after al 
I HPOTP I Vl011.03Seq06 I TURBOPUMPS I TurbIne bearlnga have wom very quickly In past-thil Fire. Uncontalned onlllnsfa1ture 
m8UUJe.IlIenlllllOllllllurethetthebllarinllaaresUlI 
capab!toflfllghlprlortoal,ur.ch. 





1 HPOTP J Vl011.02S~qO$ 1 TUABOPUMPS I Vi!luallnspecllQnaatturtilnehardware{aheetmettli ArG,Uncontalnedenglnefaliure 




THPOTP I I I I I I TURBOPUMPS V$TIflu Islstlge IIpaeal retainer screws have not I F1re,UnconlBinedBnglnefellure rolaled.Couldleadtobladofa1!uro. 
jLlnesJDtlCts ! VHJll.02Seql0 I I ! V9018.002Seql0 I ! DUCTS Conllngencyteet pelfnrmcd only when ~ LPFD helium ! Fire, Uncontatned engIne failure bltrlu'ysfl!mh"beM.dJJJJI£I~", Objet:llJ;todelecl 
pOientltl duel IlOll!Jpse or soparalloo from Ihe layer of 
InaullllllnbymeuuringlheroundnOllsatlheduct. 
I LlneB/DuCti raD jOUCTS ConUngencyreqmlpreformelfonlywilenlheO'laff1y I FIr~, Un~ntlhr~ engme fa/luro 
checklndiclteQthlltsomsdlmegeorcollapuhaa 
oteurredlntheLPFD. Tha aT088 lecllon Is X-rayed In In 
altempttoverifypresenceoldunlge. 
I TURBOPUMPS 
!LlneB/Ducts I raD I I I I !OUCTS PerformcdtolnlurelPFOstructuflllnlegrtty. I Flre,UnCQnlalnedenglnefllllure 11l8pecllonlaperfonnedlfpo8tftlghtd8ll\evaluallon 
llVealsHPFTPunatceplablesynchronouafrequoncles. 




CQnBumlnglind bec:auB8 some 'human e\Tol"" could be 
1-<mJ> VIO'Ul ...... 
HPOTP V1011.OS TURBOPUMPS Ffre,UnCQntalMdenllfnefeUIlTe 
liP(1fP Vfaff.01S6qD3 V12IU.0lI8StqO.f V9D18.D02S6qtU TURBOPUMPS Verify III moisture Is removedlrom the bearing me F1ta,UnconIlIMdenglnefal1ure 
lfIoratMtllllht. 












MCCrkJfCTOA IklPfCTIOIIWlT1I KPOTP 
SlTHRUITCHAIUEAHOZZlElE,UTf.T 
"M~NOZUEENCAP8ULATIOHLEAK 
FUEL.IDETAANIFEA TUIE IUPECTION 
""EruElPI!'M-Jt.elOAE~UUlll\!I". 





EX.C, taU. I 
























OMRSD RAnONALE/ROOT CAUSES 
hn.,.,n'.'.'O'O",.oibound.p,rlo'lo.tl1'·· 
'~~UIO.nt •• ntl"'lnl)I.~llh)g"'"dl\o.'lIn 
'''UUI"lOlk:. II ,.,., lO,! •• 1 •• ', ...... '.""n'llon 
hlOhulou"d,hllhundlh'fIIlor,.dh"lngwlnd· 
P'''.tm'dl.'ro.IU .. '.rllp .... IU •• d.n' .. 1y1l 
... dU·- ",ullm,klto'Q •• II1"n,o.orm,lnlu •• r 
,um, .... mn.d 
ao"'n' .... ooLPOTPI"'UIl.'U'nlmUllh 
lOXhllln"g'"'Oh'cK·rmplc"~na.I,c,,~poll 
pr~Uld' Pluglllmlgd ·~Lo"O'PI"g.ln",," 
O'm'IlI\O POII·~ LOI.oIPuI,C,(L t 
Und"6111 (c,ol)·> floW £rOllonMCcHIlIW.tI·~ AI,II, 
"C'1l.1 L"_;Und"Dt.o_·~Comh'II •• P'rf.'''"n'' 
Ih'.:\Ihh1l60 \1.nllll·' Ihpllr, l.lJU 1',,10''''0<1 
'U"IOI.p.III" O,m'gl,l.iftn,ILlnIfTol"ull,,, 
InI.""IDdondl·>E,,pl.,lo •• C'III: f'lllnclLllt,UAI 
IUJ"iwklnHPG1PR.mOu,d 
COld or HOI W.II n,u·Crull; Olgf1ld.d Lln.,MII:IO' 
hh.~·,. h,~k; 'Jill p"!.''''''M' lUI; t.1l ~ \0 t'll \ 
IIln ....... IInoUllon"qul"dl~," d.,.ulldI. 
Id'v"I"gl~. p,rfo'm ... ; p"811110nl 
O·I& ... 11h',"IID.g'"dlllo.·~Aflc ... ,'t1m'nl 
ColdorHo'Wlun,.·c,,,tIIllICrownf ... lon,B,u.ru. 
lubl End,,>II,pll';UAll'orll'''"'.' L ... ;Cmlrocrll 
e .... dTuUCrownl.> tlltlg. U, to Cril I;Toh 
hla .. ·>TtlpHDFI"'O •• h •• kWUt·.Or·· 
D""uW,,oHI,C'ltl:II'.,"lryA"lIl1ng·~MII.'i 
e,olldTuUCrow •• ·.l"tlg •• pl.c,nl:Tull 
hlg .. ·>TrlpHDFlawo,.no.tW,n·,Dy" 
DII"UltI •• U,C," I: ~,.,nlryAnn .. II.~ ·,MIL·I 
In"'.1 w~,. HPOTP IIlmlnd 
1 •• ,.<lwhlnHPOTPIII .. ond 
DI"'gld PUIIPln"d.lolloIPI.' .~J"."""OI,",g. 
I. P.,,·~ L~".' 1'." 1010 T.,bl •• , c,n. 1 11'.' .... 1 
lH1i;.,to "'~I~III·h""\O'.Cllt.\ 
O,,, .. godP .. ,,Plnn'.,LouoIPI.,.,IH<f''''O,m,gl 
10 PO'I.,. plug POIll U .. o,to .. oIPo;llnloTurblnl. 
C'I~II, •• rt"-""all!!!t!!.'_IITu'~II!.~~1 
OI""gldPut.Plu.d,Lu.IIPI" ·~I •• 'U .. Oomlgt 
10 1'011·) PI~g 1'011 l U".f lo .. or Po.! InlO 1u,bln" 
Co.lInl"Cr .. qml,.rformldto1 •• , .. ,I ••• ,ut,10 
fP!dlll ... " Th"'"~mlwlhbll" •• Ud~nIyHdlll 
1Y,'"u ••• IHPrrp '.,bln, dlt.h"~'I.,", ,,,10, II 
RtlOt Cause. Cllelorin, 
FI .. , U'COO!lln,d Inglnl flU." 
Flro,Un •• nlllnldlntJ·,I.UUff 
r~'.u ... U~IIo"'.'.ntl\".l1""n 
FIfO. Un .. nt~ln'd Inglo.llilon 
Flro,U .. onllln,dlllgln",lIu" 
fl".Unoonllln,dlnglo,"l1un 
n".U.,"OUI.ldulllnlflllulI 
FI",U ... n"lntdlngl.I,.UulI 
FI.I, U"con,"I •• d l.gI •• I~Jlu" 
FI't, U'''.lIlnl~ .nQ-ln.,.lIutt 
FI ... U~<~nllinle ong In, flU .. " 
frtl, Un,.ntoln.d uQln. '1110" 
FI .. ,U.,.nlllnu Ingl •• "Uu" 
FI .. ,Ununfllnld,.gl'ltlllu,. 
FJ ... U.conIIJ.,dongl.lllllo .. 
Flro, U.,onfll'U.ngl •• 1111u" 
n ... Un •• nflltt.dongl.I"lIull 
FllI.UoeO""iJlld.ngln.IIV.," 
flro, Uncln,"mld Mgln. IlIru," 
f".,Ualt(l.fI!!I.4uI5IM"U~ro 
FI ... UMo.lllnla.o"I •• loliu .. 
Flro.Ununfli •• dlOglnlllllu" 
fln,Un,"nlll.latng'n""ilo,. 
An, U.oontll •• G"g Inl 1.11~" 
f\n,~~ .. nllln"'"1lI1"tllllu" 
Table 8. Engine requirements database (Continued). 
OMRSD OMRSD DESCRIPTlON SUBSYSTEM OMRSD RAnONALEJROOT CAUSES Rool caure Calegorlel 
NUMBER (V41 RLE III DATED CODE 
9 5 
V41BUOO32 OPS FACEPLATE RATNESS CHECKS COMBUSTION [Inlegrltycheck aftar"POP" - "POP' Damage. Bowing Are,UnCOntalnedengllllfailure 
rndlcatfon of Braza Cracks-> i.oM of Element Into 
Turbll18,Crltl;oftnlemall.eakaga ->OVerheatTurbina,Crrt. 
V41BUO.04D-A I El COMPONENTS INTERNAL INSPECTION Truc T.,.·m TV1011.OlSeQ08 T I J T +- Boroacopalll9pectlonotaccesslbleengll18areaawtthOut Rre,Uncontalnedet1g1nefa1lura -'" V41CSD.020-A lEI ENVIRCLOSUREINSTAll,AnON I ruc I.,.·m I ,om",,, I I I SOO26 I Ifl!lUretlDtLPFDheUumbarriersystemlslUllcllonalto F1re,UnconlaJnedang\netaJlure precl/J6tClfOiJUfflfllfIQlntheavellfDfahwnDhscrob 
which can i8adto IlCOIIap880Ithe duct. 
V418QO.oaO I ~:RRIDEsmslEAKlEST(TIMEO\ TC V_ TBD PerIOdlc(mryl0stasl9). ToYUrlfythatll1aR!Vshaft Are.UncontalnedenginefalJure 
sealamaltalnDVllIlideoaenlool rwurewlthlnthBRIV. 
, NolOXlnHEX rest:art·Crltl A~ 
V418OO.101 AFV SHAFT AND SfAT ISOLATION F Yo""' Vl011.04Seq07 \I'1046.DOSSeq05 IsoIafJoncheckiflheV41BOO.l001&al!all8 fim!talre8Xf.88ded Rre,Uncontainodenginefallura 
V41BQD.17o..A El PROP VALVE ACT PNEU SEAL LEAK EKSC,UW V .... Vl0ft.05&!q12 vt29.f.OO288q10 Vl046.00681qD4 VIDI1.DSSIIqD3 YSE17S8q09 Va/IIQISeaJ lmkBge - LRU Jmegtlty Check Are,UncontafnBdengJoafallure 
"'" V41BOO.111 PROP VALVE ACT PNEU SEAl ISO TEST F V."" TBD laolationcheclclftheV41BQO.170-Alookagelimitaareoxceed8d F1ra,UncontainedengJnefallure 
_V4IBBOJl3lI, 
"'" 
AfV ,,-crn1 1 Are.UncontalnBdenglnefa!l~rs V41BUO.220·A APi FILTER INSPECTIONS • Yo'" V1011.04POSU5 Vl294.002POSU6 Vt046.005POSU2 Contwnlnatlonchl!c!r:tovertfythatfllt8rlsntllpluggBd whlch could lead \I) e colJapsa 01 the HEX. 
V41BUQ.22Q.D AN FILTER REPLACEMENT A ..".. V1DltD4SBQ07 Vl046.005Seq05 V5005POSU3 V5087 Task28 ContlUTllnallon chltckto verify that f1Jter Is not plugged Are,UncontalnBdengl08fi!l~re 
which coUld feadtoa cof/apSlll)ffheffE}(. 
V41BQO.010-A El FUEl TPI..JWMFVBAllSEAlLKTESi EKSC, ER HPFTP,lPFTP,Mf'V V1011.05 SeQ 05 V1294.001Seq03 Vl046.002SOq03 VelilynoLPFTPorHPFTPllft-offsealcarbonn09B I Hazardoua9i13l1uJklup 
lmgeor main fuel valve baU &eaI lsakage. (Fuel 
systempreaaurillld,measureillakagelntohotgasaystern) 
V41800.0,1 RJELTPUO/MJ:VSEAlSISOLATlON lsolat!oncheckiflheV41BQO.Olo-AlaakagellmllsaJe HazanlOLSga9;bulldup 
.-
V41800.02D-A El FUEl TPP1STJNAflEXIMFVLKCK Vsrifynoi.PFTPorHPFTPlarg«d/am6t6rBllCQrllWyS8al HmrdDUSgJl$bI1lJdUp 
Ieakl:tge or Naflexor MfV leakag:e (Fu8lays1em 
pressuri2Bd,l"(I8a$ufelBakaQeautofthe{Uelcompanoot 
drain) 
V41BQD.021 RJElTPPIST/NAFLEXlMFVISOTEST Iaol$llonchecll:lftheV41BQO.02ll-A!eakaoQl!mll9are H82lIrdousgubulIdup 
..... '" 
V41BQO.OSO-A El COMB HOT GASSYSSEAllEAKTm Verify no LPFfP arHPFrP IImllil dlameterllllCOndruy seal Hazardous gas buIldup 
IaaIIl!geDrDffle.r.llystemlBallages(HotgasB~ 
pressurfZBd,measureleakageoutoftheflRllcomponentdJaln) 
~.-- __ 1 _____ ~ ~.--
-----
V41RS1l ...... ' tDC""''' 1""'''''' V"......,·, T T T T T V41BQO.051 SSME HOT GAS SYS SEALLK ISO TEST .,..m TBD lsolatloncheck IttIlaV418QD.05D·AJeakageJimltaare Hazanloull gas buildup 
""""" V41BOO.052-A fl SSM£ COMB f«JT I1AS fa FUEL SYS me ...... VIOI1.05S1ll09 V129f.OOS8s,QD6 I V1D4A0D4&QD4 I I I Varlfyno rlMlnl8LPFTPorHPFTP carbon oose leakage I Hazardous gi\ll buildup REVU<CK (Hot gas syatem pressurized, mea5U18 leakage Into fUel system) IncorpQraledwh8l1thepurnpendtoturblna 
eoo leak check did not detect I!xIstlng carbon noseleakaga. 
V41BOO.053 SSME HOT GAS REVERSE ISO LK CK .,.." TBD Isolatloncheck~theV41Bao.052·Aleakagellmltearaexceeded T Hazardous gas bultdup 
V"'llflJl3IJ.. V .... L eClleck + HazardoUBgag bulldul V41BUO.OSD-B E2 COMPONENtS EXTERNAL INSPECTION EKSC Vl011.025eq04 f{lII\dffng Damagg. Clearencs Chscks, L~ SpotW8lds 
on or Mened TPS 
V4fBUO.03O-C E3 COMPONENTS EXTERNAl INSPECTION EKSC V1011.D2Seq04 HandnngDatnBQe,C1B8RIIlCflCheck9,LooseSpotWeids 
on or Me1ledTPS 
V41BQO.Q32 I~:; BlEED VALVE BEllOWS lEAK LRU ..".. V101'.05Seql0 V129HI05Saq03 V104S.DD2SeqD7 LRU • Remove and I8place verIfication I HazardouagllSbul1dup 
V41BUO.D31-8 E2 Met BONQLINE ULTRASONIC ruc VtOl1.D25eq05 vt038\1L2 Seq 08 COMBUSTION IntemalDeboAds·>Emploslon,Crll1; Extemal Leak, UAI 
I'N.,fOnON to Crlt 1 
V41BUD.031-C ~ MCC BONOUNE ULTRASONIC mc VlOll.02&tqas Vl038VL2SeqD8 COMBUSTION Internal Debooos·>EmploBlon,Crill; Exl.ernaileak,llAl 
IINSPECTON to Crll 1 
V41BOO.034 I~BLEEDVALVEBELlOWSlEAK LRU ..".. Vl011.05Seql1 VI294.006511qQ3 vtD4S.0D3S&q09 LRU· Rernoveand repJaeewrlficallon Hmrdousgubllildup 
V41BSO.D20-A E1HPFl'PTORaUETEST A,RI,PLRU HPFTP V101'.03Seq09 VSBl6OSSU1 TURBOPUMPS Vatlfythllrolortsfreetorotal:aprlortot8sting lmpmperslart,OXlichresu1l1ngin 
enQnenl8 





Table 8. Engine requirements database (Continued). 
OMR8D DMRBD DE8CRIJ'I10N SUBSYSTEM DMRSD RAliONAlE/RDDT CAUSES Roo eau .. Caltgori .. 
NUMBER (V41 AU: III DATED 
9/16195) 
CODE 
V41.AlO.01D-A I El GIMBAL ELECTRICAL BONDING TEST I'·E" IAvIon11l8 I I I I V5O{ISSeq06 I jAvroNICS IVBrffiaspropere!edrlcaJgroundingCOndtlklnsllXist UnacheduledMall"It8nanceActlon betwllGnthoSSMEglmbalbeaslnilandll1l1orblrer orl.aunchOelay 
structure. Test pmfOl'med each tlmethB honding straps 
aredlsturblld. 
V41ALO.02Q·A I El ELECTRICAL INTERfACE PANEl. I"" I Avionics I I I I vsoos Seq 06 I I AVIONICS VerffiesprtlP8I8IeclrlcalgroUndfngcondHlonallXist Unachedu!edMalm.en~Ad.km BONDING TEST blllwaenthllSSMEelectrlcal Intorface pal161 and Ihll orL.aunchDeiay orbiterstrlJClura.Testpesforrned8allhtrmelhe 
bondlBgstrapaaradlsturbed. 
V41AlO.03O-A I El SSMMVC ELECTFlICAl BONDING TEST IA.'.E" I Avionics I I I S12870SSU3 I --T- IAVtONICS ~V9f\fu!$~8\ed.T\t:aIwoumll:ngttmumDl1flilJds1 UnscheduledMainten~Acllon 
betwasnthllSSME TVCjIt[Uator attach points and Iho or Launch Delay 
orbilerstruclura. TestplJlformedoachtimetlle 
bondll'(jsltapsaredislurbed. 
V41ANO.010-A I El SSM~ CONTROL.lfR POWER IA,fR jAVlOnlts I I I \I!IOl)W1ASBq02 AVIONICS DlIflnesthe'propersaqU!lflClngolcockpltswllchesior UnachDduladMllntenanceAcilon APPLICAnON IIJIpJlcallon 01 SSME corJIrolier power as wall as tho or Launch Delay 
va/lIIISofthemonlloredrBSponse8.ldanUfl89the 
coll8lnllrrtll for COOling air and FACOS power. 
V41ANO.02D-A ]1 At; POWER REDUNDANCY IA.ER T"III0n!c6. 1 T T Vl00tOO1SeqOJl VOOOIVL4 Seq 02 AVIONICS ProvIdesfotSSMEACpPW8rredundanCyverlficaiion UnseheduledMalntenancfAttlon VERlRCATION whlleconlrollol1lareundarDOwerl . 
V41ANO.Q22·A I El CONTROllER POWER SUPPLY IA,LRU I Aylonlce I VI011.06SaclD2 I V1294.002$eq08 f Vl046.0015eq04 V9001Vl4SBq09 AVIONICS Perlorma a redundancy 'l8rtf1ca1l<mollhe SSME UnsthaduladMaintenanceAetJon 
REDUNDANCYVERIF Catlttotlef ~ tup!I\\e$. ComIoII&t th&IIn8lsA&Car«! ortaunchDalay 
B&Cantverlfilld. ThlsprocedurliaisowrtflasthebaClaJp 
memory power Is flinclJonal and varlfle9lhe AC supplf8d 
.10 V relanlllce dlods. 
V41AND.023-A lEI CONmOLLER 2JN MEMORY TEST ILRU TAVIonk:8 T T VI294.002.Seq03 T T AV10mCS Verllieslhecapabffltyotthe2BwltDC andbattery Unscheduled Malnt&ll8l1C11Action systema arl hoklln up the controller memory. orLaunchDela 
V41ANO.035-A El COMMANDED CONTROllER CHECKOUT A, ER, LRU Avlonlce VI011.06Seq02 VI294.002Seq07 Vl046.00ISllQII4 vro01VL4&!Q09 AVIONICS ControtterChangooutVarlftcatlon. Fuoctlonalhar.,..,are Unschedu~~!":t=Acllon and IIOttware checkout. 
V411A0.Ol0 I SSME HARNESS REPLACEMENT RfTEST ILRU \ .... "'" I I 'F..£02Se1l21 I I AVIONICS DellnastheCOnHnultymullnsulaiionreelstancetestslo UMCheduled MaintelJallco Adlon baparforrnedonanyreplacemerd harn8S8 Installed on anengln~ orLaullChOelay 
Vf2AQO.02(l.A TEIU 1 READINESS TEST }lRU 1AvlOI11ca T 1 1 TV9001VL4SaQ02 AVION!CS \JnschaduledMalntenanceAcilon orLatmchDelay 
V41AUO.060-A I ;.~:~:~:=r:;:'~NSOR ER,UlU InstrumertaHon Vl046.001 Seq 12 V9001VL4Seq02 AVIONICS Instrumentatlonintagrllych8Ckout UnadleduladMaintenanceAclJon OfLalR"lChDalay. 
V41AllD.IJ9O.A I El POST.fl.TSmAIN GAGECHECj(OUT I A.EKSO !tnstrumenfalton I "011.02"," I I I AVIDN!CS t'artotthlaCheckisWeldI3Straln&agach8Clcout- Unachaduled Malntanance Acllon noededto emJUre elaclrlc;ll conllnutty 01 gaga after orl1lUnch Delay 
bond Is aas!lrad 
V41AUO.O!IJ.D E1 POST·FlIGHTSEN$ORCHECKOUT A,EKSC Instrumentallon V9001Vl4Sacr02 AVIONICS Instrumentalkmlnlegr/lychackout Unsehadulecl~meIW\eeAt:l!oI\ 
orllWnchDalav 
V4IAUO.01S-A E1 MADS INSTRUMENTATION VERIFICATION A,ER IMtrumerallorl Vl046.0IllSeq13 V9001VL4 Seq 02 AVIONICS Inslrumantallonlntegrityclleckout UnschedlJlBdMaintenanceAction 
orLaunchOalav 
V41AIJO.D2D-A El SKIN TtMP CHANNELIZATION VERIRCATION ER,LRU ln6fTumanta1lon Vl011.06 Seq 08 Vl294.002POSU11 VI046.001 &q13 AVIONICS !nstrutOO\tationtnte;sfityc!lado:em UnllC'naduledMalntenanceAcilon 
OflaUncflOeiav 
V41AUO.042-A El HPOTP STRAIN GAGE DEBONO TEST A, PLRU,I, NRAT IllIirumantallon VSE02 Seq 21 & AVIONICS Wald 13 S1nlIn gage in placeto dalectllnlMln bearlTltJ UnBCI1BduJodMaintenanceActlon 
V1294.002 wear-debondlestneedOdtoansurellCCOplahledata orlaJJnchDalay 
oMIQ1Jl1gl"lL 
V41APO.Q2IJ.A E1 MFVA?RI I*ATERl'OWERnN COMMAND , 
""'" 
AVIONICS ChangeoutVarfllcatlon Unsch/lduladMa/ntenanceActlon 
orLaunchOala 
V41APO.02O-O El MFVASEC HEATER POWER ON COMMAND , 
""'" 
AVIONICS ChangeoutVerlficatlon J)nscheduledMaW.tan:anceActkln 
orlaUnchDala 
V418UD.351-A El POST FliGHT MCC LINER POLISHING EKSC MCO Vl0ll.D2SaqOS VI038Vt.2Seq D8 COMBUSTION Remow UfJEIf RoughllllS9 flom Intense Environ. .> UnscheduiadMaintel'lll1ceAc!lon 
Eroslon·>LDakage,PelformanceLoss or PerIDrmance loss 
V41BUO.352·A El PRElAUNCH MCC UNER POUSHING • MCO SI287OSSU9 COMBUSTION RemoveSurface Ox!d!tatlon-> Eros!on·" l.eaktge, llmlchedulfldMalnl:enance1lctkm Parformanceloea orParfOrmanceloss 
V418UO.093 HGM fUEl. SIDE DYE PEN rNSP (PHASE IQ TO 
-,""" VSE06 Seq 12 COMBUSTION 
Unlit Milt. 'I & TranallltTubo Weld ThrIf"Cradai -:> By·pass UnstheduledMarntenanceAdlon 
Flow Performance Loss or Performance losa 
V418UO.096 HGM OXIO SIDE DYE PEN INSP (PHASI: II) 
'" 
Pow._ V5E02SaqI4 COMBUSTiOn liM! Mat'lt. TlansfefTubaYMdThro-Clacks .>By-pm UnBChadul8dMalntlnanceActJon 
Row ParfofTJlanceLoss orParformancelo8& 
V419UO.097 HGM fUEL-SIDE DYE PEN INSP (PHASE II.) TC p- VSE06Seq12 COMBUSnON UlHlr Mat.'l.& TranslarTubaWald Thru-Craclcs -:> By-pass UnechedulBdMaintenanceAc1lon 
FlOW'Parformanceloss or PorformanC8loss 
V41SUO.098 HGM OXID SIDE DYE PEN INSP (PHASe II.) TO Powerhead V5E!l2.&tq14. COMBUSTION UnarMat') & TransfarTube Weld 1l1ru-Cracks·> By-pass UnschedulaciMainlenance.Actlon 
Row Parformance loss or~rmancelosa 
V72AQO.04Q.A VERIFY SSME llEtu 1 COMMAND PATH 
V72AQO.05G-A VERIFY SSME 1,eIU 1 STATCHANNfl PATH A,LRU AviOnics V9001vt.4Seq02 AVIONICS 










(V41 FILE III DATED 
aM .... 
I {IU 1 POWEAREOUNOO\NC,VERIFICATION 
IEI~UTeHlelO8LAUETINlHCTION 





RETURN 00 OEM"TE INIPECllON 
E'"CCINJECTORINII'ECTIOM 








































Table 8. Engine requirements database (Continued). 
Dl'FDIIJ', ENGINE SHOP VABJPAD OMI', DTHEROMI'. RJOMJ'. SUBSYSTEM OMASD RATiONAlEJROOT CAUSES Rlof Cau,e Calegtufel 
OMI', CODE 
VQ001VL~ 8.q 01 
81111 I.q 04 Th",,".IOo! •• m'llonl-~ All Lllk I. AIn\OIph,ro.> 




YIOII,IIIPOIU5 VIU4.0UI.q02 VI03lYL2B,qOI H20.rC •• llmln,n,.lnAuu,UcCIVlllll 
'"II.tlPr.llcti .. hmpl"t~'G,.u~dT""'.'lp'Ig,\. 
8T6 Btaek·) Atl Monllold 1""aGl. Th,"·C,a~k·> Lllkagl 
too.BoI.C,ILI 
IVtGll.DIBIQU I VUU.ODUlqIO VIQU.ODahqO~ VIOI1.0IhqOl I I ICGmbJntd"".,mon.lIllI.thatU. •• ",,,g.noy 
IhttlownPAVYI.',ort ... liI.oll •• ~l.gb.y.nd 
,~c"II~I' ITmili. AI •• ohub I •• l,.,g •• nd billd 
I VIOll.0~'uIZ I V1UU02hql0 I Vl0U.oaehq04 I Vl011.01hqOl 1 ;::·b:::::~:d::.,:::,:~.g:h:::·' .m"leuy 
Ihol1l.wn.ollnoldnnt,ort .. al"ntoltaklngb.y.nd 
"U,llbl,limlti. AI'.\~IHPV,op,nlnd,h.II.nil 
P,l1o'(lud onl~whln ,.m~inld t .. tlndililU ne .. alVl 
Inklg •. 
Vl011.011IqU4 V1U4.00ZI.qll PII.n.dp .. lIl;ftlCh.nOUI 
V1U4.00ZI,ql0 
V1011.0tl,q04 




IVllijlllllllll/l •• n;ln, 10 tOMlgUlld lo.,,,nll,,lro", 
IA.OPF. TVe .~l"'to.ln~, .. ""I""ngln' "'ty,,,,,nll 
Ind .... n! •• IIOI.1I11.lIc.ntlmln.\I.n 
D.II~ .. l~' n"dl~on. gon,nlng ~ .. 01 til, .ubj •• 1 
Ml"lmln'llnoroth,rcOfttlmln .. U •• tryl.lOlht 
V1U,:aU04 ViOl 1.002 81~ 01 Vtrily80glnllct 
In.lIl1P' ••• ly ...... 'to.I .. ·P 
VI2U.DDlllq04 Conl,oll\hlt'~ .. il ... d'o puh,m .. gl.,d')li'8 
o"ratlon,ton ... lng.Uhtllghl.P,,,,.,,,, 
\.m'.'.tu' .. ,lnlnl"' ... d.'.tio ••• ndc •• flg.lItI.n .... 
t 
Table 8. Engine requirements database (Continued). 
OMnSD OMRSD DESCRIPTION OMRSD Component OPFOMI', ENGINE SHOP VABII'ADOMI', OTHEROMI', ATOMI" SUBSYSTEM OMRSD RAnONAlEJROOT CAUSES Root Cau.e &alelorles 
NUMBER ty41 RLE III DATED EFfEcnVITY OMI', CODE 
OM ... " 
V41CBD.OSO-E ENGINE DRYING -2ND PURGE (pHASE II) EKSC Syot"" V1294.1Xl8 Seq 04 COMBUSTION Control1lthacrit8liall88dtoparformenglnedrylng 
operallonsfol1owlngeachfllghl.Pr88SlJl'eII. 
temp8fll\ures, minimum duratloneand conllgul1lllons are defined 
V41C80.Q81 DRYNESS VERifiCATION (PHASE II) 'KSC S,..m Vl294.DOBSelI05 COMBUSTION ReQuJresaverlflcallOIlO1dryneaa.dlflrtedbyamaxlmum 
molllluracrlterla.tobaperfolTTl8d1olJow!llgcompJetlonoldrylngoperailo 
V41ASO.03O-A El FRT CHECKOUT EKSC, ER. LRU Is-. VlDl'.06Seq06 V129oUXI2Seq13 Vl046.00tSeq08 ENGINE PIanIlDd Prslllghl: Chackout 
V41ASO.03O-D I ~A:' !~~~MATIC SHUTDOWN SED EKSC,ER,LRU .,..,.. Vl011.06SeqD8 V1294.002 Seq 19 Vl046.001Seq13 ENGINE Planned Pf8f1lght Checlrout 
I LRU.1ST lRn 
V41ASo.Olo.A El ACTUATOR CHECKOUT EKSC.FR. lRU 
""'" 
VlD1H16Sa 05 V1294.OII2SRlII2 Vl046.001 Se"Dl ENGINE Planned PreflklhI ChBCkDut 
v.tlBDO.04I).A El OXIDIZER PROPVl.VSlPAG CN lEAK EKSC, I V .... Vl0l1.05 Seq 09 VI294,OI2Soq04 Vl046.004SeQ04 VI294.00568qOS ChBckVlllv8Fa11ure-Col'llamlnalkln;sr5-SSabort 
'''''' V41BQO.D41 I :IID~~~~~Vl.VSJpRG CN F V",," Vl294,OI2Seq D4 Isolation check H tha V41 8QO.04D-A lsakage limits are exceeded 
V41BOO.I20·A I ~~~PROPVALVE BAllSEALLEAK EKSC,ER 
""'" 
V1011.05Seq07 V121M,007Saq03 Vl046.0D3Seq04 VaJvel..8akagt· lOX system Integrttycheck 
V418QD.121 I ~~!:ROPVAl.VE8All UCG ISOlATION F 
""'" 
TaD IsolatlonchBckHthaV41800.120·A leakaQa limits are excaadad 





V418Qo.l90 OPOV SLEEVETEST & WINDOW CALIB I,LRU V"",, V12Q4,002S81!14 V5E1768q09 Seta Opon loop Command % - Used to adjust Btart seqU81'1C8 
V418QO.191 RlOV SLEEVE TEST & WINDOW CAlle I,LRU 
""'" 
VI294.DD2SeQI4 V5E1S StU Open loop Command % • Used to adjust start $8QU81'1C8 
V41Bl1D.070-A El AFT ClOSEOUT INSPECTION • "''''' Sl2870SSU8 
FInal look b6fore laum:h 
APPENDIX B-Scheduled SSME Operations Data 
The following spreadsheets present the detailed data collection from 55MB processing experience 
at KSC relative to scheduled activities. Tables 9-12 present the summary information relative to figures 6 
through 9. Following that, the specific processing tasks for the four flows appear in tables 13-16. Finally, 
an example of the existing level of detail supporting the flow layouts is presented in table 17. Note also that 
a zero in a work column only reflects that no engine processing personnel are required for that task. 
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(V41 FILE III DATED 
.J1&~ 
E1HPOTPPRIMAAYOXIC8UJ..I.EAIC 
£1 A'TO DLOCKIIIIHPOTP 








Table 10. OMEF SSME planned operations. * 
eornpo ..... 1 OPFOMI .. VA8JPAD DMI·. ATOM.'. 
* OMEF data reflects single-engine processing. For complete model, processing timelines must consider number of engines per vehicle. 
SUBSYSTEM 
CODE 
OMRao RAnOrUU.£/ROOT CAUSES 
=~:'-I:~~I~t;"'O I, ,omovod I...,m tho lIurlng ........ 
Oh.olalto'.-o ...... 1"""$1. 01 LOl(fGOX f'om th. 
HPOW' ... 1_ P,<>I._ .valn.1 .,.". ...... ,_ 
ov • ...,oml .. VIIl.b."lor ••• I ... ndl'omll.ulng._ ..... 
tonlalo.lo .... du'lnvtlr.ohlildownoltll • ..,oln •. ~t· 
F .... ld ..... W ... 'ctu'lngop.'.Uon. 
Con.to.n.ura ,<>lOti. not bound up p'Io'IO oUrt-· 
oonoornovor"ont&mln.UonIf hlllhnn<l.loo.",rt 
oh ... _,lollo. If ro~, I. IIOW to .pln _ .. ontomlnolion 
hoob ... nfound.toUlldth.rotorbutonlyo"" •• nougll 
10 "".o,_rt(ru.lO<IP/Eboa,lng') 
Oon.only'olunln~hl9hlO'''U. pumptob,lnlllh. 
,0'Qu.u.I ... b._ .... ~ul'.m.nto 
lo<Ildnlllulll .. wu OYOfoom. on .. HPOTPP8P'mp.n., 
boltloakdurlngto''1u .... toI.plnnl .. o 01 pump tor 
In.pOolion •. A.ou".no.oon,'01 I.too~tytu'nth. 
p"mplnth.bolttlllhllnln"dl'ootlondutlnplnIOPoollon. 
and to ohaolrtho loolI/n" ,,"olUro odt"ral 
T .. ,blno bo ... ln". hovo worn uoryqUIOkly In ""M_lhl. 
m ... "rem.nllolOo ... u .. thollh.b •• ,lng •• ,o.tIIl 
0~".bl.oI11rrght"rio,to .... u ... h. 
TIll ... ok olloGkwu ........ p.rform.d du,lng ,",POW'/AT 
cortl1l"ollon.Th.d.\t.obtl.ln.dl •• ,ra,lc .. ndl.p,ob.bl!t 
IndlO.n .... oIonl!tO' ........ 11mp."."uon.(whlohwould 
m"eIUilolylM<I,IHho<llnroughlorq ... ahIOICIJ. Ill. 
ourranlly.nOMR80roqul .. m.nt 
VI.u.1 In .... "!lon.ottu.bln."".dw ... { ..... Im.toll 
no""looJ'blod_,<lu.to"rooklna ... "o,_10" ... nIn "' .. 
put.oI'th.m.lnputnplnt.t/lnduo.,d""tooD"llotlon 
d.m.go.ndoonlamlnoUon(Oundllltlr."".I.ofth.PElP 
Im ... II •• lnlMdu.tolooklng' •• t 
':::::. 1~!=O~::rI:.~I.,:.\t.,:,~~:.:~'-. h ..... no, 
COnllno.noy _1..-fIo,m.d onl!t wh." II •• LPFD h.llllm 
boor" ••• ,,-m .... Ioun d.maolld. ObJ ... I 10. to d_l 
p<>l.ntl.ld .. ol .... llllpo,.o' •• ""'.lIon'...,mtn.loy.'of 
tn.u .. llonbym ... urlngthoroundn ....... 'h.du .. t. 
COnUn".noy .. qmtp'etormlldonly .... h.nlh.O\I.llty 
oh.oklndl ..... tIIU.om.d."' .. o.o,.oU.p •• "". 
ooourrod In t1r. LPFtl. Th.o'o .... otlonl.l(-.... y.dln.l'l 
.ttomplto " •• Ity p .... n ... of d."'aa •• 
PorformodtolnOll,.LJ>FOotnlot .. /IIIlnto"rtIy. 
m.pntk>n ho ""''''_11 Pl>R1I$Qhthhl ..... 2 ... "tk>n 
...... "'HPf1l>un ....... ptabl •• Y ... hronou.,t .. q ... no ..... 
No HPOTP/AT InlOomll In.poctlonow ... modo du,lng 
... rt!IIoDtIo ... ln.putloCl.oIth.w,bln •. m.ln.UII" 
pump .. ndP8Plnl ..... nd.rrth ... b .. rtnglh.u.bo.n 
.ddodonlyb .... u •• tholn.pootron •• '.n~tlm. 
oon.umlno·ndbool!u ......... ·h"ma .. ""oroouldb. 
V.rtty.llmolotu .. Ia'.movod'romt".b ... rtng ..... 
ll1to.a, •• IIIIIaIlt. 
1"" •• Ug., .... to'''U.Oh .. klflh ..... olllo.Uonllmltto ••• 
.. o .... Ild.to."u ... ~.okt.Uu •• g.n.r.ltyllft._.ul 
bfncflngorfoby .... r __ p ... 'pfoUngrub 
Root C.u •• Ca1qorl •• 
FI". U"""ntal~ .... nglnofallu •• 
FU •• Unoonto'lI.donlllno'"Uura 
FI ... Un.ontalll'" on~ln.'.!lu,. 
Fl".Unoonta''''d.ngln.",./fIt'. 
,;, 
Flr •• l.lnocntal"'d.nglnOI~Ju" 
FI,o.l.Incontoln.donglno"'Uur. 
FI, •• l.InoonUlnld.""ln.,.nu .. 
Fl ... Unoontal"od."",ln.fRU .... 
Fire. Unoontoln.d "'~ln.1all .. t. 
FI, •• I.Inoonlo ...... ongln."'U~r. 
FI ... Unoontoltlod.ngln.",nu .. 
FI ... l.lno"nlDln.dongln.laUu,a 
FI".l.Ino"nbl.l".da"gJn.'oUu .. 
Flr •• Unoontolnod.ngln.'.U .... 
~ 
00 
Table 11. OPF post-SSME installation planned operations.* 
Process Sub-Process Process Descri)ltion 
V~ SSME Installation Preps 
"- 1- ---- - - -
1-V5m -- ---- __ J_V5057 Stiffarm B[acket &JVCA Support Installatilln Engine 1 Installation Handling GSE Operations 
~:::t-=== -- [~~~--~ _ 
V5005 ____ _ 
.Engin~_ tiostallation Operations __ . 
Engine3 Installation Handling GSE Operations __ 
E.ngine 3 Installation Operations __ 





Engine 2 ~nstallation Handling GSE Operations 
Engine 2 Installation Operations 
Post-SSME Installation Operations 
SSME Hydraulic aD Oemate Operations 
LPOTP Post-Installation Torque Check 
~_1_Q11J! .. :L_ RQJ'-'. ______ \ _________ - _LPfT"-_P-o-.s-.t .. -lnsta_ 1,_ation-TOrqUe-Chec_ k Jl101U5___ _______ .. _ OrbiterlSSME Interface Verification 
1 ___________ ._ YJQtL04 _SSM_EJ~oX_System Leak Checks ___ _ 
V9001VL4 OrbiterlSSME Electrical I"terface Verificati(m 
Heat Shield Installation Operations !mI!4!J!l80 JC's _ 
!10~3 ___ . ____ _ SSMJ_ Gimbal Clearance Checks 
V5057 TVCA Pinnina ODe rations. 
V9002.06 SSME Hydraulic aD Leak Checks 
1 V41-20003 ~ _________ \_SSME_Q~f_ROIl-Out Inspe.ctions ____ _ 
V50li7_ _ Thrust Chamber & Miscellaneous Cover Installation 
V5057 TVCA Midstroke Look Installation 
* Based upon three-engine set 















































Ellgr MHrs Total MHrs 
13l 81 
_Jl ______ . __ 1.2. 
1L5 34.5 
25 __1.9 
_1L5! ____________ 34.5 
__21i. _______ 71. 
_1L5 34.5 




____ 6 ________ ~ 
~ri:~t-=---_ _--j:l 
II 16 
01. _______ 105{j 
__ 32. 
o 









Table 12. SSME VAB/pad processing planned operations. * 
Process Sub-Process Process Descriotion Duration fPD) Tech MHrs ac MHrs Engr MHrs Total MHrs 
SOO08 Shuttle Interface Testino 38.00 _0 0 0 0 
I \l114!l GN21nterface Leak Check & Trickle Pume OilS 30.00 9.75 11.25 12.75 33.75 
I V5057 Thrust Chamber Cover Removal & Installation 1.00 1 0 a 1 
SOO09 Launch Pad Validation 44.00 4 4 4 12 
V1048.001 SSME Fliaht Re.~in ••• T •• t II. r.heeknllt . 21.00 2 9 12 n 
V9002.06 P,ons fnr !':!':M~ ~vd""lie nn."llnn. 3.00 2 0 1 3 
IVfin57 TVCA Midstroke Lock Removal 4.00 8 4 0 12 
V9001VL4 !':!':MF r.nnlrnll.,' Pnwer_lln nner.linn. 2.00 0 6 8 14 
V1046.002 LH2 ~vot.m R.II Seal Leak r.hoek 3.00 6 5.5 4 15.5 
V9002.06 SSMEfTVC Actuator Hvdraulic Power Owon Securina Ramts 2.00 1 0 1 2 
V!1057 TVCA Midstroke Lock Installation 1.50 _ 3 LS _ 0 4,5 
U1nAIO nn~ I n? !':v.t.m R.II !': •• II e.k r.h"ek 1.00 1 2 2 5 
V9002.06 SSME Hydraulic aD X-Rays 4.00 4 4 0 R 
V1202 Orbiter Aft Helium Sianature Test 34.00 _7 5.5 5.5 18 
S1005 LD2 ProDellan! System Conditio nino 6.50 3.75 0 0 3.75 
V5057 SSME Chamber r.nver R.moval/Drain Line d~.nt.r Ind.II.tinn 2.00 2 2 0 4 
S1006 LH2 ProDeliant Svstem Conditio nino 9.50 0 0 0 0 
V9001\lL4 !':!':MF r.nnlrnll., Pnw.r_lln nn."tinn. 2.00 0 2 4 R 
S1287 Orbiter Aft Closenut for Fllnht 100.00 48 42 66 156 
V9018.001 MPS & SSME Initial PreDs for ProDellan! Loadina 8.00 8 8 8 24 
1\15057 TVCA Midstroke Lock Removal 34.00 JIB 34 0 102 
'\15057 SSME Protective Cover Removal 8.00 8 0 0 8 
SOO07 Shuttle Launch Countdown ODerations 181.37 12 83 153 248 
V9018.001 MPS & SSME Final Preos for Propellant Loadinll 8.00 3 3 o ?~ 6.25 
!':1nn3 L02 ProDeliant Svstem Loadlno ODe rations 24.87 0 24.87 49.75 74.62 
!':10OA LH2 Pronellant Svstem Loadlno ODerations 24.87 0 0 0 0 




Table 13. OPF rollin to SSME removal tasks. 
to Task Hame Work Predecessors Resource Names 
1 OPF Roll-In 10 SSME Removal 
2 ~'"-O;b\terlifbP'F'DooiisOO28""""'~"'~~""''''''''''''''''"w''''''''''''''""'''''--''''"''''''~''''--'''',"",,,", ... ,,,,,,,,, 
3 ··········· .. ~~.~~~~~r.i~~~ryi.~~:~~~r.~~!~~~!\.'~~~.1::.~T....".." ......... 1.... ... ...+... ..... . ........... ,.... . ........ 1....... ............................................ . ... . 
4 Extend Platforms 108 and 198N1011.01N35xx ! 0.5h i 1.5h i i Tech[2],aC 
5 ''''''''''::~~~~~~~~~~:~~~ir~~~~ii~a.I~iosures "'1'" 0,5hl. 0.5hl~...1. ,.:!~~h.:, 
6 Mate Bearing Drying Flexhoses ; 2h . 4h 1 5 ; Tech,ac I---''---I'''_''''' ... ~ .. ''''w, ..... ''' .. '''~ •. ,_ .... ''''.~'''.,_, ...... ''' .•• , ... " .... "''''.".,,~'''' .• ,-'''',.'''' ...... "' ...... , .. , ........... ,.,.,',. . .. ~.' ................... ,... . .... '.' ......... , .. "" .......... "' .. , ............... , •. , .......... ,., ..•.....•• " ~\ " •...• , .. , •... " ...... ,-''', .. '_ .. ".' .......... .. 
7 Retract Platforms 108 and 19SN1011.01N35xx i 0.5h I 1.5h t 6 i Tech[2],aC 
S-"''''''''''''McCi''Acoustic GaviiYinspeCifons7fiistaif'fhroa£piugs-""'·· .... 'w ••....••• "' .... ", .. , ··••••·•·• .... • .. ·1··· ........... 4h'·········· ······i· ·,,······sh·,······"l .. '·-"'·,··, .. ···,"',·_· .. ·" .. r"·· .... ·, .. ······'-~ .. Tech:aC 
9 ·'''=::=::::'''M~e,~i~i~.~ryin~·Ex~~~~~~~·'''''':·''''''~=''''','':=:,==''''~~:=,~=~::~_~''~'' ... "" .. ,~ .. ".", . "':, , ..1 ''''''' , .. {h " . " ,,', j, .~,13~'" .. ,~" t ...... ',::,=':, .. ~~,",'",',~ ':..=:,] .. .', ':~~,~ ~.~=" :~~~!!l21~~ "_,, ""' ___ ' 
10 Install SSME Bellows and Miscellaneous CoversN5057 1 3h , 6h 1 19 i Tech,aC I 
12 13 Perform SSME Bearing Drying ( 8,5h ' .- .., , 
14 "'''''''''''-''''PcrlormFliter InspectiOn andCleaiilng"'''''''''~''''''''' 13 
15 """"''''''""'''oisassembie'TesrSetup'''a:,]',I''Remove'Throat Plugs' 13 
16 ' ... ·'~~·EStatiiisii'·AfrAccesi'·"' ... M''''''.''~ ... ' ... '''' .. w'"''''''''''"'_ ... m" .. · .. '"" .... ·''''' .. ' .. ' .. ' ... m~''' ... ''','' ... ''' .... · .. ,w" .. , .. ·· ... '''' ..... · ...... ·.'w···,·,,"' .. " 
17 ... w~~""' .. 'lilstaf(E;;t;yie;;;;rpiatformSN35:00ooT"''''''''''''''w'~''''''~'"""""",,,,-,,,-,,,,,,,-",,,,,,,,~,,,,,".,,,, ... ,,,,,,,,,,,, .. ,,,,,.,. 
~!~~:~~::~~r~t~~~vei'PiatlormSN3S~00001 ...................... ,.+ .+. 
20 OPF BayO'pen for Normal Work ................. . 
21 ···..Orbitediiitiiifpower~iTp· ." 
22 .. ' .. · .... ·Hiiijlim·iaiigjeTeak·Chac'Wf26:f'''..''''''''-~' .. · .. ··· ... ,,"', .. '" ..... ~, ... ,'., ... . 
23 ·,,-,· .. "··"instalirvcA'MldsiiokeTocksN5057-,· .... ·······, .. " ....... ,,,.,~., .. ".-"' ... , ............... ,. TechI2].Qc· .. ·,· .. ········· ..... ·······, 
24 "", ...... " ..... ·veiifY'ThroatPlugs Re'm'ovei{lin(j'M'PSJSSMIHeITiim Tan 'ks'Pressurizecr'~'''''''''''''''; .... ········O~25 .. h . 
25 '''''''''''''''''"~SsMrconir;;TIe['1itiii8ip'ower::UpN90oivI4'''''''-w'''''' .... ""'''' .. ''''''''_''' ... _ .. , ...... 'w ..... ''' .. ,,~'''' .. _'' ...... , ...... , ...... ' ''''''"''' 
26 .... " .... ""-EStabIT;;h~SafetY"ClearSTor'Heifu'm SystemActi;;liHon"''' .. ~ .. ''' .... '''''' .. '"''''w' .... ''''~ .. ~' .. '''''.'''''''' ....... w 
~----~4-~~;= 
24,25 
27 • .. '· .. "'~'Pertorm'SSME750"pSiHeTium"SysiemACtiVation .. ~-""'-"~ .. '-..... ~~" .... ~ ........... ''' ... ,· .. ·.'''''w 
28 Perform LPFD Helium Barrier Inspection perV41CBO.012 
29 Perform SSME 750 psi Helium System Securing 
30 '''' .... ,,' .. ''''''''''insiilflpFDP'''u'rge''Blan'k[n'gP'iiiteAdiipter/Rem;;veBagg'ies"'~-'""'''''''~''''''''''''~''w''' 
31 '''''''''SSM'fDrying OperatTcinsN11i11':ijr""'"-''''''''''''''''~''''~'''''''"''''''''''''''''''-'''''"",,,,,,,, .. ,,, 
32 ",,'"""""""'''Mate GN2"Purge'alrtoOrbiter @Pi5T4""'''~'''-''''~'~~'''~''-'''''''''''''''''''''''''''''w 
33 ·iiistaii'Heis·eGages@i'P24aiiii·TP2S'····· 
34 ··ASSembiiilMiite15Piirge'HoselFiiterASsemblies······· 
35 ·RemoveJ'iiiilIF6:10iF6.hpiugs/Boroscope for Moiiilure····· 





Tech,aC[2] ,EngrI2j' ''''''''''''1 






35 i Tech,aC 
... ,~"' .... -" .... " ........... _,., , ..... "''''' .. '''''~" ..... "" .......... ,,,'. , ... " ..... ,' 
36 \ Tech,QC 
.~ .. ~ ..... <~,.~,,~. . .... , .~. "".',m .. ~."wM.·""v.,,, .... ,,w.''''·'''''''''''''' .~ ... ~ ........... ~""~''' ..... " ..... w. 1-....:..:~--l,:::,,·="""::~??~~!~~!!?i.~T,~!~,~~~~:~~:=:=O<:~=:,~.::,=,~::=='::=:~:==,::=,~=~,:=:::==::~:.:: .• ~:::':'::::,:.:'" .. , .. + ... , .... ,." ........ "" .......... , ... ; ............. ,,,., ....  
Install LPFTP Anti-Rotation Tool ! 0.75h : 1.5h! 3 , . __ .. , __ 
39 =:::::'=:=,,:~~tjirSh~~=!, Joinr D~~~~~!!!~~~~§~~~!~~.~=:=-="=::=::,:=:=:::==:::::=:=::"=::,:''''':··]·· .. =::II~~ .. ,,, .,J:::L~~::.::::J.==:"'''''::=!~:=~'::~w,'::L::==::,= .. :ji~E~g£~=:=:::==~':::i 
7 
40 Install Shim @ MCC Pc Transducer/lnspecl for Moisture i 3h . 6h! 39 \ TilCh,aC 
-- -- -- -- ---
Table 13. OPF rollin to SSME removal tasks (Continued). 
Task Name Duration Work Predecessors Resource Names 
Install Throat Plug/Monitor Gage/Drain Line Adapters I 3h I 6h: 34 i Tech,aC ''''~',''w'''''''w. ........... " .... ..., .... ~, .......... ", .. w ............. _ .. v.m''', .... , ................... ,= ..... " .......... " ..................... ~."., ...... , ................ ~""' ....... , .... , .......... "' .......... , .................... "rl.,, ..... , . .......... ~.= .... v .............. ,·., ...... v .. , ..... ,..... .. ......... ~ .... " ......................... , .............. , .• " ... , ... "'w .. ...., ... "w.-.-.., ... ,,~.-............................... ·., .... ~, ......... · ..... · •• w .................... {m ........................................ , ........ ", ......... ".,w ...... " ............ w ...... , .... "' ... .... 
_ Mate Flexhoses @ HPOTP Turbine Primary Drain Adapters ' 1h ' 2h' 41 1 Tech,aC ~,,-""~,---,~"-,,~-,-,~.-""-,~,-,,~~"" -'"~"'"""~~~'''"''-~,,~~-~~,''''''''''''-''''-''''',,~,, "'"'''''' ,," 
- Mate Flexhoses@ Joints F6,10IF6.11/G4,3IN16 Adapters ! 2h , 4h, 42 , Tech,aC 
~E~~~!~~~~E.~~~~~,~~~~~.~,~~!~~.~,~prve~!~~x:!~~=~::::=:"-' ... """~==~:~~:~::=:::::::::~:r-:::::::::=:::~~~:::::~:~:=::[~=,:::::~~=':~::I:::,::=:::::==:~~::=:=:::::::::.I=::::'-"~ .. ·::::::~~~;~~"""~._,."' __ I 
Perform Engineering/Safety Walkdown of Drying Setup i 2h ; 6h: 44 l Safety,Engr[2] ''''''_,''''_,~"'''_·,,~.'"''''· __ ,_ .. _'~ .. m'''.''''.m'~''''. __ ,,_,,'_"."_~~''''·'''''m'''''··, .. "' .. ,,.'''','""''',,''""''' .. ,,''' .... ,, ... ·,,· .,~.""'''''.'''' .. " .... , ............... , ....... , .... " •. '''., .. , .. ".'".""' ... ".,~"""""''''''''''.,,_'''' .. '''~''''''_,+''''''''~'''''',,,, .. ,,_,,"",,,.,~,,,,""""_,,, 
V1011,01 Call to Station ! 1h I 7h! 45 i Tech[3],aC,Engr[3] 
~::·~"=~"'::~~:.~~~~~u.r.~!p.:r.~p:~~~:~~n:~j~:::~::~::~~~:~::~::~::=:::~::~~:::::::::::.::::::'::::' .. """"""""-"""''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''' .. :::1'::.:. . ......... ~.~........ ·····::I.':~·~:"'''!H~~'.·.'.I,,'::::,,''',,',,:,,::~:~':,,~:'~·:""~,,~'[,,:::::::'~'~'!.~~hJ~:?~:,~~~~!~r:'::,,::,,:'''''' 
- Establish Safety Clears for SSME Pneumatics Activation ; 0.25h ; 2h l 46 1 Tech[3],aC,Safety,Engr[3] 
~""'""~_"'~.,~"_,""'""',, ...... "'_,,_"',,,,"".~"""_"',,""",,"',' ... ,,.""~ .. "." .. "" .. '""',"""" .. , .. " .. """.,,., .... '''.w ... , .. , ..... ''''''''', .... ,,"'.. , .............. ,.. .. ..................•........ . ... <; ............ " .. " .. ,.""""'" ... ;"' .•... , .. "'~."""'''''''~.'''''''' .. ~+ .. "." ....... " ......... "_~,,,,",,_,,~ .. "'., ....... ,,~~, 
Activate SSME PneumaticsNerify SSME Valve Positions ; 0.5h \ 3.5h i 48,47 ! Tech[3],aC,Engr[3] ;; ___ + .. ,"""'" .. ""'''''''_''''''''''''''''_,,,._'''',, ... ,'''',, ... ,,''',, ...... ,,""' .... w .. ,,,,, ... "' .. ,, •• "', .... ,,,,"',,,,_,,,,,,,, ........ ,," .. ,,,,,,, .. ,,,,, .. "" .. ,,,,.,,,,"." .. , ....... " ...... " ...... ""'''''''''''''' .. " .... ''''.,' .... '''''' .... " .... " ..... '''''''' .. " .... "'""'" .. " ...... ,,.,," ...... "" .. ,,,,"' •• ""'''''',,''''.'' ...... ,,''''~,,''' ....... " ..... ~ .... ' .. " .. ""'''''w, .. " .... '''''''''''' .. ''''''''''''.'''''''''''''' .. w'''~, 
- Apply MPS L02 and LH2 System Blanket Pressure l 1 h 1 7h; 49 I Tech[3],aC,Engr[3] ::::=~~"."" ~t~~~~'Saf!~Clear~iT!§0~~9'Platfo~~=~_~'''~~ .. ~".'''_==:=~==:~:=::~~~==~:~,,=~.~=t::::::'~::~:~~~::::J:::=:::~=~~==::]==~==~~::~"51r::::'::~~=::=::I:::=:::=!!§El~~~~~fe~;~~~~I~[':.::::: 
Initiate HPOTPTurb Pri Seal/Ox System Drying Purge perV41CBO.080 ) 0.75h 1 5.25h i 51 i Tech[3],aC,Engr[3] , 
: ~~i5i~~1i~~=~:==~:~:~:~·_f~~rI~T~=3~3:~--~ii:~ 
.. Mate Turbine Secondary Seal to OPF Vent System I 0.5h 3.5h 55 ; Tech[3],aC,Engr[3] :-.-I.~"' .. "'."" .. -"" ... "'''-'''''' .. " .. ''''''''''''''." .. ".''''''''''."." ......... ""," ....... "'."' ...... " ... "., .. ~'""" ...... ","" ... ".,.,, ... ~ ..... ''' ... , .... -,~,,-...... . 
- Initiate MCCIFPB/Nozzle Drying Purge per V41 CBO,080 i 0}5h l 5,25h. 56 , Tech[3],aC,Engr[3] 
!FPB/Nozzle DrylilgPurge ActfveMonitorii1g"'~"~~"'-· ... ·""'~~·''''''····''''''''_·m ..... ~~~ ..... " ...... ~-~ ...... ""W"r" .. " ..'w .. ~w··2ii"'·· ... " .. ~'·1·~········ .. ···ifh" .. w ... w"T"'·"'''···''-.. ''w ...... 5y''w~''.''' ....... -w''r .. "''' ... ''-..... w··''TecKaC':Engrw.w .. ''w ..... '~~''~ 
~~ .... --~~~'--~. ~_~:"'~'~"""~'~~"W~'_~'''w.''w~''''~~'''~~_''._''''~_''''''~_~ " .. """.'''~'''y''''''''''~C"'''''''''-'''~j''''''' .. ~::::~::~~::::::::: .. :::::=::::::~: .. w,,~~===::=:=J:::::::~=:=:::~~~@IQc:~~g!~[::===::I' 
~'i 59 1 Tech,aC,Engr 
"'.h..{W.'''''' .... " .......... w ..... w'''' ...... ' ''''''' .... w.'''.~ ... ''''''''}.v., .... '''" ..... w.w,··, .... , .............. ........,.'''''''''''· ..... '''""'''''' .... w .• _",.~ ........... , ........ , ........... _ •. 
Secure MCC/FPB/Nozzle urymg t'urge 
Perform HPOTP Dryness Verification per V41CBO,081 
~"'~-DemateAexhoses·@JOfnts F6, 10/F6:rfjG4:3iNT6'j\dapters-~"""" .. · .. 'w." ..... '" ... '''' ... 
~ ..................................................................................................................... . 
- Torque Joint N14 Plate 
Rem'ove'silimsii'orqUe'MCCPcTransduceraniiD35:2iNH:2Staci< 
Tee:Conneci"rurb'Prfio'Turbsec/ConneCt'toTo'press Manlfoid"'"'''' 
Perform MCC/FPB/Nozzle Dryness Verification per V41CBO,081 
Disassemble Test Setup/Route Filters for Bubble Point Analysis 
~~~:=~!~~ .. ~~~,~,!~j!nSa;;d!~!~.~~~~~!~::if!~~!~~!~=:::,_:~:::"' .... "'::~==:::~='~~~,:==~=~~:'~~ 
- Perform Megger GR1864 Setup 
.. ~"'~"''''"'~Perform'EITXternannspectfons''(exCluding Nozzlerper'V4rBUO:03(r'~'"'-''''''''' , :----+.. .. ............................... " ............. " ............. " ............................................................................ " ........................... ~ ............... ~ ............... " ... . 
- Remove E1 Internal Inspection Port Hardware 1 4h 
~:~:,::=::,=:~~~~3~~,~i...~~i~~·ioo'kJ~~!~~r!~~~~~~~::::":,'~::':~~~:=~~,==~~::~""' ... =~"'''''''' .... '''w... . •..••...•• J •• =' ....•• :.~~ .. 
- Secure E1 Inspection Port Hardware ! 4h 
"'"·"·""~"Perfor;nE2·E;aemannsPections'(exCtuding~Nozzle} perV'41 BuO:030~,"w"'''''~-'-'_w'''''''''~''~~'''''~''1''''''''4h'''''''''''''' 
.,........-f.-_"w ... """'_,,_'''''''' __ ''' .. ""'~_~, .. _,_~''''' ... '''~'''w ... '''.'''''.'''''_ .. ,~.""".~''''w.'''''''''''''''.~,,~·''''w'''w.,·.'''_~'''''''''_~ •. ,'· .• ·.· .. ,·.,,",,· .• · .... , .. · ....... ·.w ... ,· .. 
" Remove E21nternallnspection Port Hardware 1 4h 
~:::_""'::::=:,~~,~O!~!!(iu:i~,~?~~I~~~~~~!~§~~::~""_,,:~~~,_~"'~:~:::~==~~~:~~=~=~:~::~:=~~~ .. :~=:::~~: ........ ~= .... :: .... :r~::::::::~~·::,.::"'······· 
~ Secure E2 Inspection Port Hardware , 4h 
PeiformEifEXternai'Tiispectioiis(exCiudin'ii'NozziiijperV"ftluii:i)30" RemoveE3'iiiternai'iiispection'PortHardwani ................... " ........................... . 
~--::'"...... .......... ,:=: .... ::.:=~ .... ~~:~§~~~.:?uicE~~~~~!~~alTi1.~~~~!!.~~s.:,::,,:::~::~:~~::::~=:~:=:~=~=~:~:="'-~=.: .... ===:,::::::,::::~~,,'., 
Secure E3 Inspection Port Hardware 
i 
\ 
. 60 1 Tech,aC 61' .......\ "Tech;iic 
; 62!' ···· .. '·TiiCii;ac 
···[~:~::~:':::::=~£'~=':=,==::::t:·····'''''-·'·· .. ···''''"Tech,tiC""""~' 
04 Tech,aC,Engr 
_ ..., 65 ! Tech,QC 




"' .... '" .. w~-aC;Engr' .. ''''''''' f6h""'····r'~"····"'· .. w'70····'~" .. " 
··"8ii' .. ·'+···"'~'7r'''''''··' ··'''''''''''~''TeciiJlC·'''''''' ... ~··' 
,., ........ ,·,...,.w." .................. , ...... .,...,....,""', 
' .. 8h""~"~·'~"'''''''68:69 I uti,tngr 
..-~."'''~:::::=:: .. ::==~~~:::=,~,.=+:: .. ,~:~:::::::~=:===·:'~i!~'~,,:':: .. ":: .. ~~,,::',,":,,·, 
75 ; Tech,QC 
........... " .. " ............................ /....... .. ............... .. 
. 68,69,70 1 aC,Engr 
";'ii ..+ .............. · .. ··Tech .. · .. . 





Table 13. OPF rollin to SSME removal tasks (Continued). 
ID Task Name Duration Work Predecessors Resource Names 
81 Perform HPOTP Strain Gauge Bonding Inspections per V41AUO.090 [ 4h l 12h, 68 
82 ~=:~.:=~::::!e~or~!~!:~~~~~~.~.~if~~~ce~a~~re~!nts·~e,r.y42~~~:~~·:===:=.~=::·::"·::~::~"::·:=·:··""·· ...........• L .•..... ··· •• :.~~~" .. ·· .• ·: .• t. ·:·=::~:~~:: .. ·"::::·r:·~=:".,,·::=~! .. ~.::,,=:::::,, Tech,OC,Engr ""TeCh';aC,En'gr"''''''' 
83 SSME Post-FlighlLow Pressure pump Torque Checks . -_. -... -J 07 
84Engine·1~2:3[piipTorQue·cilecksN1ii1{03Riiiif ·······················T 
85 ........:::.:.~~~i~~f;~:~:~~?!~:!~r~~~~~~f~a.~~i~~:~:~~~!'!.i~~f.~~~iiii'1 ···············:1···· ....... ~.~h.... .....j 
86 SSME Heal Shield Removal OperatlonsN41-40021 ,22,23,24,25,26 [ 58h 1 
87 ··············Rilmo;;ebMHSCarri'er·PaiieisN80~05907:33;35............ ··· .. ···············r "'40h ··············1···· 
·········· .... Re·moviibMHSSpiice!PerlmetediardwareN41:4002{iiii:23······ ...... : ....... ········4h············ 
89 ...... ~·-~..Tr1staiiTr·lower·SplicePlatform· .. ··· ........ ·· .... " .. ··w ........ ~ .......................... ~ .. "........ . ...... j..... . ········oii 
90 .. ,,· ...... · .. ,,·Posiiion·Davit cra·ii·eio .. l·9W·Plaiiorm .. · .. "" .. ··"····~· .. ~····" .... ····-"· .... "······ .. ···"·· .. ~··......···········r.. ······2h····· .. 
91 · .. ····• .. ···_ .. BegTn·l:feat"Shi'eldRemoval O·p·eratio;;s· .... ······-········· .... · ........ ·~· .. ···-.... ···-.. ·............... . ......... }... Oh 
92 • ........ "" .. -Remove·EfIeftHandb .. MHSN4T:4oo2T....·~w' .. w ......... m ........................... ,., .............. w . ······r ·····111···· ... . 
93 .......... · .. • .... Rem .. ove .. E'rLower .. sjiiice piatlOrm· .. -" .. 'm_ .... ~ ........... ' ... m.~ .. w' ... T Oh' .. 
94 · .... - ........ ~RemoveE2Tefi'Han(f DMHSN41'=400i2-· .... ·-.. ·~·~· .. '·~ ............ w .. w.............~ ................................... 'w ...... .. 
95 _ .. · ............ ·Remove ·E'2'R~ht Hand DMHsN41::4oo22 .... · ........ · .. ·-· .. '~~ .. · .......... -·' .. -' ...... · .... ··· ........ ·· .. ~··~· .. ~-··t,·····w ... . . 
96 ~-' .... ~ .. R;;m(;ve·E2 .. Rilihman(rEMHSN41 ~4002s .. · .. ''''-' .... w ....... w ...... ''' ...... '.w ........... ~ .... '-.............. • .... , ..... ·,,· .... • .......... t .... · ... "'-,·;; 
97 '~' .. -~ .. ""RemovemeftHand EMHSN4f::40025"~ .. w ......... '~ .... 'wN-' ..... wM'~~' .. ~ .. ~ ... ' ... " ... ~N .. - .... " ....... . 
98 · .. "-.. '~Reposftlon .. Davit Crane .. tOl·9EPfaftorm ............ w ..... - .... ~ ....... "" ....... ' .... ~' ...... " .... ~ .......... ·, ........ • ...... " .. •• .. r .. w • .... •• .... ·2h .. ···· 
99 ·~ .. ""'~Remove'ErRlQl;tHand DMHSiV41-40023 .. '~''''''''''''~ .... ' .. '·· .... ·'''''-.. ·''' .... · .. ·'' .. ''' .. ''''.~.w-.. ·""" .... · .. "'··'r' .. '....·Th' .... · .. 
100 · .............. """RemoveE3Teft'Hand .. BMHSN4140023 ...... "'~ ........ ' .. ·~ .. -·· ... · ..... ' .... ··w-•.... ' ''' ................ ~ ................... , .. "' ........ " .............. , .. ~ .•..... ,.,,·· .... ····· ... ·Tii"'.w· ... ··········· 
101 Remove E3 Left Hand EMHSN41-40026 i 1 h .. 
l~ ~~-~§~~~~~~~0~~;~~~!]=: r ........ 6h .. · 106 ......... ·~: .. :·:·.~.~.p.~~i~i~~:·~~y.~~r.~~~§:'i~~~i~~~~~·· .... ' .......................... " ..................... ,,", ............ , .... · ...... ,,::::: ......... ·: •..•• ·::· ...... 1.·: ..•....•.... :~~ ... . 
107 Remove E1 Left Hand EMHSN41-40024 [ 1h . 
....... ............................................................................................................. . ............. ~..... . .......... ~ .... . 
108 Remove E2/E3 Lower Splice Platform [ Oh .. 
109'Stow"Davlicrane' 2h 
110 ··· .. ······SSMERemovaioperaiions· 
111"eiig'iiieRemovaiPrejiii" . 
112"···~' .. ······ .. ·········iiematessMiHydrauiic'iiD~sN9ii'02:06········· .... ,··· ....... · .. · ..· ..·· .... ···· .. · .... · ... , .. ······ ...... · ......... . 
113 .. ·· ......... ·~ .. · .. ··· .... ' .... ~' .. Pert;;rm·6rbiierHydraiJifC·System"Ventinli" ....................................... ... .. 
114 ·~.w .. · .. • .................. ·•·•··· .. "DemateE1 HydraujiCRetiirnQjj@·Joirit .. H1r'····· ..... '·~ ....... '···""'··'···· ........... ~ ............... . 
115 ·· ...... · .... ·"' .. · .. , ... ,··· .............. Pertorm·E1·Hydrauiic·ReturnaDoemat;;Til·spection .. per\,S8AGci:'1·23=O .. ··· .. · ..······ 
116 ······· ...... ~ .... D(l'mateE1··HydraUlic·SuppiY6D@JOinrH1· ...... ··' .. · ............................................................ ,. 
117 Perform E1 Hydraulic Supply QD Demate Inspection per V58AGO.123-A 




~!~ 1,,,,,,,,,-~''' .... , .. ·· .. ,-~:7n~~,:: ~~~\~~u~~1;6~i~~mi~~~~i,on p~~~~~~~~:,~,~~.:~._ ... w_ ... , ......... " ...... + ........... "~~, 








··· .. ··· .... " .......... Techt'2IciC' .. ··· .. ···· 
..... , .......... :~7A~~?·~~ .. :·::··:···F·:::"~~·:~·[~;:,~~~~~~~:~~~;;~: ... :=:.I 
· ....... · .... '·gf······· .. · .. ·· ...... ···· .. ·'-.... ···· .. · .. · .. ··· .. · ..··· ............ ~ ......... , .... ~ .... ~ .. ~ ............ . 







·· .. · .. _ .. · .... , .... 105· ...... · ...... · 
106 
107 1 
l 108\ Tech[2],OC 
.... , .......................................... + ... ! 109,86 ; 
d ... ••••• ••••••• ~ •••••• 
·t' ... ····"'·····.~":.: .. "' ........ :I.·· .............. "' ........... -, ....................... " ........ . 
, .. Tech,Safety,Engr[3] 
. ... , .. ,"' .............. , ........ ! .... ... " .. ,,~:,:.!~~~~~;~~2~· .. ···N ..•••• - •.•. " 
'14 ) Tech,QC,Engr 
Tech,OC,Engr 
TeCh,QC,Engr .... · ...... • .. ""-: 
Tecti:aC:'Engr"· ...... ·" .... · ...... ·· 




Table 13. OPF rollin to SSME removal tasks (Continued). 
ID Task Name Duration Work Predecessors Resource Names 
121 Perform E2 Hydraulic Supply aD Oemate Inspection perV58AGO.123-B! 0.25h ; 0.75h I 120 f Tech,aC,Engr ~~~_~ ... ~~~.".,~~~_~"",~ __ .w.",.,_".~,~"w".,~~,,,,,~ __ ,~,,"~", __ ._".~ •. _.",,,, __ ,~.,,,,"_=,,~ ... ~.,,,,_,,, __ , .. , ... ,..w.,.·.·.""w.·.·.·.~ .•• ~"w .•. _.w.·.·.'w,'·.'w~.·.·.w_ ... _.'''~._' ...... y ..... _~._''.w.''w~~w' .• w.w''~'''' ..... ' .. 'w ...• ""''''_W''''W'·'·.'''~''~_'''''''''_·''''w~'''~'''W'·''· 122 .- Oemate E3 Hydraulic Return aD @ Joint H17 if 0.25h ! 0.75h, 121 1 Tech,aC,Engr =,,_,~"".~·m" .. ,, ____ ~_'~. __ '"= ___ ~=~""'"'_~~_''' ___ '''''''''''''"w~~~~"",,,w,,,w,w._,, .. +,,, .. ,",, •.. _ .............. , ...•. ,, .. ,,·.w.· •. · .• ·."i,,,_,, ...... w ..... "'''w''w .• , ... w''w.w __ ''"_,~'''''''w,, .. ,,~""".w ...... _ ... _ .. "' .. '" ........ . ill Perform E3 Hydraulic Return aD Oemate Inspection perV58AGO.123-F I 0.25h I 0.75h I 122 ! Tech,aC,Engr 
_,,'"'''''"'_''''~_,,~,_,,~~_,,~.,, __ '''_'''~_,_''''w''''''_,_'w.,,_,,_'''"."'""_" •. " ... ~~~ww·.".·.·.~~."" .. """· .... """w.·.·.·.·.w.w4· .... ·.·.· ..... "'''''"."· ... ·.·.·,,·.·.''',· ...... ,, ... · ..... ,·.,,,w,,-_"'''_ .•...... ' ''._''' ......... '''+''''_~ ...... , .... <~'''''''.'''''''' .. " .. """ .. "' .... ~""" ... ·."w, .. , ... ~· 124 Oemate E3 Hydraulic Supply aD @ Joint H1 ! 0.25h (O.75h I 123 ; Tech,aC,Engr 
~~~;~~~-=R=-=l=t=t==~~~~=:: 125 126 127 
126 
129 ~=~=~~~=:::::~~:~~1!i~i:nate A~:~~~§~~,~~!.~!,P,~~~ .. ~~E:iier~~~:~=:::::::'<::=~::.:::::.=,:':::,::~:: .. '"""'=::.: ..... :. .- PVO Controller Duct Removal (Aft) 
130 Reinitiate Aft Compartment ECS Purge Air per V3555 
131 
1'32 ~=~~~~~:=~~~~rat~~~~~~:<3agesl~i9-'=:=·=:=:,::=~~=_~:=~:::::~"""' ..... ""~= .... ~~ .. ':::=:,:~."' .... '""" ..... -- Orbiter Preps (Roc) 
'ii3 
134 ~==~~~ .. "'::::::~~~ect~!.~~j]~§~~~~:~e~~~~~(Aft[::.::=:===:::.= .. : .. :: .. ::.: .. ::.,=::::=:::: ..... ''' ...... :,::::::: .. :':."~~:.::'::,:",:":::,:':'. -• Engine Preps (Roc) 
135 .. --'''' .. ~''''-.. ''' .. OrbiterH;;i1ljnl"Handvalve'TnstaWatTon(Am .. " .... "" .. " .. " ..... , .. ,"" .. _,,, .... w .. ""m .... ''' .. '''"''' .. ,,''',, ... ,, .... 
136 Terminate Aft Compartment ECS Purge Air per V3555 
137 , .... DemateFiLiiCiSystemiilteifiices{Roc) . .......... ..... . 
138 ReinliiiiteAfi'Coiilp'ii'rtmerii'Ec's'PurgeAirperv355S" 
139 'iiistiili Tritertace' suiiiiori'Paiiei (R'oc'j' ...................... . 
128 ' .... "Tech[2j';OC""' .. ""·"""·""""'· 
129 
,.......Tech:QC~" .. .. 
.. w".~""''''v.~''''"'·( ............. ''' .... ..,·w' ........... ~ ..... ,......--.''''w.' ... ' ............ , ........ , ....................... , ...................... ,. 
Tech,aC 










.wE..~.~i:~!~~!~~v.!i~s.~~.~~~ii~~.~~~~~i·~~~.!~~~i.J.i'.~~~?::::............... . ....... l... . ........ + .................. . 







······Tedi;tic······ 142 "lnstaiTLifisjioo'ii .......................... .. 
143 Mount Rail Tatiie'on Lift Truck 
144 Mount'Carrier on Rail Table/Lift Truck 
145 
146 
:=-\ ................. ·····fe.·~?~~.~u..~·~~~:~~.~:.~.r.~¥.~fe.~!·~!!~?~t.:~:n.:~!~~.:::.: •••••.••.•••... 




, ........ ~,:::~:·~:~:iiJ~:a.:.~:,~a.!1~!!i~~irat§~n,!::,,:~::::: .. ~:.: .. ::, ........ ,.~ .... ~,~::.: .... :~~,:_ ... ,., ........... ,.................. . .. j. . .. , 
Position Installer for Engine 2 Removal -
~" .. ~.w ........ _ .. , ................ " ............................. ,.~ ..... ,,~ ............ ''''' ....................... , ........... '''' ..... '''' .. '''' ....... . 









~=::~:.:~~~:=·~ .. :::::!er~!a.!~~E~~~~~~~§~~~~~~!~~~=~!r.:Pe.r.:y~~:5=,:::.=...=~~ .. ·: .. ':.= .... :·:::'::::.~,·~:.~··· .. '.:: .... ~.= ..••• :: .. :!.: •.... ::'::":~~':""'" 
.. Oemate Engine from Orbiter \ 2h 
==-i .. ·: .. :::::=~==· .. :: .. ~.~I~i!I~~~ .. ~E,~~~p~~~~~I~~:~~9£~!~P~!y~~~~=, .. =: .. ,:.:· ... :: ..... , .. : .. :::·:::::::=,:·:=:::,:.: ......... ····.:.:·:::::1·· .. :: .. :.:::::.~~.: ........ . 
.- Transport Engine 2 to VAS ;' 1 h 
~ .............. "" .. -,~.-~, .................... ~ ... -....................... , .. , ...... "", ......... , ....... , ....... , ...... _-_ ............ ,,,,.................................................. . ................................... . 
-. Install Orbiter Engine 2 Interface Covers I 2h 
~:=:',::::~~:::~~~a!;; .. :!~~!~~~I!.~~r~§ .. t!!~~.n,.~l~~~~~~: .. :.:.:=::=" .. ::: .. ' ... ::=='.:' .. :' .•.•.••. :.::: .. :".......... ··· ... · .. ··i .. " .. ······ ····2 
.~ Install Rotating Sling and Unload Carrier/Engine 
=---t .... ~ ........................ ~-, .. "-,-~, .... , ......... ~w .... , ....... ~.,, .......... w .. ~ .. _ ... "'·." .. ~.,,'_ .... w, .. , .. , .. ~ .... ,.. __ ~ .. ~ ..... "ww, .. ,· .... ,· .... ·.~~~""""_"'+""" 
-- Mount Carrier on Skid ' 
158 Transfer Engine 2 to Horizontal Handler 
159 
1""1&0 
Engine 3 Removal GSE Handling Operations (Roc)N5087 




















Tech[2],aC,Engr['2y ........ ··· 
···!.~~~I!f.·~~I~I:~~~~L2L~~~~r~r 
..,..f!r8~I~j;~~i~tY@~~~i~1~L .. : 
.....u .. 1 .. S2···· .. 0 .. , ••• ,. ··T'····"'·,····o ........ ··Engr· 








Table 13. OPF rollin to SSME removal tasks (Continued). 
ID Task Name Duration Work Predecessors Resource Names 
1 61"~,~_,,,,,,,~,~,!~!!?,~~Y~~!!1¥~,~~~~,~~~,!,e.~~~!~~?~,t,,~~9in,~"~_~~'~'''M''"''".'_m'' .. '"'' .... , ,;.," .. ~~., ........... L" .,,~~~" .... 1. "".",""},~o."",,,,, 
162 Transport Hyster to OPF for Engine 3 Removal i 1 h , 1 h! 161 
Tech[4],QC,Safety,Engr 
.... "''''" ... ",., .. w·''''Engr''''''''·,,',,·''''',,·,,,·,'''''''' 
165 Mate Installer to Engine 3 i 2h i 30h t 164 1 Tech[7],QC[2],Safety[2],Engr[4] 
168 Reinitiate Aft Compartment ECS Purge Air per V3555 i Oh : Oh; 167 
169 "~"w'-'~W'transiiOrrEniij'ne3to~itAlr"""'~"""""~'''"'-'-"_"""""'~'"~_'''~W"",~"w"".·"", "'T "jh""" r'~"'''Th'''' "'1"""'"'''''''168''''''''' 
170 Install Engine 3 Interface Covers "2h"'! 4h"t'" '1"67' 
171 ""Rotate'Engine'atoHorizoiitlifIili'ii'iiiiiii\isoai 2h"'14iil"169 
""""W'''''''''''''''·''En'l)'t··""""""""""""","",,· 
"'TectdlC 
172",~"",,,,,,~,,,,w""insta:irRoiat1nii"Siing'andun'oadCarrier/Eiiiiine""""'~'"'''' , .. " .... ,",' ",,,, .. ,,, .. ,",,.,,. "·""·Tech[4j',aC";SafiltY.Eii"iii'''"'' ........  
173 '-"'·""""·"'-""MounFGarrliiron'Skid····"·'·~'·''''''''''''~"'"_".,",~ ... · .. w''''' .. ''''''''.w''''' ... ,,,,''," ..... '1'72""'''''''''''' feCti[4j':ac:SateiY:Eiigr"" """ 
174 ",,,,,,-,--w---TranslerEngirie3tclHoilzon'ialHandTei'''''-'-''''-"-,-",~,-~",-"~",,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,-,,,,,,,,, ,"""'''.,w--'Ti3''''''''''''''w,,,~ ;Engr""""" 
175 "-''''''''-''1'nglne Tii'enlovalGSE Handilng"OperatlonS'(,Roc)jV50aT"-'"'''''''''''''''''''--''''''''"'''''''"""""""" 174 
176~"-"""--'''MountCarriei'onRaifTabre7CiftTiUCk''~''''''-''''''~''~-'"""""'-"""'"'''' 
177 w"'-w""~'''''--Pertorm DummyToad Brake' Test withoutEngi;;e~'~""'''"''~W'' 
j Tech[2],QC,Engr"'''''''''''''' 
~='V""'W'.Y""V"""""""""'"'''''_'''''''''''"''"''''"'W''''''''"'"'·$.:,...... ........ .,.w-.-.-NJ.'.W'''''''''''''''''~w ...... v.""·~"''''''''-~'·.~'''w ..... m,,,,,~, .. , .. , .. ,,= .. ,, 
, 176 ; Tech[4],QC,Safety,Engr 
178 "~""~"""'-"~TranSport Hyster"fo'bpfforEngrne'TRemovar-""~""""~"""'"~'""W'''''''''''" '''w-''1'',/f''''"'~'''''''1'·'w'''''''.ww''''.' .. ''~''w'Eii'grW''''''W'ww"~"",,,,, 
179 '''''''''''''''''''En9'j'iie1Re'movafOperatlonS'''''''''''''''''''''''~w'''''~''''''''''''w",,,,,~,,,,,,,",,,,,,·,_w,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,_,,,,_,,,,·,,,_, 
180 ''''''''''posiiion'instaiierforEiiiiiiie1''R'emovai .............................. ! 2h 
181 "'Mate'Tnstailerto'Eiigiiiilf' ········"·2h ..... 
1 82 -"""""-""~Te;mT;iate'Aft Compartmeiii'ECS'PurgeAirperV3555~"'~"''''''''''''''''''''''''w.''.""""",,,,,,.,, 








184 Reinitiate Aft Compartment ECS Purge Air per V3555 t=::',="w:'::=i~1=:,::=~='::t:'~'::~:::~=:':':=:;~~~~'~:~::::=::==:,:::=::~ 185 Transport Engine 1 to VAB ~:~::=~=:~":~~~~~~~~~~1D~~i,:~:;~::~r~rN;~~;="'",~:===:=::=~~::::~~=~:::=,::,::=::::~=~~~::""" .•. """"""'w",,,,L,,,,,,,,,,,~~,,~,,,,,,,,, 
""w,,'==::~:~:~F:~~:,,:~==,=':,J 
188 =:,:::,:==:::~~==-"J"-~t~!~,,§~~i~j,iiiA,,~~~=~=riT~~,d.,,~~Ti!~,~}i~~!~::=~:~=:,=~=:=:~=~',:=~:"=,:::,~,::::,,,'::~:::::'·"···.,.::::1:':,::,, .'::?,~~,:.: .::,:.L .. ,·'::,:~::~~":: :·,::r:::,::::,~,:.::=",=:::::":,::=:::::::',r:::,:=:::!~~~r~,E~9~~!~!y;:~~~r.:::~::::::: 
189 Mount Carrier on Skid : 0,5h j 3,5h 1 188 i Tech[4],QC,Safety,Engr 
190""""f~a.~:s.~~~:~:~~i~~f~~:8.~~i#'~~~L8.~ndie';:·"',J .. : ::::·.5~ ,::1 ·"'f~ .. ··::l··········'··'f~~"··,· ':,[' '!~~h.Fj;:~~:~~,a.f~iY;~~gr 
191 Stow SSME Handling GSEN5087 : 4h j 16h l 190 ; Tech[2j,QC,Engr """""''''''''''''''-'''",,,,,,,,.,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,~ .. ,~,,,,.,,,,.,,.,,,,",,,,,,,, ..... '"'''''''''''''''''-''''''''''''''''''''' .,"""."""~~"","."',,",, ""."" .. """" .... ,,,.,,,... ..,,, .. ,, ... ,,,, ..... "." .......... ,,'" " .. '" .... ,''' ..... ""."" ............. "(,,, '''''''''''''''''''''" ." .... "'."~,,.. '''''''''''''''''''''''~'''''''''''''''''''''''' 192 Post-Engine Removal Operations 6h i 12h i 179 1--..,.""...---1 '_'''''"'~'''''"~'''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''~'''w",,,~",".,,,""", .... """,., .. "',"""""' .... ".,."".,,", ...• ,"'''''',,'''',,, .. ,,".,," ,"'" .... ''''''' .......... ;'" .. , .... ".''' .. ".'''''''''''.'f'' .... "",,,,,,,.,.,,,.,, 193 Interface Hardware Inspections . .' . :.... 4h,.. 8h I ... 186 
~:: '=,,-'''::::==~~~:l~Pm~~~~~~~~fi~~~~~:~~~=t;~~~~:~~:~~=~~~~~:r~on~=::~:==~"::==::'=:,:=~:~:C::: ,~:,:~~~~=:':~':"·:r::=::',:~~::::=:~=F::=':=:::~'~~~~:!'w_"" 
Ul 
Ul 
Table 14. Engine shop turnaround tasks.* 
ID Task Name Duration Work Predecessors 
4 
1 Engine Shop Turnaroundl ; 252.75h! 1330h, ~,~~~~"~,~",,,_~_,~_"_,, ... ,,,",,,,,,,w.,,,,w.,,,·.,,,,,,_~_,,~_,,,,,,,_·,_""",~~_~_~~~~~""."_"w.· ... ;~· . .,w.·_·,,,w .• · ...• ,, ........ , .. .,.,." ... "' ...... '""m1-.'.'.,~" ... w.,.~w.".""'''''''''.~~_ .. _·, ... "w_).,'''_.·~~"'''''''''''_'''_.·.'''.,·.''''.,·.·.,·,.w." .... ,".,· .... ·.",,1 
2 Nozzle Tube Leak ChecksN1294.0051 ! 3h 1 6.5h '. 
-:-- "' ... '''''"''_"'' __ ,.,_ .... _ .. ·_"_"''_'''"'~,_·., .. ,,.,.·~.~~w~ ___ ,,'''" __ ~,~ __ "''''"''_,_ ...... " .. ~· .... "'.w.''''.w." .... ·.·.·.",,_w.,,.".".w."'.,.W"" .... "'w.".w.i,.·.""w .... ~ .... _" ___ ~ ... "'.,, ........ ·."''''''''''''''''" ... ,,'''''''''''' ....... ,""' 
3 SSME Inspections in Engine Shop (continued)N1011.02! 1 252.75h! 135.75h 
""",,,,,,,-,,,--,,,,,,,,--,,-",-,,,,,,",-"--",,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,~,,,,,,,,,,,,,,-,,.,,,-,,,,,,,,,,~,,,,,,,,,,",,,,",,,,,,,,,,.,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,",,,,,,.,,,,,,,.,,,,, .. ,,",,,,,,,.,,,,,,"" ............ """" ....... """" ... , •. " • .,,, .... ,, ........ ,-,, ... ""."""w·" ..... r'"""""''''''''''''''''''''''''" 
4 Vertical Stand Available i Oh I Oh 
_ """" ... _"""'" ........ _ .. ''''~'''''"'''''. __ .... ~."'' ...... ,,, ... ~''' ...... ,, .. _''' ........ " .. "~ .... "'~"' ... "" .. " .. """."""""",,"'''.''''·,, .... ·''' .. '''''''·'''''w ......... ,"" ... ".,"" .... " ....... , .. " ...... " .. ; ....•. " ............. w ...................... ww •.. ,} ...... , .. w, .. ,."_ .. ~_,, 
5 Transfer Engine to Vertical StandN5087! ( 3h 11 32.5h 
6w<~::~~R~~~_~'~~i~f).i,QhI!.~~q~~:~~~~~i~:1T03:~~~~~iL=:==:~~"'""'~',,=""~~'~· •. ·.·'''.·.·.· .• ·.'''',,.· •. ·.·.'·"", .. I'.· •. ·.·.·.·.· •. · •••. ·.·~:~~~·'''.·.'~,:~, '~~"::~":'='~1~~5~., .... "~,,.,.1,, ..... , .... __ "" __ ~,_~ .. ,_w"w. __ .. "w 
7 HPFTP Post-FlightTorque CheckN1 011.03 Run 1! 1 3.5h ! 10.5h : 6' 
""~'w"~"~ .. ~ .. ,,~~~~,~~,_,,,_w""w~,,_,,~,,.""''''''' .. '''''''~'''''"~,~~" __ " .... "., ..... · ...... ,~.~_._ ..... _, .. ,, ....... +, .... , .... w ....... w.'" ....... " ... "., .............. " ... " ....... , .... "' ....... " ......... '".''''''·.·'-"""~"·.w.""'~r"""~.~w .... ~ .. w .... ~'" 
8 HEX Coil Post-Flight Leak CheckN1294.0031 I 8h 9h; 7 
............ " ........ ,,,"' ......................... ,,,,....,,,, ..... , ....... ,,,, ......... ,, ....... """"",,,,"',,,, ... "',,""'v.,,,, ....... "',,,,, ..... ,,,,,, .............. ' '' ........... , .... ,''''''"'''' ..... "w., .... ''''''''''' .... ''''' ...... ~, ...... ''''''''w.''' ........ , .... ''w ..... w ......... '''·.w ........ w ............................... "v."', ......... , .... , .... " ..... ,· ... , ............ , ......... ("""' .............. v ....... w., .......... ,,· ....................................... '""'1 ... ~w ............................................ "'N""""W ........... '~ ...... .,..'{= ................ '=.~ ........ ' ........ . 
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m ................ lnstaife=1Dii .. DMHsN41.:S0021 ........................................... · .......... w ....................... ~ ... ~ ........ ~ .................. . 
146 Install E-2 R/H DMHSN41-50022 
147 
148 =--+I"~' ... _ ... ~ ... lnSt;;~.I!~~~~~'-Y.~~:~~622 ....... =::==·"'··=~_~_ ......... w.·_ .. _ .. _.~_ ................... · ............................. ; ........ w .. ~ •• :;; ................. : .•. Position Davit Crane on 19R/G41-20017 . •. 
149 
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~~w.::~" Insta~!:!=~~E.~~41~~~:=~=====:: .. w_.= ........ ~~==:: ... M ... w •• :==:::::::::::.::.::::::::::.::<:::::: .. :: .... ~"'". 
·ft Lower Davit Crane from Level 19/G41-20017 ~~~~ ~~~~ ... "'~~.~~_."'''_ ......... ~ ............. " .... ''''w ... " ... w.J .. , .. w ........... ~ 
151 ~-~... Heat siliel(j"Sec"uring/spilceDne'Configura:iiOnJv41 -50U2X 
152 Install Carrier PanelsN80-95907,33,35 : 98h . 
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.- Hydraulic System Power·UpN1063N9002.01 
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~:,,:=:~:=·r\fP~~£!~~~~~~~~~:E~b~~~~~~I~~~~~~!~~~~.~~== •. ,,=""::::::,:.=,,===,~:,:"":. 
·ft SSME TVC Toe·ln Clearance ChecksN1063 
160 
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TeciiTaj;tic[3j;Engi[4]····· .. · ..
·····fiicii;tiC;Eiigr······,······ 
,jsh ... ,... 153 ....1. 
.~~h ........... 1 .................... " ........................... 1 ............. Tech~~~~~~f~o/:~~~.r.[.~l 
12h 164,162, Tech[2],QC 
······~~g~·· .. ·:·~[=~···{~······:~::::::l~··"·:·::~···~·~···::~i!~~:~~:~::··:::::~:·~ ...... 
···········~ .... TeC'i;:Qc···· ... ·· .. ········ ... ·········· 
· .... ······· ..... Tecii:QCw ................... ~ .......... . 
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Tech,QC 
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Predecessors Resource Names 
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~~.·"'~'"'w.·.M."'"''' ....• -'w .• I-· .. ·.· .. WM .. "' .. ' ... "'MTe'ch" .• ~·.·.·'-.w" .. "."."''' 
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E ~~~~~~~~~I~~~;[~i~E~==r=~-==~ 
21 Orbiter Power-Up I Oh I Oh j 20 =~~~;~~~~~~~~~~=fl.~j~:.~=:l:~l~:f·~~-=·-~~=i 
25 ETlSRB System Checks ! 8h I Oh I 24 ' : ~.!~~======:=~=:=:T=l=f=El=~
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E ::===::-~i-====-===T~=:~ 
36 Perform TP8 Configuration 
37 ·"""·~"'·"' .. "'''''' .. "'pertOr'm'Pb47pD5HUMsTearch'eckPreps'' .. ''''''~''' .. ''.", .. "", .. -: ~i~-=---=-==---====S=i-+-~ 
Table 16. VAB rollin to launch tasks (Continued). 
Task Name Work Predecessors Resource Names 
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;-J==".,,",,~=:i!E~~~l5isc§~!~~!.§~nJ~~eCkS!~ji~~~~.~:~~~~:=~~":::~:'~:~.:~.~:.=~~ ... """'"'''''"''"'''''+''"''' 
- MPS LOX Fill and Drain QD Leak Check 
MPS LH2 Fill and Drain QD Leak Check 
SSME GN2 Healer Checkout/GN2 Leak Checksl 
Configure Heater Power Circuit Breakers 
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'VeriryNo"Leakage'@'pb14G'N2'Purgi;-ilitertaceper's00066:oio. 
······PertormBubbie·soapleak·CheckofTSMGN2Lines . 
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; 50 ! Tech[2],QC[3],Safety,Engr[2] 
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+ ..... 
............................ <1 ..................................................... :!o ..................................................... " ............... " ............... . 
0.25h 2h; 51 Tech[2],QC[3].Engr[2],Safety 
0.25h 2h 
6:i5hI 2h 1 53 
... { •.... "" .•• ·w .. ".w.· .. W'''''''''.""t"'''''''''''''''' ..... " .......... ,w".A'." ............................ ~.,, 
0.25h; 2h f 54 
Tech[2j;aC[3j;Engr[2j;SafetY' 
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- Perform GN2 IfF Joint N1 Leak Check per V41 AXO.020!.030f.040 
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Close Panel Circuit Breakers 61 Tech,QC,Engr 
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• Open Panel Circuit Breakers 
~ .......................................... :.~~~er.~?~~·~!~~~i~utor·Pane·is··~· .. · ........ · .... '··· .... ~· .. ·····"······"'·' .... " ...... " ............ . 
- VAS RoII·Out OparationsfA52141 
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0.25h ; 0.75h ! 63 . Tech,QC,Engr 
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24h i 
· ..·"·· ........ ·········Tecfi;Qcj~ngr ........ " .......... · ...... 
'Roii:Outi'reps . . 
shlittiii Transfer to Laiiiich'Paif 
~=.::::~:=~~:~~~~!i~~sp:~~:?E_e,r~~:~~~::~: ... :~~: .. ::::=::::::::::.=:::~::::::::::::::::::::~ .. ~":::::::::::.:::::::::=::~~~: ... """ ..................... , ..... , ... " .. 
- Launch Pad Validation PrepsfS0009 POSU's : " 
:---I ..... _ .. NShUttlt1~~~~"~~on t~!~!:=~~~=.w.:=~:~,,~:.:::::: .. :,::.::::::=·~·::~~:.~::.: .. ::.::::=:.:,~:=::::" .. :":.~,:,,.,,:' ..... 
A MLP Harddown at Padl 71,69 
.. "'_. Launch palrv'8'iidlillii'ii7S1iiijgr· .... "''''·''"' ........ ''w.~ .............. '' . 
'=' ___ + .. ~ .. w." .. " .. " .... ~.~.~ ... ~ .. ~~.~~ .. ~.~.~~~~~ ... ~. • ... ~~_~""~._ .. _ .. ~_.,,,""'''~ 
• Perform PD15fPD16 Connect . 
72 
'''''''''''''-'''-Pertorrrl' A2202 'Firexvei1fTcaH;;;;"~~~'~"'''''''''' 
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:---I==::::":~:=~~!~ai~!~~!~i~§"!U£9!:===~::=:·::=:::,, .. ::::.::::=~= .. ::.=:~::::::::::::::::=:=::::=:.:::: .. :::.:,:: ... :: ... : ..... " ........  
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•... ,··<f."~.~ .. " ... ,,w:.·::::!~~~;~~~~,~~~~==~:=~:~::::,. 
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Table 16. VAB rollin to launch tasks (Continued). 
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83 Perform ET 01 Instrumentation Checks 
84 Perform ET Level Sensor Cals 
85 .,,"" ,,_w""""Pe'rtorm'VaiveVerificatlons'for'G'2340"C6 2/IH2GiieckiiutS'····"··"·~·············~··"···-'· 
86 ·······················PertormEf6fpowe·rDown··· 
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89 Preps for SSME Hydraulic OperatlonsN9002.06 .' 7h 
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92 .............. ····Remove·oralnTineAii'i1piersandEnvironm·entilifiiroatPIUgs "r"'lhlfti . 
.. · .... · ....... · .. · .. ,··90 .. · ...... · .... ·· 
'til Tech' 
Engr 
··· .. ,· .. · .. ·, .. ····TeCiil'2];OC·'··,·,· .. ·_· .... " .. ," 
93 ···················· .. ·············Pertiirm·ss~iE·CPFOHeiium Barrier Purge System ve'ntiiig 9:2 . Tech 
94 ............. · .. " ... ·"SSME Contr(;iier .. PoWe'r:DpN9601vr,f-... " ........ " ...... ·~ ..... -' ......... '-.............. -.. -.... ~.~ ... , ..... " ....... -..................... . 
95· .. · .. ·~' .... ' .. ' .. ·Siiuttie FlighfContro(SysterrI"ACilvatlor1"COm p lete"·" .. ·-w~" .. """" .. '.................. '-' .. ' .. "" ............ "" .... " .. ' .. < .... 
96 SSME Controller Load and Sensor CheckouW9001VL4 
. 89 ; QC[3],Engr[4] 
E~===~=:3 97 Hydraulic System Pressurization Complete 
98 Activate SSME 750 psi Pneumatics 97 : .. O'C·[3j,Engr[4r .... ' 
99"'SSMfHYdiiiu'iic'System'Conditl'o'ning'i1iiilActuatorCheckout······· 
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~" ........... w~.·.·.·."'·.w.·.·.w.· .................... · .......... ·.·.·.· ..... "" .. · ..... w.'"' ... w.· ... · ... • ....... ·~~ ............ MW.'· .... 102 Hydraulics and Flight Control Closeout Operatlonsl 
103 ~· .... -~ ...... - .. "'Aerosurface anassMECyCfing,i\lf368w.N .... "~"."W~"~"W.W"'.N ... " ..... ~~" .... m ....... ·.·.w." ... M .... "· ... ~w.· .. 
104 ·'~"~·~~~·~"Hyd;iuiicSystem'comii'ressfbmtYN96ij2.07w ... w .. ,-~~"' ...... , .................. ~ ............. w,............... .. 
105 .................................. .. Frequency Res'ponseTiistingNl034' 
106 Hydraulic System Closeouts and SecuringN9002.02 107 """'''SSME Pne·umatlcs .. Sei: .. ure(r' .. w ....... ~ ......................... ~ ..... - .... " ... ' ...... ~"".~ ..... " .. ~ .. , ......... ~ .. ~ ........ " .. "., ............ ,. 
1 08 -~SiME 88iTSeaILeak'Check O'peniifOns;V1046:iiii2JVfo4Ifo03r""·~ .. ~ ......... · .... ·· .... ~ ...... · .. '·'W' j,,"""""""w.w.w ... ~~ .. w ............... , ..... ' ''''' .• w ... ~.w ........... "' ... ~ ......................... , ...................... , ......... w." .......................... ,~ ........ , ... w.· ....................... vM'· ... ·.·.· 
109 Install Base Heat Shield Access LadderN35-00008 Tech[2],QC 
110 SSME/TVC Actuator Hydraulic Power-Down Securing RequlrementsN9002.06 
111 " .......... · ..... ·, .... · .... · .. ·"SSM'E''Englneer'Oetermlne·Required .. Power"Oown ... Configuratlon .. ·· ...... · Engr 
112 ............................ ········iiistaiiKiiidstroke[ocksNSOsi······· "111 .......! ··························Tech[2j;dc 
::,:::.===2~~:::::::::::::::=:::[.,::::=::~=::::::::=:!~~~:::::::.:=::~:=:~::::::= .. ' ..... ]I· 
.. ,Tech,QC,Safety r"· ... ·' .... · .. "w114 .... ' .... ~· .... j ... ··· .. ' .. ' .. "'fe'ch:QC[2rEng·rT2r-" ............. , .. ,, 
.. '5h-' .. ' .. "' .... i .. ·~·~" .... ·n5· .. " .... "'~ .. "·:·" .. '........"f;;Ch:ac[2j:fngr[2r''' ........ , .. , .... 
H6· .. · .. ·······+··· .... ~~····· ..... ····Tech:6c ... "' ..... ···· .. .. 
'1'114\ 
113 Vent Bleeder Plug at Joint P20.2 
114 Install SSME Throat PlugsN1046.002 
115 Fuel Valve Ball Seal Leak CheckN1 046.002 
116 Oxidizer Valve Ball Seal Leak CheckN1 046.003 
117 ... ~·~SSME .. HydrauIiCQOX~R'aysN9002:of .. · ... '~ .. · ..' .. · .. 
118 'lo2FeedisSMEpneu'maticsviiiited' 
119 LH2 Feed Vented Oh ; .... ···115·; 
.. "' ..... " ..... "''''"." .... , ..................................... ~, ..... , ... " ........ w ......................... ~ ........ " .. " ...... " .................................. ' '' •.. ,''"·." ............ "' ...... " .......... """ .... ","'· ....... "" .... ' '' .... ''''"_~, ..... , ........... w.,·., .............. w .............. ' '' .... '''·,·w............... ",,",,{ .. " .... , ........................... "" .... "'.~ ..... "" ... , ........... ''''~ ........ ' '' .. w ............... , .... i-.-..., .... '''w ... ''' .... " .... , ......... w ...... ~,~ ............... ~, .... ,~ .... , ..................... , ............ ..........., ............. ~ .......... "' ........ ,,"N. ........ , ..... ~""' .... 'A"."" ........ '''''''' .. ''' ............. .. G02 Blanking Plate InstaliationfT14021 ! 6h i Oh . 119 . 120 
Table 16. VAB rollin to launch tasks (Continued). 
Task Name Work Predecessors Resource Names 
GH2 Blanking Plate Installation/T14011 ; 6h 1 Oh I 120 
~=::r"'~""~rbiter/e.Y:i!in~~ .• ~i.~ .. ~?~~~~t~a.~i~·pu";g"'eyerifi~a.~~~!,!~.~~~.I... ······ .. ······· .. ·· ....... ·"····~",,··· ... ·....J'a.~.l.. ·.······· ..••.• ~h.·........L .. · ···,,5~;~~!" .. ·M"._>'. ··....,,, .. ,,, .. ·,, .. ··,·· .. ·· .. , .. ··,, .. ··1 
.- Helium Signature TestJV12021 ~ 34h ; 1ah 1 120,121 .. 
........................................................................................................................ .. ...... , .................................. ,....... .. .............. ;........ .. .............. l. · .... · .............. ·· ... · ........... 1 
SSME Preps for Hallum Signature Tast! ; 7h ; 1ah '[ ! 
......... A"',"""'·'M'·"' ... "' .... ""'''''.M'''"·AW~'''~''''~·~,~"'"''',,'~~ .... ''''' ........ ·A .... ''"""" ........ "w"'" ....... , .... ,, .... '''·''''··,,''.'''''' ...... m'''''''' ...... ~m .... '''''A''' ...... ·" .... "' .... "'M"·W· . . ......... ,···, ... t ""W ............. ~ ...... ············,·w· ,., ..... ·.,",""' ... ,··,"" ........... ,",·",""" .... ,"' ............ , ............ 'w ............ , ........ ,,, .......... · .... w ......... " ............ ",.w"''',··,''" '" .... " .... , .... , ........ " ............ , .... , .... ,,, .... .... 
Install Drain Line Closures 1 1 h ! 1 h; ; Tech 
:-=----i ...... 'w" ... m.w .... ~w'''''''_ .. ~.,_" ..... ''''' .... " .. '''''''.''"'_~".,_"''w"'_~"w_"" ... "".~·_·m'"~·.''''''' .. ,~,''·''"' .... , .. ,··· ,··,·,',., ..... ·,··w··.·· ..... ··· , ",.. ." ..•.. . ......... " ............ _ ......... "" .. " .... , .... " .. ~ .... , ..... , .... " ..... """"""""'"''",'''.''''''",,''''' 
.- Establish Safety Clears/OK for Thrust Chamber Entry , 1 h I 3h I 125 I Tech,aC,Safety 
"",~''' .. '''''''''"''''''''"' .... ,~''''''' .... " .. "'' .... " .. ,, .... '''' .. w·'''''· .. '''''''''w.,,,', .• ,.''''',,'''''''.'''''''''''''.,.'', .. ,,' .• ,, ................. ~ .... "~~ ....... ""··,·· .... ······ .. ·,, .. ,····· ..... · ...... f.· .. ··········, •..... '.'.''' ........ '' ..... + ......... '''' .... " ..''~"''''''''''''''' .. '' .. ''+'~, .... ""."" ..... , .. "' .. ,,, ........ , .. "',,,, .. ,,,,,"',,,, 
Perform MCC Liner Taping l 2h i 6h , 126 I Tech,aC,Safety 
.," .. " .. ""' ..... "" ...... , .. _"" ___ .. _."""''''' ... ''''''.~,~,,,'''''' .. ''''_~'''~-""""'·.· ..... --~"'''''''''-''''.''''''"" ...... ".-".~, .. ,~ ... " ... ·,1 .... · ..· ............... "' ..... ~w •• , ....... ,.'''' .. " ... ·, •• " .. " •• ''w .... w_'w .. ''"., ....... ,· ... w.· ....... ·.·.·.'w."" .... ·.·.w ...... · ......... · ..... ""w""',, .... "'.w ..... "'''.ww""'"'''"·~,,''''''_,, 
Install Throat Plug and Monitor Gage Manifold ! 2,5h ; 7.5h 1 127 i Tech,aC,Safety ~"'w.~"'."'''.'''" ... ''''~ .. ~~.''' ... w_.~".w ... ""'~'''.''''"''.,,.·~_ ... ''''''."'''' ... "'''_ .. ,,'''' .... ·.w.,,'',,w·, .. '''' .. _.m''''' .. '"'""_'''''''''',·.· .• ·.w ..... ' .. , ............ " ....... w~ __ .. " ..... _. __ ';---'.""ww ...... _""._www .. w .. - .... "."' ... "~-''' .•.•.• w ... " .•. w .• "".·.·l-· .. ·.· ..... w, ... ,,,·."w .• · .• · .. · ..... w .. · .. ww .. ,," __ 
" Mate Flexhose Between Supply Panel and Manifold : O.5h , O.5h I 128, Tech :;:. __ +ww~.~~_ .. __ ~ ..... ~_~''''''' ....... __ ~~'''.ww. __ ~,~._ .... _". __ ~~"".w._""_"' .. w"""',, ... ,.w .. w .. ·.· .• w .• ·• __ .... w ... · 
-- Perform PV13 GN2 Panel Setup 
ww-·"~·~Haz·Gas·Detection Sysrem'PrePs--w~w.-"-"''''' 
= ___ -I."" .. " ...... ~ww.,w_,w ... w'~ww.m ..... " ..... " ....... w"' .. "'ww'".""' ... ""'~, ....... ~ ... "' .... w,,, .. "" ... "" .. "'" ... ww~.~,,."' .... w, __ ............ , ... . 
_... Pre-Test Helium Intrusion Test 
~_r~mw .. -MPS'(m27L02Fee(r .. and·S .. SME'Hot· Gas·System·Tesr"'·····--· .. "·-····· .. ··"'w~ .• - .••.. " .............. ".... • 
··G0'2·System·Test'···· 
'TH2Fe'eii'System" . . ......... ······· .. ·········'2h 
=_+~~==..-::~~~T!!i:~~~!~!~~~~~!~~"-~::~=-~~~::::::::=:=.::~~.":::.=~:.::::~::::=~~~~:="=== __ :~:,~::::::: __ ::::~=: __ ..... '".-."'~''' ......... 'w'' .. ·'·9h········· 
-- G02 Blanking Plate Installation/T14021 
!!=\.~==~B~~!"§~rng'~!3t~~~~E~~?n~I~~=:~=~::~=~:=:=:=, ... ".,,~""""'==:=::~=::~::~=:.:::::=: 
: ~ Ordnance Installation Oparatlons - Part 11 ~-" .... ~~"'''~~~"'~"''''''" .. ".""''''~'"''"'"''' .. --."'"'"' ... ''''''''"'' .. " .... ".'''"'',·""",""""~." .. ,,.,,'"_"""'''''''''"''w.·.''''''''''w .... · .... · ..... w.'''~ .... 
• - Ordnance Installation/PIC Resistance Checks/S5009 
:~ ............. '" Ordnance Closeouts/S5o'b~9"'''' .. '''''''-'''''''w .... -~."''''' .. '''' 
= __ +"'~~~ .. _,~"w ___ ~_~N~.~"W .. ~.'w~_"'_~~w ... _~~_w,~ ... "., ... w.w.w"'" ... w .... __ ~"' .. "'".w .. w ...... 
. - Pre-Launch Hypergollc Propellant Loading Operatlons/S00241 
~ .•• ~,.~:~,.: .. :,:: •• :~r.~p.:~~~~~.:~~a.~~i9P~t~~~"-.s.!~~:~~~::::~::.~~:::::::~ •••• ::~.:.:w'"._ .. ~ ... ::=:::.: .. :.::: .•• : ..... : .. : •.:~ •• : .•" .......... , .... . 
-• Propellant Loading CJoseouts/S0024 
'Ordiiii'iica'iiistiii'j'iiti(jii'ojiiirati(jiis"~'Part2i' .... . ....... . 
',····SRSS'SystemT'esi 
~~==:=~:~~~~§~~:~~~~~y~?~~~~~~"-~~~~~~~~/~~~~~~~--:·=~~::~~::~~::::,:::.:.:::::::::~~='~::.":~::::': ......... . 
-- Ordnance Closeouts/S5009 
LOX System Dewpolnt and Condltlonlng/S10051 
SSME Thrust Cover Removal/Drain Line Adapter InstaliationN5057 Tech,aC 
Rocketdyne Tech on Station for Dewpoints Tech 
~:~"w~=:::=:?~ ... ~!!er~~~~_O_1 ~ower-up .. ·=~ .. ,=:~::=::=~ .. , .. ~ ....... "'w ... ~ ... "'~"" ..... "''' ............... WN .... W ••• "'. __ ~ ........ .. 
. - SSME Trickle Purge Securing Tech 
~ .. :====~", M.!'.~!50 i~!~~~~~§s.~~~~~~!i~!I~~==~ .. = .. :::::::·'::::: ... :::: .. ::.=~:~.=:==~:==~~:= ... ~:.: ........... w .... "" 
.- ET LOX Tank. SSME, TSM Vent and Engine Bleed Dewpoint 
···~iiijnFiiTiind'5rainDew·ii·iiint··· 
.............. "'j ......................... . 
LOX ET Pressure Maintenance ! 2,5h 
1-~=--1~!;$;:~=======h f. ___ .w ..... .w., ... w.~.;,~,.w ........ ~."'''.+_~-.... _.~,~~~~ng~I~L~", .. ,,'w~ .. "'''"''w 
~ 
Table 16. VAB rollin to launch tasks (Continued). 
ID Task Name Duration 
161 Transfer Une Purge and Sample \ 1.5h . 
~ .. , •.... ~.~ ... ~""'~~~ •. "." __ .. __ " .• , ..... ,.~, •• ,, ...• ,~, ••• "''''''''''"'.~''m.' ........ _ .......... " .• ~ ... ~ ..... m.' ............. "'''' .. '''. . ..•.••.. ,.. . .........•.... , ."' ......... . 
162 Vaporizer Purge : 1 h '. _. 
163 ·~'OiiiiierAii'cfiiiieoiiiiS12ii7r··'··'···''''· .. ' .. · .. ···· .... ''·-· .......... , ................................................................................... ,.. ········1·iiiiii· 
164'······'''"''· .. Aft''ConiidenceTesr.:-Pre:OoorTiista1iatio·ii"~ ... ""' .. , .. , ... , .... " ....... ,, .. '''"'''' ..... -~ .... '' ... '''' .. ~,......... 1· .. ·• 
165 •• .. ,,, .. •••· .. '68 M EMCC·PoTIsiiTii'g· .. ·-.. mm_.,~~.~ .. " ....... m ............... -~ ••• ~ ...... w ..... ~ ............ " •••••••••• • .• w .• w., ....... W ••• "m ... .. 
166 ···~" .. n;C ActuatOrAight"'Closeout'indTl1Sufatlon'lnstalTationN56Sr'-'''''ww,,, ... ".m,",._ .. _,....._ .......... -r" .. . 
167 ......... , ... ,,' MPSEngii;iiiiilngVerificatlonancfWafkdown _."""_., ...... _ .. " ......... ··~.~' ... _m_ .. "."._.,,,' .... ·.. ......... ...... , .. 
168' ~MP6·1niilarpieps·fo;. FlightN9ii18.001·,,"·'w .. w •• '.'w"-''''"W~''w''-''N-~'w'''''' •• , •. · ...• ~ ..... ,.w,." . 
169· .... ··-~p5T5ipD16'Ef·stiindiiy PressuF;;'fv;on1i'orSiicurrng"~'''-''-'''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''w,""".""~'''''''''' 
170 '''''''''''''''EMH'STnsuiationlnspi;Ctio;;'p~erV41BU6:420'~''''w,,,· ....... _ ........ , .. "~ ... · .......... N. . w_· ..... w ..... ,~, .. ·.·.· .. _ ....... · ..........  
171 SSME Engineering Walkdown 
172 SSME Initial Preps for FlighW9018 .. 001 
173 SSME Quality Walkdown per V41 BUO .. 070 
174 MPS VJ Line ChecksN9019 
~ .. , ... w .. ~'" .. =-veri~~~~~~ .. r.~.~~~~~~~~~~~~~~".==-~:~~: .. :=~:=::.:~:: .. :::: .. ::=~: .. =::=:.=::: .. = ..... '" ..... = .. :=:::::.~:: ..................... ,L,... .~,~ ... . 
176 LPFD Baggie Installation : 6h 
I ~~~ '::=:::::=:::::i~~g6~~~~~~~~~:~~~~~~~.~!!~~~:~:·::::=~::==:~':=:==.::" .... =:':::::::==~:.::::::: .. '::: .. :::' .......... " .. ····· .... I~: ............ !~ ...  
179 .. ~-·· ..... "MPSProtiictive .. Co;;erRem .. ovaJN35:60ob2 .... , .. " ..... _ .... ,~w .... w .. w, .... ~" .... _ •. , .... , ........... , ............ , : •••• , .. ,,' 1611' .... ········ 
180 SSME Protective Cover RemovaiN50Si'············..····························· .. , 8h 
181 ··········MPssoienoi(fPrcitiictive·coiier·RemovaiN35~iiiiiiii3···· 
1 82 ·········Tiistail·Aft5ii~lj50:2'jjiiors· .. fo·rFiigili'········ 
183 ······MPS .. Functionai .. verificatiorifiirFiigilt:·Post:Ooor .. instaiiaiionN9MifOof' 184 ..... . 80007 Launch Countdownojiiiratiiiiiiif 
.................... .:,: ........ : .. ~. . .............. :: ..... . 
185 80007 Launch IOountoown prepsi 186 .... ,· ...... ,""· .. sooii7'Launch .. C·ountdown·Preps ..... ' .... · ...... · ..... , .. " ... d" .", ..................... , , .• , 
187 ····· .. · ........ ~· ... · .. SSME··Drag'on·piinefPurge·Priips/S06ii7VC1,·pOsus··· .. ,",· .... ······ 
188 ·' .. SoO()'7'seq1;FT~43"hours .. ton1 .. ho·ursi····· .. ··········'· ................... , ....... , ......... ~ ........ . 
I 189 "'"'~'''s''6iio7Seq1S:Tffhours'tor:lfhou'rsr'' 
190 .. ·······, .. ·soo07Seq·16:'f:S·hou·rs"to"launciii····'..· ........... ~ ...... , .... ~ ........... . 
191 · ..... ~ ... STiuttliiTifiOfflT~~ .. ~' .. ·-'~~~~ ..... " .... - .. ~ .. ~ .... ~·w ....... ~ ..... '~ ........................................... - .. " ............ ~'''." ............ ... 
192 ...... w ... ~""·~ .. sOO(;7Seq·TFposrCaunch'Si;cUringOperations· ....... - .. ' ............. w ..... w ...... ~" .... w ............... w .......... w ......... .. 
Predecessors Resource Names 
.. .. ·· .... ·140···· .. ·, .. ·· .. ····· .. 1 ..... · .... · ...... · ..,· .. · .... · .._· .. ··· .. ·· ........ ,··,· .... · .... 
.,.~, •• "' ••••••• , ...... " .... " .... y.'..~ ................ +... .<.' ... nnnm.· •.. -.• · .• " .............................. , .... -.................... ' ''m ........ . 148 ! 
.. .. · ........ i64' .. " .... -"T ...... " .. ··-fii·ch .. ;aC:Safety· ........ ·_ .. · 
··,,, ....... 164",· ........ , ... ,. ...... , ..... Tec"f;12IQc' .... ·~-· .. · 
164 
fBT69' .. ·~ .... · .... 1L .. · ...... "·Tech:ric~safetY·"" .... ·w .. .. 
170·, .. ·· .. ' .. • .. r ............ ' ....... "EngrTsI ..... · ............ .. 
·17i ...... · .... ,·_; .. _ .. · .. · .. Tech:·oc;Engr ................ , .. 
:· .................. ·~}~~=:::::::::~=E=:·:::::~:~::::==:=~===.~=~=:= 
. cii:ac;Eng'F'· ... · ...... · .... 
''1'76'''' ···· ...... 'i··· .. • .... fech~QCI2TI;;gr12r·'"" .. ·· 
191 
..· .. · ........ ··· .... fech·· .... ·~"" .. 
Tech 
.. · .... T;;ch~dc;Enii·r· . 
'ac';€ngrlij" 
aC:Engr[ij', 
" ...... _) 
QC,Engr[2) 

APPENDIX C-Unscheduled SSME Operations Data 
Figures 20-24 and tables 18-19 present the detailed data collected from 55MB processing experi-
ence at KSC relative to unscheduled activities. Figures 20-24 present the remaining unscheduled process-
ing classification types. The sixth, base R&R, is presented in section 5. Following these figures, an un-
scheduled summary data table (table 18) is presented. Finally, an example of the existing level of detail 



































'1 h 0 ,. MR AcceDt Performance Timel: 
QC ; Determine PR Condition : i 
QC D Initiate PR Paperwork ' 
: O,5h D Apply MR ID (if Required) 
O,5h-. MR A~cept Administative Time!: 
Engr 0 QE ResearchNalidate PR : 
12h 0 ,0 MR Accept Diagnosti~s Time! 
Engr H"";'! Engr/Mgt Review, Assess PR : 
, Engr Ii'lElI Engr/Mgt Determine Corrective Action: 
Oh 0: 0 MR Accept Delay Timel : 
oEngr DispOSition PR/MR Accept Rationale 
1'+'''''''1 Engr Route PR through Signature Loop 
Oh m Engr Disposition PR Closure ' 
Oh n QE Close PR 
Figure 20. Base MR accept. 
1 h 0 , 0 MR Repair Pe:rformance Time I 
O,25h ; Determ1ne PR Condition ' i 
O,25h 0 Initiate PR Paperwork : 
, , +Time/Resources for Corrective Action (Varies) 
, O,5h n Apply MR ID (if Required) i 
i12h • • Mr Repair Diagnostics Timel ' 
i 8h Hii;",.) ~ngr/Mgt Review, Assess PR 
4h EEl Engr/Mgt Determine Corrective Actidn 
12,5h • • MR Repair Adminstrative T,me! 
O,5h D QE ResearchNalidate PR : 
, 4h 1%;''''',",'0,'1 Engr Disposition PR/MR Repair Rationale (Varies) 
:8h I',,%<,,;,! Engr Route PR through Signature Loop 
i Oh w MR Repair Delay Time! : 
i Oh III Engr Disposition PR Closu~e 
: Oh B QE Close PR i 















































Man-hr IWednesday.! :r~ursday I Friday I Satllrday I Sunday I 4 112 1 8 I 4 1 121 8 I 4 112 I 8 I 4 1121 8 I 4 112 I 8 I 4 I 12 
0.5 0.5h ... PR Performance Time 
, 
I 1 
0.25 I 0.25h 0 Determine PR Condition I I I 
0.25 0.25h D Initiate PR Paperwork I I 
0.5 0.5h ... PR Administrative Time 
0.5 0,5h 0 QE ResearchNaildate PR 
5 'Sh ........ PR Diagnostics Time 
4 4h ""'" Engr/Mgt Review/Assess PR : 
1 1 h 0 Engr/Mgt Determine Corrective Action 
9.5 9.5h ~ PR Delay Time I I 
4 4h ""'" Engr Disposition PR I I 
4 I 4h _: Engr Rt PR through Signature Loop 
1 I 1 h m: Engr Disposition PR Closure I I I 
0.5 I , 0.5h q Engr Disposition PR Closure 1 I I I 
Figure 22. Base PR accept. 
IWednesdayl Thursday 1 Friday 1 Saturday 1 Sunday 1 
Man-hr 41121 8 1 4 ' 121 8 1 4 '12 1 8 1 4 '121 8 1 4 '12 1 8 1 4 '12 
0.5h ~ PR Performance Time! : 








0.?5h 0 Initiate PR Paperwork ! ! 























! 2h ~ PR Diagnostics Time : i 
! 1 ho Engr/Mgt Review/Assess PR ! ! 
: 1h 0 Engr/Mgt Determine Corrective Action : 
4.5h ~ PR Administrative Time: ! 
O.5h n QE ResearchNalidate PR: : 
! + Engr Disposition PR (Varies w(th Repair Classification) 
: 4h c=1 Engr Rt PR through Signatur~ Loop ! 
: Oh ~ PR Delay Time : : 
: Oh Q Engr Disposition PR Closure: : 
! Oh Iil QE Close PR I ! 
Figure 23. Base PR repair. 
IWednesdayl Thursday 1 Friday 1 Saturday 1 Sunday 1 
41121 8 1 4 '121 8 I 4 '12 I 8 I 4 '12 I 8 I 4 '12 I 8 I 4 '12 
0.5h ... Waiver Performance Time , , , , 




0.25h I Initiat~ PR Paperwork , , , , , , 
0.5h'" Waiver Administrative Time , , , , , , 
0.5h I QE ResearchNaiidate PR , , 
12h ........... Waiver Diagnostics Time ! 
8h 'u",,' E~grIMgt Review/Assess P~ 
4h """ EngrIMgt Determine Corrective Action 
Oh , ; , Waiver Delay Time 
Oh i Engr Disposition PR/Waiver Rationale 
Oh ~ Engr Rt PR/Waiver Rationale through , . Signature 
: Oh f1 Waiver Presentation , , , 
Oh [j Engr Disposition PR Closure ! , , 
, Oh 0 QE Close PR , , , , , , , , 








































SSME PR Classlllcation 
48hr Drying OMRSD Waiver 
AFV Filter R&R 
Bagg'le Hose R&R 




Burst Diaphragm R&R 
Contamination MR Repair 
Contamination Repair 
Contamination/Corrosion Accept 
Contamination/Corrosion MR Accept 
Contamination/Corrosion Waiver 
Controller R&R: Post-FRT 
Controller R&R: Pre-FRT 
Coolant Diffuser R&R 
Coolant Duct R&R 
EDNI AccepJ 




Enoine Assemblv R&R 
Enoineerina Chanae 
Flange Sealing Surface MR Repair 
Flange Sealing Surface Repair 
FPB Oxidizer SI!JIPly Duct R&R: Post-HPOTP 
FPB Oxidizer Supplv Duct R&R: Pre-HPOTP 
Fuel Bleed Duct R& R 
Functional Failure AcceDt 
Functional Failure Clean/Adjust 
Functional Failure MR Acc~ 
Functional Failure Reperform/Retest 
Functional Failure Waiver 
GCV Assemblv R&R 
Table 18. 55MB unscheduled processing summary. 
Tach ac Engr Engr 
Total Basa Basa Basa Base Tach ac Pari 
Pari Pari Dlag Admin Base Perl MHrs 
MHrs MHrs MHrs MHrs MHrs MHrs 
0 0.5 12 0.5 13 0 0 
0 0.5 2 6.5 9 1 1 
0 0.5 2 6.5 9 1.25 1.25 
0 0.5 2 4.5 7 1 1 
0 0.5 2 6.5 9 1.5 1.5 
0 0.5 2 4.5 7 0.75 0.75 
0 0.5 2 6.5 9 1.25 1.25 
0 0.5 2 6.5 9 0.5 0.5 
0.5 0.5 12 12.5 25.5 1.25 1.25 
0 0.5 2 4.5 7 1.75 1.75 
0 0.5 5 0.5 6 0 0 
0.5 0.5 12 0.5 13.5 0 0 
0 0.5 12 0.5 13 0 0 
0 0.5 2 6.5 9 154.5 74.25 
0 0.5 2 6.5 9 35.5 14.5 
0 0.5 2 6.5 9 2 2 
0 0.5 2 6.5 9 2 2 
0 0.5 5 0.5 6 0 0 
0.5 0.5 12 12.5 25.5 5.5 5.5 
0 0.5 2 6.5 II 7 7 
0 0.5 2 4.5 7 6 6 
0 0.5 2 6.5 9 1 1 
0 0.5 2 6.5 9 8 8 
0 0.5 12 0.5 13 0 0 
0.5 0.5 12 12.5 25.5 3.5 3.5 
0 0.5 2 4.5 7 4 4 
0 0.5 2 6.5 9 22.5 14.5 
0 0.5 2 6.5 9 13 9 
0 0.5 2 6.5 9 5 5 
0 0.5 5 0.5 6 0 0 
0 0.5 2 4.5 7 4 4 
0.5 0.5 12 0.5 13.5 0 0 
0 0.5 2 4.5 7 2.5 2.5 
0 0.5 12 0.5 13 0 0 
0 0.5 2 6.5 9 3 3 
Total Engr Total No. No. No. 
Perl Pari MHrs Tachs acs Engrs MHrs MHrs 
0 0 13 0 0 0 
8.5 10.5 19.5 1 1 1 
0 2.5 11.5 1 1 0 
0 2 9 1 1 0 
0 3 12 1 1 0 
0 1.5 8.5 1 1 0 
0 2.5 11.5 1 1 0 
0 1 10 1 1 0 
0 2.5 28 1 1 0 
0 3.5 10.5 1 1 0 
0 0 6 0 0 0 
0 0 13.5 0 0 0 
0 0 13 0 0 0 
93.25 322 331 na na na 
13 63 72 na na na 
0 4 13 1 1 0 
0 4 13 1 1 0 
0 0 6 0 0 0 
0 11 36.5 1 1 0 
0 14 23 1 1 0 
0 12 19 1 1 0 
0 2 11 1 1 0 
8.5 24.5 33.5 1 1 1 
0 0 13 0 0 0 
24.5 31.5 57 1 1 1 
6.5 14.5 21.5 1 1 1 
1 38 47 na na na 
0 22 31 na na na 
0 10 19 1 1 0 
0 0 6 0 0 0 
0 8 15 1 1 0 
0 0 13.5 0 0 0 
0 5 12 1 1 0 












































SSME PR Classification 
Hardware Configuration Acc~ 
Hardware Configuration MR Accept 
Hardware Confiauration MR R~ir 
Hardware Configuration Reinstallation 
Hardware Configuration Waiver 
Hardware Crack/Weld Defect MR Repair 
Hardware Crack/Weld Defect RelJllir 
Hardware Damaae Accepl 
Hardware Damage MR Accept 
Hardware Damage M R Repair 
Hardware Damage Repair 
Hardware Damage Waiver 
Harness AcceDt 
Harness M R Accept 
Harness MR Repair 
Harness R&R: Post-FRT 
Harness R&R: Pre-FRT 
Harness Repair 
Heat Shield Clip/Bracket R&R 
Hot Gas Manifold R&R 
HPFD R&R: Pad 
HPFD R&R: Shop Post-FRT 
HPFD R&R: Shop Pre-HPFTP R&R 
HPFTP Bellows Shield R&R 
HPFTP R&R: Pre-R&R 
HPFTP Thrust Bearina Housing R&R 
HPOTP Preburner Volute R&R 
HPOTP R&R: Pre-R&R 
HPOTP Turbine Housino R&R 
HPV Assembly R&R 
Hydraulic aD R&R 
laniter R&R 
Line Assembly R&R 
LOX Post Support Pin R&R 
LPFD R&R: OPF/Pad 
Table 18. 55MB unscheduled processing summary (Continued). 
Tech QC Engr Engr Total Tech 8ase 8ase 8asa Base DC Perf Engr 
Perf Perf Diag Admin BasB Pari MHrs Perf 
MHrs MHrs MHrs MHrs MHrs MHrs MHrs 
0 0.5 5 0.5 6 0 0 0 
0.5 0.5 12 0.5 13.5 0 0 0 
0.5 0.5 12 12.5 25.5 2.5 2.5 0 
0 0.5 2 4.5 7 3 3 0 
0 0.5 12 0.5 13 0 0 0 
0.5 0.5 12 12.5 25.5 7.5 7.5 0 
0 0.5 2 4.5 7 8 8 0 
0 0.5 5 0.5 6 0 0 0 
0.5 0.5 12 0.5 13.5 0 0 0 
0.5 0.5 12 12.5 25.5 3.5 3.5 0 
0 0.5 2 4.5 7 4 4 0 
0 0.5 12 0.5 13 0 0 0 
0 0.5 5 0.5 6 0 0 0 
0.5 0.5 12 0.5 13.5 0 0 0 
0.5 0.5 12 12.5 25.5 2 2 0 
a 0.5 2 6.5 9 11 4 4 
0 0.5 2 6.5 9 3 3 0 
0 0.5 2 4.5 7 2.5 2.5 0 
0 0.5 2 6.5 9 1 1 0 
0 0.5 2 6.5 9 4 4 8.5 
0 0.5 2 6.5 9 70.75 27.25 9 
0 0.5 2 6.5 9 37.25 26.75 8 
0 0.5 2 6.5 9 23.25 13 2.5 
0 0.5 2 6.5 9 2 2 0 
0 0.5 2 6.5 9 0 0 a 
0 0.5 2 6.5 9 8 8 0 
0 0.5 2 6.5 9 16 16 0 
0 0.5 2 6.5 9 0 0 0 
0 0.5 2 6.5 9 2 2 0 
0 0.5 2 6.5 9 8 8 0 
0 0.5 2 6.5 9 6 6 0 
0 0.5 2 6.5 9 2 2 0 
0 0.5 2 6.5 9 5 5 0 
0 0.5 2 6.5 9 0 10 8.5 
0 0.5 2 6.5 9 64.75 24.75 5.5 
Total Total No. No. No. Perl MHrs Techs DCs Engrs 
MHrs 
0 6 0 0 0 
0 13.5 0 0 0 
5 30.5 1 1 0 
6 13 1 1 0 
0 13 0 0 ",. 0 
15 40.5 1 1 '/, 0 
16 23 1 1 0,. 0 
0 6 0 0 .... 0 
0 13.5 0 0 0 
7 32.5 1 1 0 
8 15 1 1 0 
0 13 0 0 0 
0 6 0 0 0 
0 13.5 0 0 0 
4 29.5 1 1 0 
19 28 na na na 
6 15 1 1 0 
5 12 1 1 0 
2 11 1 1 0 
16.5 25.5 1 1 1 
107 116 na na na 
72 81 na na na 
38.75 47.75 na na na 
4 13 1 1 0 
0 9 na na na 
16 25 1 1 0 
32 41 1 1 0 
0 9 na na na 
4 13 1 1 0 
16 25 1 1 0 
12 21 1 1 0 
4 13 1 1 0 
10 19 1 1 0 
18.5 27.5 0 1 1 





Table 18. SSME unscheduled processing summary (Continued). 
Tech QC Engr Engr 
Base Base Base Base Total Tech QC Perl Engr Total Total No. No. No. 
10 SSME PR Classlllcation Perl Perl Dlag Admin Base Perl MHrs Perl Perl MHrs Techs DCs Engrs 
MHrs MHrs MHrs MHrs MHrs MHrs MHrs MHrs 
71 lPFD R&R: Shop Pre-HPFTP R&R 0 0.5 2 6.5 9 23.5 11.5 2.5 37.5 46.5 na na na 
72 lPFT Discharge Duct R&R 0 0.5 2 6.5 9 26 10 0 36 45 na na na 
73 lPFT Drive Duct R&R 0 0.5 2 6.5 9 25 10 0 35 44 na na na 
74 LPFTP R&R 0 0.5 2 6.5 9 53.5 29 11.5 94 103 na na na 
75 lPOD R&R 0 0.5 2 6.5 9 57.25 26.25 4 87.5 96.5 na na na 
76 lPOTP R&R 0 0.5 2 6.5 9 52.5 28.5 13 94 103 na na na 
77 Main Il1jector Assembly R&R 0 0.5 2 6.5 9 4 4 8.5 16.5 25.5 1 1 1 
78 Mee Assemblv R&R a 0.5 2 6.5 9 4 4 8.5 16.5 25.5 1 1 1 
79 MeC Roughness Repair a 0.5 2 4.5 7 4 4 6.5 14.5 21.5 1 1 1 
80 Miscellaneous Hardware Conlig. MR Repair 0.5 0.5 12 12.5 25.5 2 2 0 4 29.5 1 1 0 
81 Miscellaneous Hardware Config. Repair 0 0.5 2 4.5 7 2.5 2.5 0 5 12 1 1 0 
82 Miscellaneous Hardware Damage MR Repair 0.5 0.5 12 12.5 25.5 2 2 0 4 29.5 1 1 0 
83 Miscellaneous Hardware Dam~ge RB]l3ir 0 0.5 2 4.5 7 2.5 2.5 0 5 12 1 1 0 
84 Miscellaneous Hardware R&R 0 0.5 2 6.5 9 6 6 0 12 21 1 1 0 
85 MOVA R&R: Pad 0 0.5 2 6.5 9 79.5 50.25 62.75 192.5 201.5 na na na 
86 MOVA R&R: Shop 0 0.5 2 6.5 9 29.25 18.75 3.5 51.5 60.5 na na na 
87 Nozzle FRI R&R 0 0.5 2 6.5 9 221.5 119.25 54 394.75 403.75 na na na 
88 Nozzle R&R: Post-Testing 0 0.5 2 6.5 9 245 133.75 65 443.75 452.75 na na na 
89 Nozzle R&R: Pre-Testing 0 0.5 2 6.5 9 213.5 111.25 54 378.75 387.75 na na na 
90 Nozzle TPS MR Repair 0.5 0.5 12 12.5 25.5 5.5 5.5 0 11 36.5 1 1 0 
91 Nozzle TPS R&R 0 0.5 2 6.5 9 8 8 0 16 25 1 1 0 
92 Nozzle TPS ReDair 0 0.5 2 4.5 7 4 4 0 8 15 1 1 0 
93 Nozzle Tube leak MR AccepVWaiver 0 0.5 12 0.5 13 0 0 0 0 13 0 0 0 
94 Nozzle Tube leak MR Repair 0.5 0.5 12 12.5 25.5 7.5 7.5 24.5 39.5 65 1 1 1 
95 OPB Oxidizer Supply Duct R&R 0 0.5 2: 6.5 9 6 4 0 10 19 na na na 
96 Orifice R&R 0 0.5 2 6.5 9 2 2 0 4 13 1 1 0 
97 PCA Assembly R&R 0 0.5 2 6.5 9 12 12 0 24 33 1 1 0 
98 POgo Baffle R&R 0 0.5 2 6.5 9 51.25 24.25 4 79.5 88.5 na na na 
99 Powerhead Assemblv R&R 0 0.5 2: 6.5 9 4 4 8.5 16.5 25.5 1 1 1 
100 Reouirement/Documentation Channe 0 0.5 12 0.5 13 0 0 0 0 13 0 0 0 
101 RIV Assemblv R&R 0 0.5 2 6.5 9 6.75 6.75 0 13.5 22.5 na na na 
102 Seal R&R 0 0.5 2 6.5 9 1 1 0 2 11 1 1 0 
103 Sensor AcceDt 0 0.5 5 0.5 6 0 0 a a 6 0 0 0 
104 Sensor Mount R&R 0 0.5 2 6.5 9 1 1 0 2 11 1 1 0 
105 Sensor M R Accept 0.5 0.5 12 0.5 13.5 0 0 0 0 13.5 0 0 0 




ID SSME PR Classification 
107 Sensor R&R: Pre-Checkouts 
108 Sensor Reoalr 
109 StudIBolt R&R 
110 Surface Corrosion MR Repair 
111 Surface Corrosion Reoalr 
112 Surface Discoloration MR Repair 
113 Surface Discoloration Repair 
114 Threads Damage Repair 
115 TVCA Pin R&R 
116 Valve Actuator R&R: Pad Post-Testino 
117 Valve Actuator R&R: Pad Pre-Testina 
118 Valve Actuator R&R: Shop Pre-Testina 
119 Valve R&R: Pad 
120 Valve R&R: Shop Post-Testing 
121 Valve R&R: Shop Pre-Testing 
122 HPFTP R&R: Post-R&R 
...ill. " HPOTP R&R: Post-R&R 
Table 18. SSME unscheduled processing summary (Continued). 
Tech QC Engr Engr Total Tech Engr Base Base Base Base QC Perf 
Parf Perf Diag Admin Base Perf MHrs Perf 
MHrs MHrs MHrs MHrs MHrs MHrs MHrs 
0 0.5 2 6.5 9 1 1 0 
0 0.5 2 4.5 7 2.5 2.5 0 
0 0.5 2 6.5 9 3 3 0 
0.5 0.5 12 12.5 25.5 3.5 3.5 0 
0 0.5 2 4.5 7 4 4 0 
0.5 0.5 12 12.5 25.5 3.5 3.5 0 
0 0.5 2 4.5 7 4 4 0 
0 0.5 2 4.5 7 3 3 0 
0 0.5 2 6.5 9 5 5 0 
0 0.5 2 6.5 9 99.5 63 74 
0 0.5 2 6.5 9 49.25 31.5 14.75 
0 0.5 2 6.5 9 49.25 31.5 14.75 
0 0.5 2 6.5 9 127.75 80.25 93.5 
0 0.5 2 6.5 9 127.75 80.25 93.5 
0 0.5 2 6.5 9 77.5 48.75 18.25 
0 0.5 2 6.5 9 197 122.75 56 
0 0.5 2 6.5 9 239.5 142.25 53.25 
Total Total No. No. No. Perf MHrs Techs QCs Engrs MHrs 
2 11 1 1 "' 0 
5 12 1 1 ...• 0 
6 15 1 1 0 
7 32.5 1 1 0 
8 15 1 1 0 
7 32.5 1 1 0 
8 15 1 1 0 
6 13 1 1 0 
10 19 1 1 0 
236.5 245.5 na na na 
95.5 104.5 na na na 
95.5 104.5 na na na "" 
301.5 310.5 na na na 
301.5 310.5 na na na -~- . 
144.5 153.5 na na na 
375.75 384.75 na na na 




Table 19. Example of detailed data for unscheduled processing. 
10 Task Name Duration Work Predecessors Resource Names 
1 LPFTP Removal and RepiacementJV5E241 l 37.5h, 94h! , 
2~~~~~~~~!~~~~~~}\~~~:~!~T!~~~'~""'::~~,,'~~"~'=,,,,~'~~~~~=~=~~'~=''':~~'~~'''''''.~~'~~"''~:~''~=''T~~''~'~''''~~~·''""'] w'.'w""6h"""':,,~,,"'r"'~··w' .. "","'~",w"'~,,I"'~"",~".",",'","'"",,,~,w,w,~., 
Tech,QC 3oc.", ... , .. ~~r~tyf~~~~I,~~,~."w., ..... ,.,w,.~ww. ,~ .. """ .. ",."", ..... , .. ",L,."..?~. . .. L.. 4h 
4 Perform LPFTP Receiving Inspection l 1 h ! 2h; ,Tech,QC 
=, ..... ,,.,..,,... ....... ,,..""'·,~,'w.w· ... ..-,,wA.-.w.· ....... w.·.M==y.w,..w.w>.Wh"'WA·_· . ..,...'NN."""'''",.·.·.w=w.W.W.·N.V''"W.M ........ "''· ...... '".·.~ ...... '" ... ,· ...... ''"=''w.''' ....... w.' ........ ~ ........... ' .. w ... ' ....... "'" ... :'t ....... w ........... ·.·.···N.W ..... " "" , .... " ...... ' ........ 1.. . ......... ,,,. ...................... ""'.,, ............... ········"··· ............ 3 ...... '"-'.· ............... """'""" .. ···· ........... ······· ..... ··· ......... ,,...,. ........... N.W"""" .......... "' .... ..,.·.·.·.· ..... ..,. .... ,· ....... ·.·.w.w ....... • • .,..W ... " ....... M ............ · ....... ""'-........ ,·.· ................ ,, .......... w.·.W ...... ·m·'· 
..... ~.~.,,~'''.+ .. 
5 LPFTP Removal Prepsl ; 20.5h I 25.5h, , 
: ~;!f~~~~~=~~~~~l~-==~!_o~=J~±~:E~~ 
9 Support LPFD l O.Sh i 0.5h • . . 8 Tech 
",.,.".",,,,,,,,,j, 
10 Disconnect LPFT Drive Duct @ Joint F8 l 3h : 3h 1 9 Tech 11 ""·~ .. """·'Support'LPFT'Drive·DI;Ct~··'M"-'M ... '.""ww'''''''''M''~--'''''''''"'' .. ''w'''.'''' .. ' ''.' .. wt'''~''O:5h·''··········1· .. ····,·····,······,········O:Sh'······,·,,··'·""··r' , "''''''''''''10''''''''_''''''''M';'''''''''''''''''''''"''~'TeCh'''''~''''''' ... ',w""" •. 
t-_1.,-:2:----I.~~:'~,:=~~~".QI~~~~~!~I1~PF"'_·i'~~E~~ar9,~~~:~!i~2,i~~::~,~~:~~:,:·~"~~~:~"'""~::,,"::~~:::~:~~~~:.:~:==:t~~~~,"""" .. 3;;" .. ""'· ...... ·['~"' .. '''''':·'::":~'3:h:::,:'::"~:,,:~~':':~:~[::,:::=,::,:::=:i3:::::,:::::::"~:,:::::::"",,T,:,::':=''':::''':,,:::::::=:::!.~~~::=:::::~,=:,,=,,=] 
13 Support LPFT Discharge Duct ! 0.5h i 0.5h ! 12 ' Tech 
""· .. "~y ...... w.·"' ..... "".""''' ................... <-,-rr. ...... ....,.,,....,.....,.,,,·"·~''' ...... y.w.· ..... ,~~w.w.~.~ .. "''''' ........ ,-'"'w ... , .. ".y.·.w'"'' .... ".Y.· •• ~· ........ '"'"' .... ,., ••• w. ... ,.,., .... M •..• w ....... ~".y ....... }.' ........ '.='_ .. ''' .... w ...... '' ••••• ,.... .. ••••••• , ................ ' .................. ' ............ " ••• -.w •••• y ..... ~<<o •••• ~ ••••• y ........ '" ........ ' ...... " •.. ~., ........ w," .... "' ........ w. __ .. < ..... 'w ........ "' .... "., 
14 .. "'" .... ,,'''"'''p,~.~~!~~D,~~cto,~~,,!J::~!:I"Spe~,qIl~D~~,~£~!:~,gi,nt ~!,:!,~"' .... w .. ''''_''''ww .... "l.'''' .. ww,."'1~''' .. ~" .... +'''''w"",!h.,,,,,,,.,o,, ... L ... ,,",",, ... ,, ... ,!,~, .. ~,,~,,",,,.,,,,j,, .. ,,,"W"'~,"'"'"'~~~ 
15 M"No"w'w,_,~~;!~lI H~~~~:~~~~"g~", ... , .. ,~~" .. w~." ......... _~, ..... m.~~ ...... m ..  "'"'..... ~'"'"'~ .......... "." .. o,·1 .. ~·" ... ' .. m.~! ... ~ ......... " .... ·."·.·L, .. ,,,,~,· .. "m.".~ ... ~ ...... ",_ .. ............. '""J, ........... """'" .... , ......... ""'"'~ ... ~ .... w •.. " ..... , .. "''"' .. , .. "J.'''~''w'' .. ''' ... "' .... '''.w~.E~,:~o"", .... ,~ ..... ""~ .. ,." .... 1 
16 Reference Check Joints F2, F8 and F9 ( 5h ; 10h l 15 ' Tech,QC 
................ ........... .............. j...... . ............ \..,j ...... " .......... , ................... , ...... j ................................. , ..... . 
17 Horizontal Handler Removal Preps l 0.5h: 0.5h i 16 ' Tech 
20 Connect J-Hook to Handler Sling i 1h : 6h i 19 : Tech[3],QC,Safety,Engr 
21 ""~~::~'"··:=:~~~:~~~~ijp·t2,£!~~~:,:::=,=:,,·:::,==~ .. ~,,::=~=:~:=,:::=:::::~~:===:=~,=:,,~.,~:~.o,,":,,==:t,::"''':":"j~:'':''~,=]:,:~ .. ,, .. :'. 6~ .... ""'"=,::I:""'"'ww'''=,:,::~?==:,:~::::,,,,,:=::I==:=~i~:~~I~I~~,~~~!~~;~~i~~,~"" .. 
22 Install LPFTPinto Shipping Container I 5h . 10h ; 21 : Tech,QC 23':~~~!~j~~~~Ti~!~,~I,~~,:'"=,:,,~,,~=:~~~""==,,,'~:,,=: .. ',,~''"~.''o_' .. ~-'o,,~~~,,~~,t''w'22~~' .. '·:,,''· ·'~1'3:5h""o~":=,,t·' .. "M'W' .. ~w· .. '2r'·w"""'''''' .. '':''''''''''"''"'"W"~O'WN, .... ~".m~"o,,",,,~,, 
24 Establish Safety Clears for LPFTP Installation 1 0.25h! 1.5h l 
25 '=,::=::~""'~~~~~~ct·~:~??k't~,,~andie~~~~~~:,,:'::::=:==:.:,:~=~: .. ::~:~:"'".:,,:::=.~:~=:::~:===,=~:=::.t",","",,,!h,,,,,,,,,,,.w.l .... "'''"~,~ ... '''''''.j:~=w~:~,,~~ 
26 Install LPFTP onto Engine l 1 h i 6h ; 25 
".,,, ... !~c,~[~):~~,~~~f,~ty~~!1~, ... 
"wM!~~Eh~~~~.~!~ty'.~~:'m~M' 
.• '''w .. !.~~~I~'!~~9,~,~,~,t.~ty~,~~.y!,"",,~ 27~",,::~:r'.¥.!~~e.c~~~~T':,,:,::=~:~~'::,,== .. """=~" .. ,,'~~~:""" .. '":,,:~,,~~,,',,":~""~:~",,~",,"""~,,~:",,:"1··':.,,,,3~~~'~"'r 24.5h':',:"r'···""'''''''23 ..................j 
28 Torque and Stretch Joint F9 2h i 4h 1 Tech,QC 
~~~~~~w~~_~~~.~~~~~~,,~~~~~~_.~" _,_~_ ""'~,._~"'''~.''_~~O~M' __ ''"''~_~"''_ .. , __ ,~_, 
29 Torque and Stretch Joint F8 ~ 2h ! 4h ! 28 : Tech,QC 
30=,,~,,=~~~,,!.~~~~~~~~:~t.~i~hJ~~n.!~¥.~,,',,:~~,,':~",,"""~~' .. ::""='·'~~"""'"=~'"'"=~~~~'='"""·~"=,,,,:r',,,,,,,,,,:,,,'2F'~:~:""]""~,,',,~h,,,,'·~~':'~~'J':'·:=',,,,',,"·:~~~::,,'"'"=':~~"I"',,'::~,,,,~:,,'f~~~,~£=:"" .. ',,""·:~,,J Install LPFTP Speed Transducer@ Joint F1.1 \ 1h ' 2h ~ 30 : Tech,QC 
=~~==.:~~~~~,~E~:~!~~~~~~~~~!~!§!~:~!~~_'"' ... ,=,:::,~,~ ,:,:~'~:,::".w .. "."'"=~'~':N:."']~"W.N~".=.,~~::.""",~,~''''''.:,::'''''''J'"''''':.~~ .. '"''M' ....... ,:::l~N,,''w'w·E~~:;~~.:::.:,:=.: .. w'w, 
Secure LPFTP Drain Line @ JOint 017 1 0.5h 1 1 h j 32 : Tech,QC 
34 "''''''v'.~w''".w·'·Pertorm''['PFTI;''forQue'Che·ck'''''''''"M .. '''"A''~'',~""''''''A'''''''''''V.·'''.wmA'''·_·.··A'·A'·'''''W,·"''''''"w.''''"_·,,""T""w",,,,,, 1.5h , .. , .. "."~.,, .. '4':Sh ........ , ""'''''''T'''''''''''' '"'''''''''''''''''3'3''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''-;''''' ··'"'''''''~''''''fech:(iC'~En''g''i''''''''··''''''·A''''W''' 
:: ':':~,,: .. ::~,~~~~~i:~~i~i~@"~L~~~~~~~1,i~!~~,,~~:~,~~,~i~~i~~~~",==:::,,=,,==~,::,."""+,o,,"::::,§~~~:"".::,i",+~o""'"'·':'=~l''' .... ~~%j,"" .... '''''~,_''' .. ''''''''"w"w"r.egR~;~"'W''''",w,,wl 
APPENDIX D-Pertinent SSME Results From Analysis of Data Collected 
Figures 25-28 present examples of the fidelity of results supported by the data collected. These 
results, of course, apply to SSME processing and are subject to the assumptions, ground rules, and constraints 
described in section 5. 
OPF Rollout Preps 
(71 man-hr) 1 
Interface Verification 
VAS Operations 
(54 man-hr) 0% 
(307 man-hr) 3%,-----.:~ 
Shop FRT's & -......,~dlnE:E:l:anHt!!! Leak Checks 
(1,271 man-hr) 11 % 
*Based upon three-engine processing 
HPTP R&R 
(3,624 man-hr) 34% 
OPF Rollin 
Operations 
(343 man-hr) 3% I SSME Inspections (OPF) t 492 man-hr) 4% 
Heat Shield R&R 
(1,335 man-hr) 12% 
SSME R&R 
(1,189 man-hr) 11% 


































































*Based upon three-engine processing 
Figure 26. Scheduled 55MB manhours by process type. * 
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APPENDIX E-Reliability of Engine Sets With Engine Out Capability 
The reliability estimates of future launch vehicles can be further refined upon receipt of more 
accurate estimates of engine reliability, catastrophic failure probabilities, coverage time, and trajectory 
requirements. This is a discussion of the effect of engine out <;:apability and time of engine out on the 
reliability of aerospace vehicles. This study looks at sample data, sets out basic formulas, and presents 
results related to the issue of engine out. For the purpose of this study, only engine data will be considered. 
Upstream component reliabilities such as tanks, feed systems, power systems, etc. will be omitted. 
Certain definitions are important to this discussion. Engine failure is failure to provide the level of 
thrust desired at the time desired. Catastrophic failure in an engine is a failure that results in a failure of a 
second engine in an engine set. Benign failure is the proportion of failures where failure does not result in 
catastrophic failure. Time of engine out refers to the time at which an engine can be shut down and the 
remaining engines will still provide the necessary thrust to achieve the desired orbit. Time of engine out 
refers to a known event. 
Engine out capability is generally believed to provide increased overall engine set reliability. For 
example, using a binomial distribution27,28 to analyze the example of three engines with one engine out at 
launch is as follows: 
R = pn + npn-l(l-p); where R is the engine set reliability, p the engine reliablity, and n the number 
of engines with one engine out capability. 
A comparison between a two-engine set with no engine out capability and a three-engine set with 
one engine out capability is presented in table 20. 
Table 20. Engine out capability comparison. 
Engine Two Engines! Three Engines! 
Reliability No Out One Out (N) (R=p2J (N) 
0.95 0.903 0.993 
0.97 0.941 0.997 
0.99 0.98 0.9997 
0.999 0.998 0.999997 
With a baseline engine reliability at the above values, there is a significant gain displayed by a 
three-engine set with one engine out as opposed to the two-engine set with no engine out capability. The 
gain diminishes as the engine reliability improves. 
77 
This analysis is now expanded. The cases need to be examined where catastrophic failure fraction 
and coverage times are varied. The formula that incorporates time of engine out and benign failure fraction 
is:29 
The parameters in the formula are: 
R = Engine reliability 
REO = Engine set reliability 
S = Startup reliability 
T d = Throttle-down reliability 
Tu = Throttle-up reliability 
b = Benign failure fraction 
c = Coverage 
n = Number of engines. 
For the following analysis, the formula will be simplified by setting both the throttle reliability and 
and startup reliability to 1. It is assumed, in this case, that throttling is accomplished within design margins 
and that startup reliability is ensured by some event such as holddown, both reasonable assumptions. 
One study of the SSME30 has suggested that such a catastrophic failure could occur in the main 
engines approximately 17 percent of the time (benign failure fraction of 83 percent). This is derived data 
based on a small amount of data-almost all main engine tests have occurred singly and the study concluded 
that only 3 of 17 failures could have resulted in a second engine failure. This conclusion was generated 
based on the incidence of explosions and test stand damage that occurred. The small amount of data, 
typical in the aerospace industry, makes it difficult to draw defInitive conclusions or to use confIdence 
intervals. 
Another factor to be considered in overall engine set reliability is the time of engine out. If all three 
engines are needed for 100 sec of flight and then only two are necessary to obtain orbit, this time of engine 
out translates to an increased reliability for the engine system. 
With example engine reliability, table 21 can be generated. Two conclusions can be drawn. First the 
probability of catastrophic failure rather quickly degrades the increase of reliability gained due to engine 
out capability. From table 21, at 0.97 reliability and engine out at time 0, a catastrophic failure probability 
increase from 0.1 to 0.25 results in a decline in reliability from 0.9889 to 0.9762 for the three-engine case. 
Still, this is considerably higher than the two-engine, no out case reliability of 0.941. 
Second, it is evident that reliability can be gained if some engine out time is possible. For example, 
if engine out is possible for two-thirds of the flight (0.97 engine reliability and 0.2 catastrophic failure 
factor), then the reliability goes from 0.913 to 0.9578-a significant gain. Note that the engine reliability at 
1= 1 for all catastrophic failure factor values is equal to the n engines/no out capability since this is equivalent 
to all engines being necessary for the full-duration flight. 
78 
Table 21. Engine out and time of engine out comparison. 
Engine Catastrophic Engine Out Three Enginesl 
Reliability Failure Probability Time One Out Reliability 
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